

Lucknow University Studies in Political Science.

FORCES IN MODERN POLITICS.

[NATIONALISM, IMPERIALISM, AND
INTERNATIONALISM.]

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PUBLISHERS' NOTE.

The Publishers feel justifiable pride in presenting to the student of Political Science this small but weighty volume from the pen of Dr. E. Asirvatham of the Political Science Department of the Lucknow University. The learned author does not stand in need of introduction, as his previous comprehensive volume on Political Theory (Vol. I of 'Political Theory and Modern Governments' published by us in 1935) has received enthusiastic praise from both academicians and practical politicians from distinguished quarters. In the present volume he has maintained the lucidity of style, the comprehensiveness of treatment, the trait of clear thinking, and the impartiality of an academician which were the main characteristics of his earlier production. In this work he has discussed from every possible point of view, the main forces in modern politics, viz., nationalism, imperialism, and internationalism and has given his own views wherever they were needed to clarify the issue. The author has promised another volume which we may soon have the privilege of publishing.

DEDICATED
TO
My Father and Mother

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CHAPTER I

Nationalism.

1. Definition of Terms:—Writers on political science are not all agreed on the precise meaning of such terms as 'nation,' 'nationality,' and 'nationalism.' Not infrequently in current literature the terms 'nation' and 'nationality' are used interchangeably. The word 'nation' is derived from the Latin word *Natio* which means 'birth' or 'race.' This does not mean, however, that nationalism and racialism are identical conceptions in our present-day world. The term 'nation' was used in the seventeenth century to describe the population of a State, irrespective of its racial unity, and this meaning, says Bernard Joseph, has in a large measure persisted up to this day. After the Partition of Poland in 1772 and during the French Revolution, the term 'nation' came into great popularity and was used to mean 'patriotism.' "Nationality was at this period a collective sentiment."*

From the beginning of the nineteenth century the terms 'nation' and 'nationality' have assumed quite definite meanings. The term 'nation' conveys the idea of political independence or sovereignty (either actually attained or desired), while 'nationality' is largely a non-political concept and can exist even under foreign

* B. Joseph: *Nationality*, p. 20

domination. Nationality is primarily a psychological quality, although it is often used to convey an ethnical and cultural conception as well. Bluntschli used the term 'nationality' to designate "a union of masses of men of different occupations and social strata of hereditary society, of common spirit, feeling and race bound together especially by language and customs in a common civilisation which gives them a sense of unity and distinction from all foreigners quite apart from the bond of the State." †

Interpreted in this manner, a 'nation' and 'nationality' are not identical conceptions. A nation, meaning the population of a self-governing State, may very well include several nationalities. Thus, while Great Britain is a single nation it consists of three distinct nationalities—the English, Scots, and Welsh. As soon as a nationality acquires political unity and sovereign independence, it becomes a nation. According to Lord Bryce, "The sentiment of nationality is that feeling or group of feelings which makes an aggregate of men conscious of ties, not being wholly either political or religious, which unite them in a community which is, either actually or potentially, a Nation." *

The term 'national group' is used to designate a community in which nationality is still in the making and the 'will to live' as a nation is still lacking. An example of such a group is found in the Arabs of to-day.

† The Theory of the State, p. 90.

* J. Bryce: International Relations, p. 118.

The term 'people,' says B. Joseph, carries with it the notion of a civilisation, while the word 'nation' is primarily a political concept. " 'People' is the broader and more comprehensive term."† Just as a 'nation' may include several nationalities, so a 'people' may include several nations. Thus the people of Norway and Sweden form one people—the Scandinavian people—although they belong to two distinct nations. Likewise, the 'German People' includes many more than those who belong to the German nation.

The terms 'nation' and 'State' do not mean the same thing. B. Joseph writes: " 'Nation' refers to an agglomeration of individuals, and 'State' to an organised entity which functions as such independently of the nation or nationalities which constitute its membership."‡

Another pair of terms which is used loosely is 'nationality' and 'citizenship.' A person's citizenship, in common parlance, is referred to as his 'nationality.' This is a mistake. "The fundamental difference between nationality and citizenship is that nationality is subjective whilst citizenship is objective. Nationality relates to a condition of the mind or feelings or mode of life; whilst citizenship is a political status."*

But the terms which are confused the most are 'nationality' and 'nationalism.' 'Nationalism' is at times used to describe an exaggerated sentiment of nationality bordering on aggressiveness. This perverted sentiment

† B. Joseph: op. cit., p. 26.

‡ " " pp. 26-27.

* B. Joseph: op. cit., p. 27.

which sees nothing but good in one's own nation and its deeds is not true nationalism. Rightly understood, nationalism stands for the historical process by which nationalities are transformed into political units. It stands for the legitimate right of a people who form a distinct and vigorous nation or nationality to a place in the sun. B. Joseph holds that the sentiment which forms the basis of nationality should be called the sentiment of nationality and not nationalism.

II. The Meaning of Nationality.—Thinkers are generally agreed to-day that nationality is essentially a psychological disposition, a condition of mind or a sentiment. But it is a sentiment, not sentimentalism. It is rooted in such factors as race, country, language, religion, culture, and tradition. Like other subjective terms, the term 'nationality' is incapable of exact definition. It is vague and elusive A. E. Zimmern writes: "Nationality, like religion, is subjective; psychological; a condition of mind; a spiritual possession; a way of feeling, thinking and living."† Its core is "group consciousness, the love of the community, great or small, to which we belong."‡ Nationality stands for a feeling of corporate unity. It cannot be manufactured by artificial means. It is the resolve of a group of human beings to share their fortunes, a determination to go through thick and thin together. It is a "form of corporate sentiment."§

† A. E. Zimmern : *Nationality and Government*, p. 51.

‡ G. P. Gooch : *Nationalism*, p. 5.

§ A. E. Zimmern : *op. cit.*, p. 52.

Zimmern means by nationality "a body of people united by a corporate sentiment of peculiar intensity, intimacy and dignity, related to a definite home-country." * According to the same writer, nationality is not a political but an educational conception. Broadly speaking, it may be said that if a people feels itself to be a nationality, it is a nationality. "Nationality is not a political question at all. It is only *accidentally* a political question. It is primarily and essentially a spiritual question, and, in particular, an *educational* question. It is bound up with the question of corporate life, corporate growth, and corporate self-respect." "Nationality is not a political creed for oppressed peoples." It "is more than a creed or a doctrine or a code of conduct, it is an instinctive attachment."

J. H. Rose says: nationality "is an instinct, and cannot be exactly defined; it is the recognition as kinsmen of those who were deemed strangers; it is the apotheosis of family feeling, and begets a resolve never again to separate; it leads to the founding of a polity on a natural basis, independent of a monarch or a State, though not in any sense hostile to them; it is more than a political contract; it is a union of hearts, once made, never unmade."

Bringing out the difference between a 'national State' and 'nationality,' C. J. H. Hayes writes: "A 'national State is always based on nationality, but a nationality may exist without a national state. A state

* Nationality & Government: Ibid.

is essentially political; a nationality is primarily cultural and only incidentally political."†

III. Factors of Nationality.—If nationality is a subjective conception, are there not any objective tests that we can apply to it? What are the conditions which a people should be required to fulfil before they can be entitled to the status of nationality? An answer to these questions calls for a discussion of the factors of nationality to which we now turn.

In discussing these factors, it must be borne in mind that a nationality can exist without some of them, but no nationality can exist without any of them. Besides, the importance of these factors is not the same everywhere or at all times. It varies according to time and place. Thus, religion may be a very important factor in the building up of nationality in one place, and yet be insignificant in another.

1. *Geographical unity.*—There can be no doubt that a naturally defined territory or geographical unity, often described by the name 'homeland', is a powerful tie in the formation and continuance of nationality. Several exceptions to this statement may be found in the history of the world. The city-states of ancient Greece did not possess a naturally defined area. The boundary between France and Germany to-day is artificial. The Jews have had no home of their own for centuries. Yet no one will deny to them the status of nationality. Though scattered over different parts of the world, the

† C. J. H. Hayes: *Essays on Nationalism*, p. 5.

hope that some day Palestine will be restored to them, has been a powerful stimulus in keeping Jewish nationality alive.

Where there is no national home or no hope of securing one, it is difficult to acquire or develop the spirit of nationality. The gypsies have no home of their own and do not constitute a nationality. The Roman people, in exchanging their homeland for a world empire, lost their nationality. Natural boundaries do play a very significant part. Geography is a potent factor in the history of nationalities. Attempt to deprive a people of any portion of its territory always results in war. B. Joseph holds that the chance of survival of a national group is in direct ratio to its control and possession of its homeland.

A naturally defined territory is of great importance in the moulding of nationalities for several reasons : (a) Geography and climate have a direct bearing on the character and physique of the people, although their influence can be altered within limits by man's intelligence and other kindred forces. Geography and climate tend to create common physical, mental, and psychological traits, which facilitate the development of a spirit of unity and keen sympathy among people living under the same environmental conditions. It has been discovered that even the head shape of immigrants in America undergoes a change in the course of a generation or two. (b) Human sympathies are limited. It is easier for an inhabitant of India, for instance, vividly to imagine the feelings of a person

living near him than of a person living in Labrador or Greenland. As a general rule, the sympathies of "the citizen of the world" are not very deep. They are watered down. It is often the man who does not have much love for his neighbours and who cannot get on with them who speaks of being a citizen of the world.

(c) Human beings share with animals a love of their habitat. There is an instinctive attachment on the part of every man for the place where he was born and brought up. This love of the habitat is particularly noticeable when a person returns to his homeland after a long absence in foreign countries.* When he returns every familiar scene takes on a peculiar hue and appears strangely new and charming. This love of the habitat partly accounts for the fact that, however much people may quarrel as next-door neighbours in their own country, they are often knit together into a close fellowship on foreign soil. The love of one's country is intensified during exile. The ancient Israelites, during a period of captivity in a foreign land, gave expression to this sentiment in the passionate cry of one of their Psalmists: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand forget its cunning."

* In the well-known words of Sir Walter Scott:—

"Breathes there the man with soul so dead

Who never to himself hath said:

"This is my own, my native land?"

As home his footsteps he hath turned

Whose heart hath ne'er within himself burned,

From wandering on a foreign strand?

If such there breathe, go mark him well."

If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth ; if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy." †

In estimating the importance of the homeland to nationality, Mazzini, the spiritual father of modern nationalism, writes: "Our country is our home, the house that God has given us, placing therein a numerous family that loves us and whom we love ; a family with whom we sympathise more readily, and whom we understand more quickly than we do others ; and which from its being centered round a given spot, and from the homogeneous nature of its elements is adapted to a special branch of activity.

"Our country is our common workshop whence the product of our activity is sent forth for the benefit of the whole world, wherein the implements and tools of labour we can most usefully employ are gathered together." ‡

While the existence of a naturally defined territory is valuable in the formation of nationalities, its importance must not be pressed too far. Attempts to divide the area of the world strictly according to nationality lead to chronic strife and warfare. Where other factors of nationality are strong, the importance of a naturally defined area need not be much emphasised. Prof. Hayes, in criticising the view that geography makes nationality, asserts that the idea of natural frontiers between nationalities is a myth.

† Psalm 137, 5 & 6.

‡ Mazzini : *Life and Writings*, volume IV, p. 276.

2. *Identity of racial type or racial unity.* Common racial origin, either real or assumed, has been an important factor in the moulding of nationality. Some writers emphasise its importance more than others. A. E. Zimmera says that nationality implies "a particular kind of corporate self-consciousness, peculiarly intimate, yet invested at the same time with a peculiar dignity, and corporate self-consciousness in which the element of common race is perhaps the most important factor" Bryce believes that race is one of the elements which constitute national sentiment. Mazzini, on the other hand, holds that race is not essential to nationality. Renan is of opinion that "a race is something which makes and unmakes itself and has no application to politics" Likewise, J. H. Rose writes: "only in a very crude form does nationality depend on race." In normal circumstances, nationality does not depend on race. Laveleye, the celebrated Belgian writer, observes: "In proportion as the culture of a people advances, identity of race and of blood exercises less power on it, and historic memories exercise more power." Several writers call attention to the fact that there is no pure race to-day anywhere in the world and that every modern nationality consists of racial mixture. "Purity", says Hayes, "if it exists at all, exists nowadays only among uncivilised tribesmen." Pillsbury writes: "In the determination of national lines in general race is no more important. There is no pure race in any nation. Man is everywhere a mongrel."

The weight of academic opinion thus seems to be on the side of those who give a relatively low place to race. Modern Switzerland and Canada are frequently quoted as examples of people of different racial origin living together and forming a strong nationality. For ourselves, we believe that racial unity, where obtainable, is a powerful tie of nationality, but is not indispensable to it. It is more important in the earlier stages of nationality than in the later. In the U. S. A. there is a great diversity of racial stock, but at the same time there is a dominant racial group, descended from the "Old Immigrants," which is able to give a tone to the national life of the country. The Negroes of this country, as well as those of South Africa, when they are able to assert themselves, will probably put a severe strain on the American and African nationalities respectively.

As a general rule, it may be said that a certain degree of racial homogeneity is helpful to nationality. There may be diversities of racial stock, but so long as these diversities are minor variations within broad racial divisions, there seems to be no serious difficulty. But it is hard to see how races of very diverse origin such as the Anglo-Saxons, the Chinese and the Negroes can constitute a single nationality so long as the present racial and social stratification is kept up between them. No nationality can long endure if there be sharply drawn cleavages between its racial elements. Even if people do not actually descend from the same racial stock, the unwarranted belief that they have

done so has often played an important part in forming and strengthening nationalities. Etymologically, as indicated earlier, the 'nation' means a people having a common ethnic origin. But this is not the primary meaning to-day.

Summing up the discussion on purity of race as an essential element of nationality, Garner writes: "Race is a physical phenomenon, whereas nationality is a complex phenomenon into which spiritual elements enter. To identify race and nation is (therefore) to subordinate moral conscience to organic life and to make the animalism which is in man the whole of humanity."* Race purity, it must be added, does not, in itself, mean superiority or inferiority.

If we turn to the history of the world, we find "no entire single race has ever formed one nationality." The Finns may be regarded as a single race, but belong to different nationalities. Every nationality in the modern world is composed of several races. Race and nationality are nowhere identical. "Nationality", says Joseph, "actually cuts through and across race." Some writers go so far as to hold that it is nationality which creates race and not race which creates nationality.

3. *Unity of ideas and ideals or a common culture.* If nationality is primarily a cultural conception, unity of ideas and ideals is indeed an important element in it. In making nationality rest upon cultural foundations, Hayes writes: "A nationality is any group of persons who speak a common language, a distinct cultural society

* J. W. Garner: *Political Science and Government*, p. 117.

in which, among other factors, religion and politics may have played important though not necessarily continuous roles."

Unity of culture includes common customs and manners, common traditions, literature, folklore and epics, and art. It also stands for "a certain dominant view of life with its common standards, duties and prohibitions." It is obvious that when people differ violently in their general outlook and attitude, it is difficult to create in them a national sentiment, unless they possess, at the same time, a high degree of tolerance and mutual forbearance. Community of ideas and ideals draws people close together and creates in them an *esprit de corps* which cannot be easily destroyed.

B. Joseph believes that national literature, education, culture, and art may be both, the cause and effect of nationality. While national literature does not, by itself, create nationality, it can strengthen the sentiment of nationality. In recent times, national literature has played a notable part in the rejuvenation of Bohemian and Serbian nationalities. To borrow the words of Joseph: "National literature makes a large contribution to the development of nationality by striving to create and maintain national traditions and by endearing the national history to the nationality. It is the vehicle of national traditions."* A further advantage of national literature is that it is an object of pride and reverence to the members of a nationality. Voltaire boasted that "Our language and literature have made more conquests than Charlemagne."

* B. Joseph: op. cit., p. 114.

What is true of national literature is also true of national education. It tends to create a similar outlook on life and sets up the same or similar standards. The danger of such education is that, when mishandled, it is liable to give rise to national prejudice and bigotry. But there is no necessary connection between nationalism and chauvinism. Rightly used, national education can become the best aid to the maintenance of national solidarity. It "serves the necessary purpose of creating a certain moral unity, a common understanding of right and wrong, a community of ideas in most matters, and social intercourse amongst all the members of a nationality."*

National literature and national education are a part of national culture. Where there is no common culture and civilisation, a people lack individuality. While there are elements of culture in the world which are universal in their scope, there are others which are the peculiar possession of a people knit together by common customs and common ways of thinking, feeling and living. Common ideality is decidedly a cohesive factor. When people think together they are prepared to act together, and when they act together they are prepared to go through thick and thin together. A cultural homogeneity is thus a valuable aid to nationality.

Under 'national culture' a special place should be given to national history and tradition. Ramsay Muir remarks: "Heroic achievements, agonies heroically endured, these are the sublime food by which the spirit

* B. Joseph: *op. cit.*, p. 118.

of nationhood is nourished." A legitimate pride in the past, a wholesome confidence in the present, and a buoyant hope for the future all strengthen and sustain the national spirit. Defining national tradition as "a prevalent view or recollection, or a custom or practice, of immemorial age which has become time-honoured and universally accepted in a particular people"*, B. Joseph shows how such national traditions as playing the game, pride in the navy, and even drinking tea can serve as the cementing factors of nationality. J. S. Mill says: "The strongest of all (factors) is the identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history; and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation; pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past." Hayes is of the same view when he holds that nationality is an attribute of human culture and civilisation and that the laws of zoology and botany are not applicable to it.

4. *Unity of Language*.—Much stress has been laid on common language as an important factor of nationality. Ramsay Muir believes that language "counts for more than race in the moulding of a nation." "Common language means also a common literature, a common inspiration of great ideas, a common heritage of songs and folktales." J. H. Rose considers common language as the most powerful political influence. B. Joseph observes that the most obvious element of nationality is language. "It is by language, more than by any other

* B. Joseph: op. cit., p. 102.

single distinguishing feature, that nationalities are identified.”*

The advantages of a common language are:

- (1) It enables a people to express the same ideas and same sentiments;
- (2) It tends to create common standards of morals, manners, literature, and justice;
- (3) It preserves common historical traditions;
- (4) It is the store-house of “successful achievements and distressing hardships shared in common”;
- (5) It is an aid to the unifying of a people and creating in them of a national psychology.

Notwithstanding these obvious advantages, we find that there are several nationalities to-day which do not possess unity of language. Thus, the people of Switzerland speak at least three distinct languages. The people of the United States do not all speak the same language, although English is the dominant language. The Jews have not known a common language for centuries, and yet no one would deny the existence of a Jewish nationality. On the basis of facts such as these, J. H. Rose advances the opinion that “probably, with the spread of education, language will play a smaller part than before.”

All this does not mean, however, that unity of language is of little consequence to a nationality. For every nationality which speaks more than one language, there are scores of nationalities which speak only one

*1. B. Joseph: *op. cit.*, p. 51.

language. A common language, as Joseph points out, cements the various elements of a nationality and rivets upon them an everlasting bond. Besides, "there is a natural and mutual attraction among persons who speak the same language."* In modern times the Polish people, more than others, have demonstrated the value of a common language in keeping alive the national spirit. Where there is a determination on the part of a people to hold together socially and culturally, unity of language is of great value. At the same time, if other factors of nationality are strong, it is possible to dispense with a common language. Thus, the German-speaking population of Alsace is attached more to France than to Germany. Likewise, in spite of the fact that the Americans and Canadians speak the same language and live next door to each other, there is no disposition on their part to fuse into a single nationality.

Unity of Religion: The history of nationalities shows clearly that religion has played an important part in the early stages. Early communal life centred round religious customs and practices. In the case of the Jews, for instance, religion has been the mainspring of their national life. It has given them such a distinctive quality that their nationality cannot long endure if a majority of them exchange their ancestral faith for some other faith, say Roman Catholicism. Religion is the warp and woof of their common life. Similar statements can be made of the Japanese, the Poles, and the Irish of to-day. During centuries of oppression by

* B. Joseph: op. cit., p. 61.

the Turks, it was the Greek Catholic Church which enabled the Greeks to persist as a people. Among other factors, John Knox and the Protestant Reformation played a notable role in the creation and continuation of Scottish nationality.

While common religion and religious institutions have contributed considerably to the national life of a people, it must be admitted that they are not as important to-day as they were in the past. They are even less important in the West than in the East. Most States to-day practise religious tolerance and, hence, diversity of faith does not interfere with their national life. The United States of America is the best example of a country into the national development of which religion has hardly entered. England has a State-recognised and State-supported church known as the Church of England. But there are at the same time millions of Roman Catholics and Dissenters who owe no allegiance to that Church. "Most modern nationalities," says Hayes, "manage to flourish without insisting upon uniformity of religious belief or practice." Common religion is no longer a factor of much consequence, although in a few exceptional cases, it is still the basis of national unity on account of peculiar historical antecedents. Although common religion is a factor of minor importance in the modern world, religion as a social organisation is still capable of playing an important part in the formation and strengthening of nationalities. It is a vital aid to unity of ideas and ideals and common sentiments.

6. *Common Economic Interests:* It is more than possible that one of the strongest factors in the maintenance of Japanese and Australian nationalities is the economic one. Living in a small country endowed with limited resources, the Japanese instinctively feel the necessity for colonial expansion and foreign trade. This economic motive, among other factors, undoubtedly welds the people together and creates in them "a consciousness of kind." Similarly, behind the "White Australian policy" there is the fear, real or imaginary, that Australia will be flooded by Mongolians who might imperil the economic life of the Australians, if the immigration bars are removed or lowered.

However important common economic interests may be in the holding of a people together, we do not believe that such interests alone are capable of creating the sentiment of nationality. The history of nationalities shows that the sentiment of nationality is frequently supremely indifferent to economic considerations. It does not count the cost. A people drunk with the spirit of nationality often throw their economic good to the winds in the name of national pride and prestige. If economic interests alone were enough to constitute a nationality, we should expect to find nationalities composed solely of labourers and nationalities composed solely of capitalists. During times of war one finds that the spirit of nationality cuts across economic distinctions and unites people with different economic interests. Renan is right when he says that community of economic interests makes a customs

union and not a nation.

7. *Common subjection to a firm and systematic government* is sometimes adduced as a factor of nationality. There is no doubt that the strong rule of Britain has to a certain extent precipitated Indian nationalism. In the same way, obedience to a single ruler has at other places fostered the national spirit. Witness, e. g., the high pitch to which nationalism, perhaps of a morbid kind, has been raised under the dictatorships of Mussolini and Hitler. However important a part a strong government may play in reference to nationality, it cannot by itself produce nationality. Ramsay Muir rightly observes: "Mere unity of government, however admirably wielded, will never of itself produce nationhood."

Another factor of nationality which is similar in nature to the above is *oppression*. History furnishes several examples of nationality being intensified under persecution. "In Europe," says Zimmern, "nationality is an instinct which has been stung into morbid and acute self-consciousness by political oppression."* After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the national spirit became acute in France. † Oppression by the Moors and later, the Napoleonic Wars, roused the sentiment of nationality

* A. E. Zimmern : op. cit., p. 74.

† A French periodical of the time wrote : "Bismarck has probably done better service to France than to Germany. He has worked for a false unity in his country, but very effectually for a regeneration of ours." (quoted by Joseph : op. cit., p. 154.)

among the Spaniards. The Partition of Poland quickened the national spirit and preserved it under the most adverse conditions. Similarly, Irish nationalism developed into an exaggerated and even undesirable form under English oppression. In spite of all these illustrations, as Joseph notes, "oppression of a group does not itself transform it into a nationality." ‡ It may split the people into several selfish communities, each trying to win the favour of the oppressor.

8. *Political Sovereignty* : It is sometimes argued that it is the State which creates the sentiment of nationality and not *vice versa*. This is a position which it is difficult to uphold. Despite the fact that Great Britain is under a single political sovereignty, it comprises three distinct nationalities, the English, the Scots, and the Welsh. In most cases, it is difficult to determine whether the concepts of State and nationality are related to each other as cause to effect or as effect to cause. A general remark which we may venture to make is that while nationalities have existed even before modern States assumed a permanent form, political sovereignty has contributed to the strengthening of growing nationalities. Laski advances the view that "Political allegiance does not explain anything. The history of the nineteenth century is largely the history of changes of allegiance effected in nationalist terms." Leaving aside such exceptional cases as Switzerland where, perhaps, a common political sovereignty has given birth to nationality, the most that

‡ B. Joseph : *op. cit.*, p. 151.

political sovereignty can do is to fortify existing national consciousness by means of common laws and political institutions. It cannot produce nationality as we have defined it.

9. *Popular will* : It has been said repeatedly that the sentiment of nationality is primarily psychological. If this be true, popular will is certainly an important factor of nationality. A people do not become a nationality until they have a will to co-operate. Nationality is an expression of the soul of a people. Toynbee regards "the will to be a nation" as the principal element of nationality. Likewise, Mazzini, the founder of nationalism in its pure form, regards popular will as the basis of nationality.

10. *Minor factors* mentioned by B. Joseph. Some believe that nationality is an instinct. It is an expression of the gregariousness of man and is based upon the willingness to submit to the majority. This is only a partial explanation.

Some hold that nationality is a question of historical accident. We consider this a superficial view. Others attribute nationality to the power of the press. This is equally superficial.

Lord Acton considers exile as the nursery of nationality. While this may explain such cases as the Jewish, Armenian, and Irish nationalities, it is by no means an universal explanation.

Others consider folk-songs, national holidays, common moral code, national symbols, such as the flag, national costume or dress, and national sovereign as

factors of nationality. While all these may contribute to the development of nationality, they are not indispensable to its existence.

After considering the various views of nationality discussed above, B. Joseph concludes that nationality is "a natural corporate sentiment which manifests itself in the members of a group in certain preferences and sympathies for things connected with the group." * From the point of view of this conception of nationality as a corporate sentiment, Joseph writes : "Nationality as a quality is the subjective corporate sentiment permanently present in and giving a sense of distinctive unity to the majority of the members of a particular civilised section of humanity, which at the same time objectively constitutes a distinct group by virtue of possessing certain collective attributes peculiar to it such as home-land, language, religion, history, culture or traditions. Nationality as a concrete designation denotes a group possessed of the quality of nationality as so defined." †

IV. *The Growth of Nationality: (a) In Europe:* While the sentiment of nationality can be traced back to ancient times, the idea of nationality is essentially modern. The nineteenth century in particular may be regarded as the period when nationalism reached its zenith in the West.

The dim origins of nationality are probably found in the herd-instinct of man, i.e., his gregariousness. At

* B. Joseph : op. cit., pp. 304-5.

† " " " " " 308-9

a very early time in human history, people lived together as clans and tribes. This early tribal life, often organised into a patriarchal society, meant common customs and manners, common religious practices, common language, and allegiance to a common superior. Here we find some of the factors of nationality, although as yet there was no conscious idea or even sentiment of nationality.

The Greeks who mark the beginning of an advanced type of political life in the West lived in cities. Their political life was municipal and not national. Greece did not exist as a political unit. It is doubtful whether it even existed as a geographical expression. The most that the Greeks possessed was local patriotism.

The Romans who came later differed from the Greeks in many ways. They possessed the gift of assimilation. They extended the civil rights to large sections of people within the Empire and achieved a political unity on the basis of metropolitan citizenship. Law and order were maintained throughout the Empire. Yet the Romans were not able to evolve a nationality. They only had a State. As B. Joseph remarks, "the elements combined within the Empire were too numerous, too diverse, too devoid of cultural homogeneity to be moulded into a single nationality."* The break-up of the Empire meant a return to the tribal stage of an earlier time. The homogeneity of the Empire did not survive.

* B. Joseph : op. cit., p. 168.

The Dark Ages and the early Middle Ages were not conducive to the development of nationality. They were troublous times, torn by a struggle for supremacy between the Pope and Emperor. Feudalism reigned supreme in Western Europe, and as long as it lasted the evolution of nationality was out of the question. Decentralisation was the order of the day. Petty political dynasties and principalities ruled everywhere. Latin was the language of the learned. It delayed the development of the vernacular. No pride of race or country had yet appeared. The thinkers of the day dreamt of universalism, a universal Church-State comprising the whole of western Europe. In these circumstances, it was difficult, if not impossible, for the national spirit to manifest itself.

As the Middle Ages advanced, conditions began to change. Dante in Italy and Chaucer in England used the mother tongue in literature, and, in so doing, gave an impetus to the sentiment of nationality. Although Dante gave a high place to the mother-tongue and ascribed a divine mission to his people in the economy of things, his prevailing thought was in the direction of universalism. The time was not yet ripe for Italian nationality. Machiavelli at the close of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern era stood forth as the first nationalist of the modern type. He placed Italian national unity above everything else. But even his work bore little fruit. It was not until the days of Mazzini and his followers in the nineteenth century that Italian nationality became an accomplished fact.

Conditions for the growth of nationality were more favourable in England, France, and Spain. The dawn of a truly English literature in the writings of Chaucer, Wycliffe, etc., coincided with the dawn of English nationality. The Hundred Years' War which was fought at this time brought into clear relief the nascent French and English nationalities. In France Joan of Arc embodied the national spirit and gave expression to the growing sentiment of her people in the memorable words: "As to the peace with the English, the only way possible is that they go back to their country in England." By her martyrdom she held aloft the idea that "every civilised nation, when thoroughly awakened to conscious life, must control its own destinies and will not long submit to be held down by another people."* The Spanish nationality, which was already born, received at this period a great stimulus from the Crusades. Although nationalism had an early start in England, France, and Spain, it did not enjoy an unhindered development. Religious and political disputes marred its growth.

The modern period, beginning with the Renaissance and the Reformation, started with conditions most favourable to the evolution of nationality. The Renaissance marked the beginning of new national cultures, and the Reformation marked the beginning of a national religion. They broke down the idea of a universal Church-State and paved the way for the modern nation State. National navies, too, came into being at this time.

*J. H. Rose: Nationality in Modern History.

While the Reformation movement stood on the whole for national princes and taught passive obedience to them, the cleavage it brought about between Catholics and Protestants led to innumerable religious wars and disputes. For a while, under Queen Elizabeth, England enjoyed national unity. But both before her time and all through the seventeenth century England was torn by religious and constitutional disputes. France and Germany, too, had their religious wars. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648), marking the close of the Thirty Years' War, gave for the first time, open recognition to the system of national States.

By the seventeenth century many of the European nationalities reached maturity—Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Spain, France, and Portugal. Italy and Germany took a longer time. The Partition of Poland in 1772, flagrantly violating the principles of nationality, raised the issue of nationality to a prominent place.

The next landmark in the development of European nationality is the French Revolution. It established "on a firm basis the method of organisation of society into nationalities."* It emphasised democratic nationalism. It inspired a love and devotion to the homeland unknown before. It introduced a system of national education and gave a new emphasis to such national emblems and symbols as the national anthem and the national flag. It "enunciated both the doctrine of popular sovereignty and the doctrine of national self-determi-

*B. Joseph: *op. cit.*, p. 178.

nation.”† As a result of it, France became a strong nationality and has remained such ever since. Its influence soon spread from France to other European countries and was accentuated by the Industrial Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Romanticism of the early nineteenth century.

It is interesting to note that side by side with the nationalistic spirit of the French Revolution, there prevailed in some of the European countries, especially in Germany, theories of cosmopolitanism and super-national humanitarianism, which received a rude shock at the hands of Napoleon. Prior to the Revolution, Goldsmith and Paine in England and Lessing in Germany gave expression to this cosmopolitan sentiment in striking words. Goldsmith confessed: “The whole world being only one city, I do not much care in which of its streets I happen to reside.” T. Paine declared: “The world is my country, mankind are my brothers.” Lessing wrote: “Love of country is at best but an heroic vice, which I am quite content to be without.”

This cosmopolitan humanitarianism continued in Germany up to the time of the Napoleonic conquests. Writing as Professor of History in 1789, Schiller said: “It is a poor and little aim to unite for one nation; a philosophic spirit cannot tolerate such limits, cannot bound its views to a form of human nature so arbitrary, fluctuating, accidental. The most powerful nation is but a fragment.....” Fichte gave utterance to the sentiment in the Lectures he delivered in 1804-5. In

† C. J. H. Hayes: *op. cit.*, p. 44,

these Lectures he spoke of the human race as one and was extremely indifferent to the claims of country and nationality. But the Napoleonic wars wrought a miraculous change in the attitude of both these thinkers. Fichte's patriotism which was fired by these wars proclaimed: "We desire to inspire in Germans a feeling of unity which may throb through all their limbs."

The nationalist fervour of Fichte was carried over into Hegel's theory of the State and there appeared in an exaggerated worship of the State. Later, Bismarck gave a practical shape to German nationalism in his policy of 'blood and iron,' which culminated in the annexation of Alsace Lorraine. A contemporary of Bismarck, Treitschke, set forth in 1861 the idea of a "nationally exclusive State." He prophesied that the peoples of the world would all form national States. In his thinking nationalism took the form of aggression and militarism. His teaching was that the State "only represents the nation from the point of view of power." He and his followers forgot that the nation is primarily a spiritual entity. The exaggerated nationalism of Treitschke has risen again in the teaching and practice of Hitler and his associates.

Italy also attained national unity in the nineteenth century. The father of Italian nationality was Mazzini, although Dante and Machiavelli and Cavour had blazed the trail before him. Mazzini was a high-souled individual and interpreted nationality as a spiritual principle. He wrote: "Nationality is sacred to me because I see in it the instrument of labour for the well-being and.

progress of all men." Elsewhere he said: "Every people has its special mission, which will co-operate towards the fulfilment of the general mission of humanity. That mission constitutes its nationality. Nationality is sacred." Mazzini realised that race was not indispensable to nationality. He laid much emphasis on geographical determination and popular will as the basis of nationality. As G. P. Gooch writes: "He subordinated nationality to the moral law and harnessed it to the unselfish service of humanity."

Mazzini was not a narrow patriot. He was essentially a man of faith and a believer in humanity. He regarded cosmopolitanism as a will-o-the-wisp and attributed an instinctive basis to patriotic feeling when he wrote: "In labouring, according to true principles, for our country we are labouring for humanity."

Under his inspiring influence, members of the Young Italy party helped to remake their country in accordance with their oath: "In the name of God and of Italy. In the name of all the martyrs of the holy Italian cause who have fallen beneath foreign and domestic tyranny.By the love I bear to the country that gave my mother birth, and will be the home of my children..... By the blush that rises to my brow when I stand before the citizens of other lands, to know that I have no rights of citizenship, no country and no national flag. By the memory of our former greatness, and the sense of our present degradation. By the tears of Italian mothers for their sons dead on the scaffold, in prison or in exile. By the sufferings of the millions—I swear to

dedicate myself wholly and for ever to strive to constitute Italy one free, independent, republican nation."

The Great War gave further impetus to the sentiment of nationality. Attempts were made to re-draw the map of Europe on national lines. In the name of nationality, enlarged Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia, and Roumania were constituted into self-governing, independent States. Southern Schleswig was restored to Denmark and Alsace Lorraine to France. Although Bolshevik Russia started with an international outlook, it is fast developing into a national State. Fascist Italy, too, is strongly nationalistic. In Nazi Germany the sentiment of nationality is being carried to absurd extremes.

The phenomenal rise of Turkey to prominence immediately after the War is one of the greatest surprises of recent times. "Up to the period of the revolution of the Young Turks in 1909 the only basis of Turkish Nationality was the common subjection of the Turks to their despotic Sultan." * Even before the War young Turkish intellectuals, attracted by the idea of nationality operative in neighbouring countries, set out to create a national consciousness among their people; but it was only with the meteoric rise to power of Mustapha Kamal and his colleagues that Turkish nationality became an accomplished fact. By his military victories and determined efforts to make Turkey an up-to-date and unified European country on a par with other European countries, Mustapha Kamal has been able to create a

* B. Joseph; op. cit. pp. 203-4.

strong Turkish nationality. Turkey is no longer the "sick man of Europe." It has abandoned such ideas as Pan-Islam and the desire to conquer and rule over territories belonging to the "infidel Christians." Every ounce of energy available is concentrated on the internal life of Turkey. Turkish language, literature, and folk-songs have been revived. The Purdah and antiquated Arabian practices and modes of life have been abandoned. A scheme of national education is enforced which will make the Turks more Turkish in their thought, word, and behaviour. Turkish officials are even prohibited from marrying non-Turkish women.

(b) *In the Orient.*—When we turn our attention from Turkey to the Asiatic countries, proper, the same record is not maintained, except in Japan which stands head and shoulders above other Eastern countries in the unity and strength of her nationality. Emerging from a feudal state, since 1867 Japan has made rapid strides during the last seventy years in unifying her people and instilling in them a high degree of patriotism. In addition to such elements of nationality as geographical unity, identity of racial type, common religion, and common language, she possesses the will to hold together to a remarkable degree. China and India are still nationalities in the making. While China does not have such diversities of race, religion, language, and caste as India, she has not yet been able to emerge as an united nationality. Her internal differences prevent her from having a single government or offering a united resistance to the outside world.

The idea of nationality, in the western sense, is probably new to India. Ancient Hindu India was organised round homogeneous, self-contained villages. Corporate national life was almost unknown. Successive invasions of Mohammedans and western races have broken up the village life of India, so much so that heterogeneity prevails everywhere. The present nationalistic movement is largely the result of western education and a reaction to the firm and systematic government provided by Britain. Since the inauguration of the Indian National Congress in 1885, the nationalistic movement has been gathering strength. Geographically India possesses a naturally defined territory, and her people show a fairly high degree of devotion to their motherland. This does not mean that provincialism has been entirely wiped out. Racially India is not single. According to anthropologists, there are at least eight distinct racial types. Prohibition of inter-marriage between the various castes, religions, and racial groups makes national unity a difficult task. From the point of view of language and religion, too, India is far from being a nationality. The people of India speak about two hundred languages and dialects, although the principal languages, spoken by over 5 million persons each, is fourteen. English is the *lingua franca* of the educated classes and there is no clear sign that Hindi or any other Indian language is likely to become a common medium of expression in the near future. Even if English can be made universal throughout India, it is difficult to see how it can.

express the national soul of the people. Religion to-day is a divisive factor in India. Mutual sympathy and understanding are still lacking between the followers of different faiths. Until India learns to practise religious tolerance and forbearance, her nationality will always rest on a slender basis. From the point of view of traditions and culture, too, India is disunited.

On the side of assets to Indian nationality must be mentioned an increasing sense of individual and national self-respect, general opposition to a foreign government, however efficient it may be, a growing Indian character or personality, an increasing "unity of purpose and action," loosening of the bonds of caste and class, earnest efforts towards village uplift and popular education, and growing emphasis on Indian art, literature and culture.

B. Joseph expresses a fear that Indian nationalists are repeating the mistakes that the West has made in striving for a national unity out of totally different conditions. He asks "Whether the Indians would not be better advised, making use of the unities which already exist within several groups, to pursue the course of fostering the national development of the principal groups of India into a number of distinct and friendly nationalities."*

Turning to the Near East, we find that national consciousness has been gaining ground in recent years among the Egyptians, Arabs, and Persians. Since the Great War the nationalist movement in Egypt has

* B. Joseph: *op. cit.*, p. 235.

been fairly active. The prevailing illiteracy of the people, their lack of culture, and their poverty make it difficult for them to think in nationalistic terms. Nevertheless, their unity of religion and language and their common desire to be masters in their own household make it possible for nationality to take root among them and bear fruit. The fore runner of the nationalist movement in Egypt was Arabi. His work was ably followed by that of Mustapha Kamal and Zaghlul Pasha, the latter of whom was able to wrest several concessions from the British. At the beginning of 1922 the British Government declared "independence" for Egypt. In Egypt, even more than in India, the nationalist movement has taken a political rather than a spiritual and cultural turn.

The Arabs are not yet a unified nationality. They are scattered over the North of Africa, the Peninsula of Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Syria. It is not possible for all these Arabs to constitute a single nationality. It is possible, however, for the Arabs of Asia to evolve into a homogeneous group. "They are for the most part good Mohammedans" * and practise more or less uniform customs. The tribal loyalty of the Arabs, the practice of *vendetta*, the geographical nature of the Desert of Arabia, the animosity between Moslem and Christian Arabs, and the illiteracy and poverty of the masses are hindrances to the evolution of an Arabian nationality. B. Joseph believes that "though they

* B. Joseph: op. cit., p. 280.

possess several of the important attributes of nationality, they lack fundamental unity and have much to achieve before they become a nationality."

V.—*Self Determination of Nationality*: A question which interests both the student of political theory and the practical politician is whether every nationality has an intrinsic right to be a self-governing, sovereign State. All through the nineteenth century, since the days of the Congress of Vienna (1815), the principle which dominated European politics was 'one nationality, one State.' This principle received further stimulus during the Great War when the idea of 'the self-determination of nations' came to the fore-front. The contention has been that to group together people of different nationalities into a single State will lead to a lack of patriotic feeling and internal dissensions. It is further contended that a nationality which is spread over several states can never be happy and contented and that such a nationality is like a dismembered social organism. All these contentions are seriously questioned to-day. It is admitted by many that, other things being equal, political boundaries should be drawn where national lines are drawn. Thus J. S. Mill, in his *Representative Government*, writes: "It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of Governments should coincide with those of nationality." Likewise, Ramsay Muir writes: "The experience of the whole modern age has shown that where the spirit of nationality genuinely exists and is based upon real and strong affinities,.....it is clearly to the advantage

both of the nation and of the world that the nation should win that degree of autonomy which is necessary to enable it to develop its characteristic mode of thought and life. This autonomy must be sufficient to satisfy the sentiment of the nation and to let it feel the assurance that its distinctive mind and character have adequate means of self-expression. Thus alone will it be able to make its fullest contribution to that variety which is the strength of Western civilisation."

Lord Acton and several others take the opposite point of view. According to Acton, "the theory of nationality (*i.e.* one nation, one State) is more absurd and more criminal than the theory of Socialism." Zimmern writes: "In the long run the theory of a national state will go the way of Henry VIII's and Luther's theory of a national Church." He believes that the state should make room for all sorts and conditions of communities and nations—like mediæval Christendom or Islam.

B. Joseph holds that "one nationality, one state" is a dangerous principle and constitutes a chief obstacle to world progress. He argues that 'nationality' and 'state' are two different conceptions and that a nationality can continue to exist even after the state has been destroyed. In his own words: "It is indeed apparent on reflection that the doctrine that nationality and state must be co-terminous is entirely erroneous and unfounded in fact."* In practice, Joseph finds that a State and nationality are never identical. Either a single state

* B. Joseph; *op. cit.*, p. 324.

includes more than one nationality or a single nationality is spread over several states. According to the same authority, there is no truth in the contention that multinational states are exposed to internal friction and unrest. He believes that such states possess advantages over those consisting of only one nationality "so long as there is freedom of national expression and no attempt to enforce uniformity."* National and State loyalty are, according to him, two different things and can exist side by side with each other; for all that a nationality requires is freedom for cultural and social life and a certain measure of group autonomy, particularly in communal matters. In this way, Joseph argues that several nationalities can live together within one state. He further believes that "the only hope of order and peace in world affairs is to be sought in the ultimate recognition of the principle that several nationalities may live together in harmony and co operation within a state, each at the same time following its own national life."†

For ourselves, we agree with Prof. Hocking in the view that no nationality has an intrinsic right to be a state. Whether a given nationality should be admitted to statehood or not is a matter of the maturity of that nationality. Only mature nationalities have a right to become states. Nationalities must earn their statehood by their own merits. All our rights are conditional or presumptive. In the words of Ramsay Muir: "It is

* B. Joseph: *op. cit.*, p. 328.

† do. p. 331.

only loosely that every nation has a right to freedom and unity. Nations like men must earn their rights." "A nation has a right to exist only when exercise of that right is to the advantage of the claimant and of society at large."

In general we may say that the admission of nationality to statehood depends partly on the size of the nationality and partly on its rigidity. As a general rule, it is not advisable that every pool of nationality should become a self-governing state. Where nationalities are plastic and are still in the making, it is not desirable that artificial attempts should be made to render nationalities and states co-terminous. It is time that often makes nationalities. Therefore, it is not a calamity if political boundaries at times disregard national boundaries.

Before a nationality is allowed to become an independent sovereign state, there are certain conditions which it should be required to fulfil. These are, according to Prof. Hocking, as follows:—

1. It must be able to manage wealth and develop natural resources and capital.
2. It must make good laws. A nationality has no right to become a state until it can provide a reasonable form of justice. It should so manage affairs that there will be no need for extra-territorial courts.
3. It must establish a suitable form of government.

4. It must recognise its duty to admit trade, pay debts, and allow travel.
5. It must assume its share in international matters, receive ambassadors, arbitrate, enter into treaties, etc. In particular, it must produce men and women who can represent it in international matters with dignity and adequacy.
6. It must be able to defend itself against foreign attacks so long as wars are a national contingency.

Who is to be the judge whether a given nationality should be allowed to become a state or not? Obviously, it is not the nationality seeking such a privilege. Nor is it any single outside nationality. The judge should be an impartial and international group representing the family of sovereign states. A nationality which is not fit to be admitted to statehood should be placed under the guardianship of the entire group of nations. It should no longer be a matter of self-election, as in the past.

VI. Is Nationality a Blessing?—It is not possible to give a categorical answer to this question. Everything depends on the meaning we assign to nationalism. Many thinkers have idealised and idolised nationalism and see nothing but virtues in it. Others find that, in practice, nationalism has led to many evils, and are convinced that, as it is practised to-day, it is the greatest enemy to international peace and goodwill.

For purposes of this discussion we may accept the definition of nationalism given by Hayes that it is "a complex of nationality, national state, and national patriotism."* Nationalism is not only the political creed of subject nationalities. In our modern world, it is a cultural, social, economic, and political conception. B. Joseph and many others regard it as the connecting link between the individual and humanity. Nationalism, they believe, frees a man both from individual selfishness and colourless cosmopolitanism. It is the salvation of humanity and a great spiritual possession. It is the pre-requisite of true internationalism. It is often argued that to the extent to which a man is devoted to his nation, to that extent can he understand and appreciate the devotion of others to their nations, just as love of one's family does not mean hatred of other families. Divorcing nationality from economics and politics and confining it to the social and educational spheres, Zimmern contends that nationalism is a great blessing. We are not convinced of the validity of this distinction. For good or ill, nationalism, in the modern world, is distinctly economic and political, and no useful purpose is served by ignoring this aspect of it.

Looking at the actual working of nationalism, Rabindranath Tagore, in his essay on *Nationalism*, has no hesitation in condemning it. He calls it the "organised self-interest of a whole people;" "self-idolatry;" and "the organisation of politics and commerce for selfish ends." Nationalism means to him "that aspect which a

* O. J. H. Hayes, op. cit., p. 257.

whole population assumes when organised for a mechanical purpose." At the origin and in the centre of Western nationalism, Tagore finds nothing but a spirit of conflict and conquest. He regards it as organised power for exploitation.

In the cultural and spiritual spheres, too, Tagore finds nationalism deficient. He considers it least human and least spiritual. It is mechanical and wooden. It is a hydraulic press which crushes out all individuality. It seeks to mould the members of a nationality after a single pattern. It has no place for originality or catholicity of outlook. It so embitters relations between countries that a sympathetic study of one another's culture and civilisation becomes almost impossible. Compared with France and Germany, Tagore finds that England has produced the smallest number of scholars who have studied Indian literature and philosophy with any amount of sympathetic insight or thoroughness.

The well-known American historian, Hayes, also criticises nationalism, although not in such unqualified terms as Tagore. He distinguishes between nationalism as a long, historical process and nationalism as a "proud and boastful habit of mind about one's own nation, accompanied by a supercilious or hostile attitude towards other nations."* While accepting the former as a historical fact, which calls for neither praise nor blame, Hayes condemns the latter in no uncertain terms. Reviewing in detail the history of the world in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, he finds that

* C. J. H. Hayes: *op. cit.*, p. 275.

nationalism is unable to give a creditable account of itself. In the words of Shillito, it has become "man's other religion." It has its own gods, patron saints, priestcraft, creeds, and rituals. It is "sentimental, emotional, and inspirational." It has more devout followers than almost any living religion. It even claims that it has a "mission" to the rest of the world, and woe betide that country or people which does not recognise such a "mission." It arouses and sustains the war-spirit. In the name of national interests, national rights, national honour, and national policy millions of lives and billions of treasure have been wasted in recent times. A careful analysis of the so called national wars reveals the fact that many of these wars were really fought on behalf of some interested group or other in the country. Investors of capital in foreign lands, owners of "infant industries" which receive protection, and private manufacturers of armaments have had their share in precipitating national wars. Nationalism furnishes the necessary idealism and poetry to prosaic economics. A man who would not ordinarily fight for his own economic interests cheerfully goes to the battlefield for the sake of vested interests clothed in the form of "King and country." Nationalism is an ally of militarism and sooner or later leads to imperialism of the exploiting kind. There are few instances of a country having attained national independence and unity, stopping short of that and not proceeding to exploit other countries. National self-determination is often followed by wars of conquest and colonisation.

Nationalism leads to the hatred of the foreigner and competition. It sets up irritating tariff walls and humiliating racial distinctions. Aggressive nationalities rouse the resentment of weaker nationalities and sting them to action when they feel they are able to do so. Vexing restrictions are placed on the freedom of movement of foreigners. Trivial incidents are utilised for wresting concessions and exacting indemnities from weaker people. Thus the U. S. A., in 1891, exacted an indemnity of 75,000 dollars from Chile for an American sailor who "was killed in a brawl in a drinking den in Valparaiso." * Likewise Germany wrested several concessions from Chinese when two German Catholic priests were murdered. Hayes adduces several instances to show that nationalism has been a most devoted helpmate to imperialism in England, France, U. S. A., Germany, Italy, and Japan. He further finds that national states are most heavily armed, although each one claims that it is only for defensive purposes. Military traditions and ideals are extolled by nationalism. It is interesting to find that "professional militarists are invariably rampant nationalists." †

Not only has nationalism in practice become "man's other religion" and has led to war, militarism, and imperialism of the worst kind; it also breeds, as Hayes points out, intolerance, cultivates a spirit of exclusiveness and narrowness, places a premium on uniformity,

* C. J. H. Hayes : op. cit., p. 170.

† " " " " " p. 194.

and increases the docility of the masses. * It is not conducive to the spirit of "live and let live." It frequently cultivates that frame of mind which says "my country, right or wrong, my country." It persecutes minorities. Witness, for example, the persecution of Jews in Germany and the ill-treatment of Negroes in America, of Indians in South Africa, and of linguistic, racial, and religious minorities elsewhere. Nationalism breeds racial pride and arrogance. It wounds the feelings of others. It is not favourable to an impartial and scientific study of other people, their culture, and institutions. The fact that socialism, communism, syndicalism, and pacifism are essentially of foreign origin is enough to condemn them in the eyes of most Americans and British. Nationalism develops mutual exclusiveness and antagonism. It is not always friendly to international movements. An international faith like Roman Catholicism has not always had a smooth sailing in nationalist states. In most countries, national education, "yellow" journalism, and compulsory military training intensify the blind, flag-worshipping kind of nationalism. Even religion is made subservient to it. Hayes is of opinion that for an enormous number of people in the West Christianity has become an adjunct to nationalism. In the U. S. A. school children are required every day to repeat the mystic formula: "I pledge allegiance to our flag and to the country for which it stands, one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice

* C. J. H. Hayes: *op. cit.*, p. 258.

for all." * "Patriotism," says Lord Hugh Cecil, "has become the convenient cudgel of the scoundrel to batter critics dumb."

From what has been said, it may appear that nationalism is an unqualified curse. Such, however, is not our conclusion. Nationalism as a long, historical process cannot be undone. It is instinctive. We cannot destroy it any more than we can destroy the sex instinct of man. A Jewish-American writer says: "Men may change their clothes, their politics, their wives, their religion, their philosophies; they cannot change their grandfathers." Nationalism is rooted in man's gregariousness and his tribal instinct. It cannot be eradicated without doing violence to the fundamental nature of man. Therefore, what needs to be done is to reform nationalism by turning it away from chauvinism and making it do service to the cause of humanity and internationalism. What often passes for nationalism to day is nothing more than "patriotic snobbery." It is jingoism pure and simple. Unless a people learns to temper its national loyalty with an honest and reasoned respect for all other nationalities, we cannot look to the future with any great hope. If we are to avoid the order of sequence suggested by Franz Grillparzer "From Humanity through Nationality to Bestiality," it is necessary for the nations of the world to develop an "international mind" and active international good-will and friendship. This they can do by proper popular education, cross-fertilisation of cultures,

* O. J. H. Hayes: op. cit., p. 108.

eradication of racial pride and racial intolerance, removal of irritating tariff laws and immigration restrictions, disarmament, and the sacrifice of the out-worn doctrine of absolute sovereignty on the altar of humanity. To use the words of a contemporary, the well-being of the world requires the substitution of "sheep-flock" nationalism for the raging, tearing "wolf-pack" nationalism which has held sway hitherto. It should no longer be possible for the ruler of any state to pray, as one did, "O God, strike all my people blind of one eye !" in response to the promise given to him by an angel that he could have whatever he wanted for his people on condition that the people of the neighbouring, rival states got double the share.

Nationalism possesses too many good qualities to be destroyed or even slighted. It should be preserved and purified. In the words of Hayes : "Nationalism, when it becomes synonymous with the purest patriotism, will prove an unique blessing to humanity and to the world." * Only such a nationalism can become a road to internationalism. As time goes on, more and more emphasis should be placed on the cultural and spiritual sides of nationalism than has been the case hitherto. National language, literature, traditions and ideals are excellent in their own way, but they should not be allowed to become inimical to the cause of humanity. "An ideal international world means a world of nations living at their best." † The future well-being of the

* O. J. H. Hayes: *op. cit.*, p. 275.

† B. Joseph : *op. cit.*, p. 888.

world requires the education not only of our minds but also of our wills and emotions in the interests of internationalism. "It must be an education which aims to surmount exclusiveness and to inculcate mutual understanding and co-operation, an education which seeks to overcome docility, to foster the critical spirit, and to encourage independence of judgment." *

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* O. J. H. Hayes : op. cit, p. 272.

CHAPTER II.

Imperialism.

I. *The Meaning of Imperialism:* The term 'Imperialism' may be used in a good or bad sense. To some imperialism is a synonym for the economic exploitation and political domination of weaker races and gross materialism. To others it is a sacred duty which must not be shirked by the advanced countries of the world in their relation to the backward countries. Both of these views are extremes, and the careful student would do well to study imperialism objectively and distinguish the historical processes of imperialism from later rationalisations. A well-planned and carefully worked out programme of the ruthless exploitation of backward regions is as foreign to the general history of imperialism as a conscious, civilising mission typified in the well-known phrase, "the white man's burden."

In the very nature of the case, it is difficult to give a definition of imperialism which will fit both ancient and modern times. Even in modern times there has not been a single type of imperialism. In some cases political control has followed trade relations, and in others the reverse has been the case. There is no *a priori* way of deciding whether 'trade follows the flag' or 'flag follows the trade.' Some empires are almost accidental in their origin and development while

others are the result of careful deliberation. Earlier empires were largely "tax-collecting and recruit raising" agencies. They were an expression of the superior military strength of the conquerors over the conquered. There was no question of humanising and civilising the conquered peoples. Modern empires are due to a variety of causes.

C. D. Burns claims that imperialism is a name given to "a single system of law and government in many different lands and races", a half-way house to internationalism, and an antidote to provincial nationalism. We do not believe this to be an accurate definition. It leaves out of account certain important elements of modern imperialism and exaggerates some of its favourable tendencies. It comes under what Prof. Hocking calls the *ethics of evasion* as against the *ethics of severity*. Prof. Schuman is nearer the truth when he says that "imperialism is intelligible as a factor in international politics only in terms of the imposition by military means of the power of the western nation-states upon the non-European parts of the world."* "Imperialism," says the same writer, "is the imposition by force and violence of alien rule upon subject peoples, despite all moralisings and pretensions to the contrary." †

From the above definitions it is clear that a gulf separates the ideal of imperialism from its practice. No useful purpose can be served by idealising

* F. L. Schuman : International Politics, p. 428,

† " op. cit., p. 622.

imperialism and ignoring the glaring abuses to which it is open. Nor is there any justification for regarding it as an inhuman institution devoid of any redeeming feature. Our problem is to understand imperialism as a potent, historical phenomenon and devise means by which it can be turned into an instrument for good. Mere condemnation of it cannot abolish it.

A good working definition of imperialism, as found in the *Encyclopædia of Social Sciences*, is that it "is a policy which aims at creating, organising, and maintaining an empire; that is, a state of vast size composed of various more or less distinct national units and subject to a single, centralised will."* The important elements of imperialism emphasised by this definition are its vastness, national diversity, and unity of government. To these the author of the definition later adds 'certain spiritual links.' Applying this definition to the British Empire, the largest empire that the world has seen, we find that it possesses all the elements mentioned above, except, perhaps, "a single centralized will." As far as the Dominions are concerned, the "single centralised will" is more a matter of form than a reality. This is why it is sometimes said that the British Empire should really be called "the British Commonwealth of Nations." The fact of the matter, however, is that there is a British Commonwealth of Nations as regards the Dominions, and a British Empire as regards the colonies and Dependencies.

* *Encyclopædia of Social Sciences*, vol. 7 p. 605.

In studying modern imperialism it is necessary to remember that colonisation to-day is not as important a factor as the economic and political control of the backward regions of the world. There are very few available areas on the surface of the earth fit for white colonisation. Hence attention is directed more and more to trade, investment of surplus capital, and political control. In other words, exploitation colonies are valued more than settlement colonies.

II. *The Causes of Imperialism*: The rise of imperialism is not due to any single cause. Imperialism has come about as the result of several factors. The early empires of the orient were empires of conquest. They were a continuation of the tribal instinct for the subjugation of weaker people and the annexation of territory. They did not much concern themselves with the internal life and organisation of the people. They were primarily "tax-collecting and recruit-raising agencies.

The thirst for conquest and the competitive struggle for power have played a notable part in the development of later imperialism too. The desire to print the map of the world with red or with some other colour has no doubt been one of the powerful incentives in the building up of modern imperialism. It was the boast of Cecil Rhodes that he thought in terms of continents. Although the economic advantages of imperialism are very much to the forefront in modern times, the thirst for conquest and power has not yet been satiated. Recent history shows clearly that the

underlying motive of many an imperialist adventure is the "will to power" and national prestige. Witness, for example, the present military occupation of Abyssinia by Italy. Nationalism easily merges into imperialism. Colonial possession and military success are often taken to mean national strength and glory. Prof. Schuman believes that modern imperialism is "a new expression of the will to power and the drive for conquest. The imperialist designs of Italy, which are an expression of her "will to power" were forcibly expressed by Mussolini in a speech delivered on August 4, 1932, though clothed behind the usual humanitarian and civilising professions. "The Fascist State is a will to power and an empire. The Roman tradition is the idea of force. In the Fascist doctrine, the imperial idea is not only a territorial, military, and mercantile expression, but also one of spiritual and moral expansion. For Fascism, the tendency to the imperial idea means expansion of the nation and is a manifestation of vitality." Imperialism means expansion.

Territory is desired not only to increase the national prestige of a country, but also as an outlet for surplus population. Living in a small island kingdom, the Japanese are ever on the look-out for opportunities for expanding their territory. This accounts for their occupation of Manchukuo and the covetous eyes they cast upon other parts of the globe. Similarly, Italy believes that with her it is a question of expansion or suffocation to death. Sparsely populated countries like Canada and Australia are aware of this desire for expansion and

stoutly resist it by means of immigration barriers and other such devices. Their aim is to hold these virgin lands intact for the benefit of future generations of their own kith and kin.

The surprising fact with regard to the argument that imperialism is a remedy for over-population is that it has not so worked in practice. The number of Japanese who have settled in Korea, Formosa, and Manchukuo is infinitely small. Likewise, the number of Italians who have left the shores of their country for settlement in Italian Somaliland and Libya is negligible. Besides, as one writer puts it humorously, emigration to a foreign country is often rapidly replaced in the mother country by immigration from heaven!

The most fundamental cause of imperialism to-day seems to be economic. Colonial possessions and concessions in foreign lands are sought primarily for the economic advantages which they are supposed to bring. The imperial nations of the world to day are for the most part highly industrialised countries, depending upon the backward countries of the world for raw produce such as cotton, rubber, oil, cocoanut, tea, coffee, and precious metals. "The fight for raw materials", says Dr. Schacht, German Minister for Economics, "plays the most important part in world politics, an ever greater role than before the war." The import of raw materials to the industrialised countries of the West becomes particularly great in times of war. Yet statistics to day show that no imperial country, with the exception of Great Britain, can solely depend upon its colonial

possessions for the supply of a major portion of her raw materials. Professor Parker Moon adduces facts and figures to show that there is no truth in the common notion that an imperial country receives most of the raw materials which its colonies produce. In the words of this writer : "Raw materials, in general, are colour-blind. They recognise no national flag. They follow the laws of supply and demand, and of distance and transportation costs. They obey economic rather than political control."* It is true that imperial countries are sometimes able to impose differential export duties in order to favour themselves. But such cases are few, and do not constitute an imperial factor in modern international life. Even restriction of the raw materials produced in order to keep up prices has not succeeded much in benefitting the imperial country.

Colonies, dependencies, protectorates, and spheres of influence are valued even more as furnishing a market for the manufactured goods of the mother country. "The Empire," says Joseph Chamberlain, "is commerce". Thus we find that the importance of India to England is to a large extent commercial. The cotton interests of Lancashire would be hard hit if the Indian market were closed to them. Preferential tariffs and commercial discrimination of other kinds are often resorted to in order to favour the finished goods of the mother country. But these devices have not been a complete success. According to Andrew Carnegie, trade does not

*. P. T. Moon : Imperialism & World Politics, p. 553.

follow the flag, but the lowest price current. R. L. Buell estimates that only one-fifth of world trade is with countries which come under imperial sway. The remaining four-fifths is with independent states themselves. Among the imperial powers only the United States and Japan enjoy more than half of the trade of their colonies. Nevertheless, "imperialism affords an additional margin of marketing facilities for an industrial nation's goods."* The important point to note is that those who benefit by imperialism are not the masses in general, nor even industry in general, but a few industries like the cotton, iron, and steel industries. The indirect gain to the public at large is not significant.

An empire suggests to many people an outlet not only for surplus goods but also for surplus capital. A phrase which has come into prominence in recent years is "dollar diplomacy." The phrase brings vividly to mind the eagerness with which American bankers and investors have been pouring money into the backward countries of Caribbea and Central and South America with a view to reaping an enormous harvest. Government agencies and diplomatic channels are used to persuade, if not coerce, backward countries to borrow money from advanced countries. This kind of diplomacy is not confined to the U. S.A. alone. It is characteristic of imperialism as a whole.

Capital may be lent by an imperial country to the governments of her colonial possessions, or to private

*. P. T. Moon : *Imperialism & World Politics*; p. 351.

individuals and companies therein. At times, investors may put their money into business of their own in the backward countries, where labour is cheap and abundant. In this connection it may be mentioned that one of the arguments frequently used in defence of imperialism is that an advanced country has an intrinsic right to exploit the natural resources of a backward country, the assumption always being that military strength and power to exploit are marks of advancement. It may be further mentioned that the argument that if a country is unable to exploit its own natural resources to the full, some other country has a right to do so on the ground that the world's resources belong to those who can best use them, is never conceded by the stronger nations of the world to the relatively weaker. If it were allowed, large tracts of land which now lie uncultivated in Canada, Australia, and parts of Africa, would of right belong to the teeming, industrious, and frugal millions of Japan, China, and India. It is too much to expect imperialists to apply to themselves the arguments which they apply to others in the process of exploitation.

Imperial possessions are of advantage not only to those engaged in import and export trade and to the investors of capital, but also to shipowners and manufacturers of armaments, of military and naval uniforms, and of railway, cable, and telegraph materials. Thus all these classes of people become ardent champions of imperialism, and are at times responsible for questionable imperialist adventures. Their ranks are swelled by young men who look forward to a lucrative career in

different parts of the empire, by military and naval officers, by diplomats, and by colonial officials and their families. At times empires are built by individual adventurers such as Clive, Napoleon, and Cecil Rhodes, although they generally try to sublimate their individual ambitions into national prestige and national greatness.

Imperialism can further be accounted for by diplomatic military causes. The interest of Britain in the Suez Canal, her indirect control over Egypt, and her efforts to establish some form of authority in the Arab territories of the Near East are all to be explained by her determination to hold India, as control over these territories means control over the gateways of India. The building of the naval base at Singapore is interpreted by some as a forcible reminder to Japan that she cannot afford to set foot on Australia or other parts of the British Empire in the orient with impunity. For the same kind of military and naval reason, France controls Djibouti. She values highly her African colonial possessions as troop reservoirs. When this policy of using the black troops of Africa in fighting European wars becomes more widespread, the desire for colonies will become even more acute. Italy's annexation of Abyssinia possibly has for one of its objects the increase of her military strength.

Religious and humanitarian causes are sometimes adduced as explanations of imperialism. But these are minor factors when compared with the political, economic, military, and diplomatic factors dealt with above. In the seventeenth century the missionary motive was an

important factor of imperialism. The annexation of Siam by France during this period was largely the work of Jesuit missionaries. Even in later times it has played a considerable part. The name of David Livingstone in Africa is the most outstanding name in the history of missionary empire-builders. The London Missionary Society was closely linked up with the spread of British imperialism in Africa. There are several instances to show that the Christian missionary has at times been the forerunner of the Western trader and imperialist. Even to-day it is no exaggeration to say that the missionary enterprise is, to some extent, an arm of imperialism. Frequently in the past territory was annexed and economic and political concessions obtained under the pretext of protecting missionaries.

Imperialism to-day is generally indifferent to the question of converting the people of backward countries to Christianity. At times it even opposes missionary work for fear that it may give people a new freedom and a new sense of their dignity and importance. Where Christian missions have been the open or secret ally of imperialists, they have been accorded a warm welcome.

While conversion to Christianity pure and simple is no longer regarded as a sufficient cause of imperialism, Christianity in the form of humanitarianism is sometimes used as a justification for imperialist adventures. Thus, in justifying the annexation of the Philippines, William McKinley, the President of the United States, declared: "There was nothing left for us to do but to

take them all, and to educate the Filipinos and uplift and civilise and Christianise them, and by God's grace do the best we could by them as our fellow-men, for whom Christ also died." Likewise, Calvin Coolidge, a more recent President, said: "The legions which [America] sends forth are armed not with the sword but with the Cross. The higher state to which she seeks the allegiance of all mankind is not of human but of divine origin. She cherishes no purpose save to merit the favours of Almighty God.....We extended our domain over distant islands in order to safeguard our own interests and accepted the consequent obligation and liberty upon less-favoured people."

The history of imperialism, however, does not show that humanitarian considerations have been uppermost in the minds of imperialists. The amount of money spent on public education, sanitation, and the general improvement of the people, is notoriously small. Schuman advances the view that: "It is no more the 'purpose' of imperialism to confer benefits upon its victims than to confer benefits upon the home country."*

A particular form of the humanitarian motive is expressed by the hackneyed phrase, "the white man's burden." It carries with it a clear suggestion of racial superiority and prestige. Another name given to it is the "imperialism of responsibility." The idea behind this phraseology is that the *raison d'être* of imperialism is the civilising and humanising of the backward peoples of the world by the more advanced. This argument

* F. L. Schuman: *Imperialism and World Politics*; p. 426.

assumes that the West is civilised and that the rest of the world is uncivilised or only partially civilised. It also assumes that the culture of the imperial country is good for the whole world. At its best it seeks to supplant ignorance by enlightenment, crude forms of government by settled and progressive forms of it, and primitive ideas of justice by modern ideas of it. It aims at abolishing cannibalism, slavery, serfdom, and usury. Whether the so-called 'white man's burden' is really to be found in practice or not to any large extent to-day, it certainly was not the original cause of imperialism. It is largely an after-thought in adapting imperialism to changing times and conditions. Increasing emphasis is being placed on this aspect of imperialism, although much of it is mere lip-service. Those who speak in season and out of season of 'the white man's burden' of progress and enlightenment quietly ignore the fact that there is also a 'black man's burden' which cannot be mistaken. If 'the white man's burden' consists in improving the economic, social and political conditions of people, the black man has to pay for it in hard cash, in the destruction of the powers of self-help, and in the loss of manliness and national self-respect.

III. *The Origin and Growth of Imperialism.*—The earliest states were city states. As one writer puts it, "they were oases of civilization in the midst of barbarism." Early state systems developed in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, and China. War and aggression were the normal and natural relationships between states. There was a keen struggle for power among them.

Some of them maintained a balance of power between them. Between 1947 and 1905 B. C., Hammurabi was able to break the balance of power and establish the Babylonian Empire. Two centuries later the Hittites from Asia Minor brought about the downfall of this Empire. The Egyptians had an Empire as early as 3200 B.C. The Assyrians, too, had an empire.

The city-states of Greece belong to a later time. The two principal city-states were Athens and Sparta. They struggled with each other for supremacy and empire. Each city-state highly valued her local independence. The two leading ideas of the Hellenistic Empire were, according to E. Barker, (1) the deification of the ruler and (2) the idea born of Stoic theology, of the 'cosmopolis'-the world state or city of God. The independence of Greece was brought to an end by Philip of Macedon, who established his power throughout the peninsula. The work of conquest begun by him was continued by his son, Alexander the Great, who was perhaps the most spectacular military and administrative genius of all time. His empire included Greece, Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Babylon, Persia, Turkestan, Afghanistan, and the borders of India. It was the greatest empire of his day. But his early death and the confusion which followed it disrupted his empire.

The next great empire was that of Rome. She began her political career as a city-state, situated on seven neighbouring hills. Her government at this time was monarchic. In course of time monarchy fell

and a republican form of government took its place. At a later time Rome began to expand by acquiring neighbouring territories. By 256 B.C. the Roman power was unchallenged all through Italy. Soon after the conquest of Italy, Rome destroyed Carthage, her only formidable rival in the West, and became a great naval power. She also acquired the fragments of Alexander's empire. By 41 B. C., as a result of a series of military conquests, Rome became a world empire. Practically the whole of the western civilized world came under her sway during the reign of Trajan (98—117 A. D) In the East the Roman Empire extended as far as the borders of India. During the six centuries that it lasted it gave order and unity to people of diverse nationalities and brought "prosperity and peace to a larger human community over a greater area for a longer period of time than had ever been known before." Later generations came to view "this great World State of the Caesars as the most magnificent political structure ever reared by the hand of man".

But even this mighty structure could not last for ever. The diverse races which comprised the empire could not be held together very long. There being no fixed rules for the succession of emperors, rivalries, civil wars, and horrible assassinations became the order of the day. The economic foundations of the empire were unsound. Nearly half the population were held as slaves. The upper classes despised industry, and their morality was far from satisfactory. Cities became infected with a lazy proletariat. Pestilences like malaria

swept the country, and took a heavy toll of lives. Religion was disintegrating. To add to all these forms of internal decay Rome was invaded by barbaric hordes—the Huns, the Goths, and the vandals—who succeeded in bringing about the downfall of the Roman Empire.

Although the greatness of Rome came to an end, her influence continued even after her death, especially her ideas of “imperium” and ‘jus’* fused with the Greek notions of law and liberty’. Rome dead was even more powerful than Rome alive. The idea of a universal empire haunted men’s minds all through the Middle Ages. Their dream was one of order and peace maintained by a universal state. Both the church and state fought with each other for the fulfilment of this role. While the church in the Middle Ages was a living reality, the empire was only a ghost. It was “the unfulfilled dream of a vanished past which never could be recovered.” † The power of the Pope was a reality, but that of the Emperor was a fiction. Still the dual sovereignty of the Church and state in spiritual and secular matters respectively could not work in the very nature of the case. Dante immortalised his view of a universal secular empire in his well-known work the *De Monarchia*. Lord Bryce has characterised it as “an

* ‘Imperium’: “the supreme power which the whole people vested, at first in the republican magistrates, later in the sole person of the emperor, with at least the ghost of democratic consent.”

‘Jus’: “a certain and enforced body of law enjoyed by Roman citizens throughout the territories of the empire.”

† Schuman: International Politics, p. 32.

epitaph of the Holy Roman Empire", rather than a prophecy. This remark is no doubt true as regards the times in which Dante lived, but is a prophecy as regards the present, when the need of the hour is for an effective international organization, which would influence, if not determine, the destinies of the world. Empire to Dante meant peace and not war. It corresponds to the modern idea of an international tribunal.

The imperial system of to-day which is entirely different from the imperial system of the classical and mediæval periods, had its origin in the fifteenth century in the explorations of European seamen, which resulted in colonial expansion. Portugal and Spain were the first European countries to launch out on naval explorations. In 1497 Vasco de Gama of Portugal rounded the Cape of Good Hope in his search for a sea route to India. Availing itself of this and other discoveries, the Portuguese Government claimed all of Africa, southern Asia, and Brazil as her territorial possessions. Her only claim was priority of discovery. About the same time Spain added Mexico, Peru, and Netherlands to her Empire, and soon became "the largest, richest, and most imposing of the colonial domains." But her empire did not last long "owing to policies of ruthless exploitation, mercantilistic monopoly, and religious intolerance."

In the first half of the seventeenth century there arose the Dutch empire, establishing itself in Africa,

* F. L. Schuman : *op. cit.*, p. 32.

India, South Seas, etc. The establishment of this empire was followed by the expansion of England and France in India, Canada, and America. A struggle for supremacy ensued between the two powers, culminating in the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), which left England supreme in Canada and the Eastern coast of India. During this period England had her colonial possessions in what later came to be known as the U. S. A. But the short-sighted and step-motherly treatment which she meted out to them led to their revolt and complete breaking away from Britain. The years following the French revolution were marked by the ascendancy of France under the leadership of Napoleon. It is no exaggeration to say that Napoleon came nearest to the establishment of a universal empire in modern times. He made himself emperor in 1804, and under him the French empire included France, Corsica, Western Italy, Netherlands, Illyria, &c Spain, the Kingdom of Italy, the Kingdom of Naples, Switzerland, the confederation of the Rhine, and the Great Duchy of Warsaw (Poland) became dependencies of Napoleon. For a time it looked as though the Napoleonic empire would include the whole of Western Europe. But the ascendancy of British sea power and the growing national consciousness all over Europe brought about the defeat of Napoleon, who "lived to see the destruction of the whole fabric into which he had woven so much blood and treasure."*

* F. L. Schuman : op. cit., p. 89.

The latter part of the nineteenth century which was characterised by an unprecedented expansion of trade and commerce gave a fillip to imperialism. It was a period of capitalism, nationalism, and imperialism, although in the mid-Victorian era there was a general prejudice against imperial expansion. This prejudice was clearly marked in Gladstone's Cabinet of 1868. Gladstone himself was nick-named a "Little Englander." Even Disraeli, an ardent champion of imperialism, began his career as an anti-imperialist. Colonies were considered "economically unprofitable, politically dangerous, and philosophically an anachronism." (P. T. Moon).

After the seventies of the last century, the imperial fever began again. Disraeli won the election of 1874 as an outspoken imperialist. The wide spread industrialisation of Western Europe meant a demand for markets where finished goods could be sold, the raising of tariff walls, and the winning of territories where capital could be invested and from where tropical and sub-tropical products could be obtained. All this meant unparalleled imperial activity. England was in the forefront of this imperial expansion. Germany and Italy, which were slow in achieving their national unity, took a long time before they could be converted to the new 'gospel of imperialism. Bismarck, 'the Iron Chancellor of Prussia,' resisted imperialist development for a long time, thus retarding the growth of a German empire.

The year 1881 marks the beginning of the new imperialism under which we are living to-day. The

French capture of Tunis in 1881 and the British "occupation" of Egypt in 1882 gave the signal for a general scramble among European Powers for the conquest of Africa. The race for territory was conducted so relentlessly that by the year 1911 not a square mile of the huge continent of Africa was left free, with the minor exceptions of Abyssinia and Siberia. The story is completed now when the independence of Abyssinia, too, is gone, and Italy has solemnly promised to begin the humanising and civilising work of the "barbarous" people of Abyssinia, now that she has conquered them by means of machine guns, poisonous gases, and liquid fire.

Along side of the partition of Africa has gone on the partition of Asia. Japan in the Far East, which has mastered the technology and diplomacy of the West, has firmly rooted herself in Korea, Formosa, and N. China. The only Asiatic countries (outside Japan) which still enjoy greater or less freedom are Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Siam, and truncated China.

Fortunately the partition of America by the European powers was prevented by the promulgation of Monroe doctrine in 1823. But this did not stop the United States gaining ascendancy in America and the Islands of the sea. She has converted Cuba, Panama, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua into protectorates, and made the Caribbean an American lake. She has further annexed the Hawaiian Islands, in addition to relieving Spain in the last century of Porto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippine Islands.

The Extent of Empire. There is hardly any part of the world to-day which does not feel the crushing weight of imperialism. Empires have been established over China, India, Africa, parts of Latin America, and Polynesia. Two hundred and eighty-three million whites directly or indirectly control the lives and destinies of nine hundred and twenty million "backward peoples." To quote the words of F. L. Schuman: "More than half of the world's land surface and almost half of its population are included in the colonies, protectorates, mandates and spheres of influence of the "Imperial States."*

The three great imperial powers of to-day are England, France, and Holland. The British Empire includes one-fifth of the surface of the globe and one-fourth of the population, five-sixths of which are of non-European origin. The colonial empire of France, with its possessions in Africa and S. Asia, is the second largest both in area and population. Holland, which comes third in the order of importance, "contains a population eight times as great and an area sixty-two times as large as the home country." (R. L. Buell.)

The lesser imperial powers are Japan, the U. S. A., Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Japan is in possession of Formosa, Korea, and Manchukuo; the U. S. A. has her possession in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Belgium is in control of the Congo Free State in Africa. Italy which possessed Eritrea, Somaliland,

* F. L. Schuman: op. cit., p. 374.

and Libya till the other day has now annexed Abyssinia. The most important possessions of Portugal are Angola and Mozambique. Spain, which once was the proud owner of a vast empire, possesses to-day Spanish Morocco and a few minor colonies; and it is quite probable that the Spanish Morocco will some day fall into the hands of the French. The few colonial possessions which Germany acquired late in the imperial game were distributed on the conclusion of the Great War among the allied powers in the form of Mandates; and it seems probable that Germany will make a desperate effort to regain them in the next few years. Although Russia never set on the imperial path in the sense of acquiring distant colonies, she spread over the neighbouring territory. Some of these territories became independent at the end of the Russian Revolution. In spite of that, the U. S. S. R. is the largest of the Great Powers next to the British Empire, both as regards area and population.

IV. *Modern Imperialism*: Imperialism in the twentieth century takes more indirect forms than imperialism in the previous centuries. Downright conquest and annexation are on the whole foreign to the spirit of the present age. The one significant exception to this statement is the ruthless conquest of Abyssinia by Italy in 1936. Generally speaking, the emphasis to-day is not on annexation for its own sake. As one writer puts it, the stakes to-day are commerce, industry, railroads, ports, strategic bases, raw materials, and markets for goods and for capital. Although the

imperialist powers pile up armaments, they take care not to use them against each other as far as possible. Reliance is placed more on diplomacy and international agreement than on the sword in the carrying out of imperial designs.

The indirect forms of imperialism which prevail in many parts of the world to-day are:

(1) *Leasehold*: For commercial or strategic reasons, weak or backward countries are persuaded or compelled to part with the jurisdiction of portions of their territory for a period of years—usually ninety-nine years. Nominal sovereignty still rests with the country granting the lease, but actual jurisdiction is in the hands of the lessee. For all practical purposes, "a leasehold is a colony until the lease expires."* Examples of leasehold are Manchurian ports given by China to Russia in 1898 for a period of twenty-five years, Port Arthur and Dairen in China held by Japan, and Weihai-wai held by Great Britain. The U.S.A. possesses lease of the Panama Canal which extends to five miles on either side of the canal. Over this territory, the government of the U.S.A. enjoys exclusive authority. The lease is made in perpetuity, the U.S.A. having paid a large sum at the beginning and a yearly subsidy thereafter. By virtue of the lease, the U.S.A. has practically established a semi-protectorate over the Republic of Panama.

(2) *Protectorates and Semi-protectorates*.—These are of various kinds. In all protectorates the foreign

* R. L. Buell: *op. cit.*, p. 443.

relations and defence are controlled by an imperialist power; and in many cases control is exercised even over financial affairs and other matters of internal administration. In the British Empire a protectorate is virtually the same as a crown colony, although from the point of view of international law the two are quite different. In the case of a protectorate old treaties with foreign powers continue, but not so in the case of a colony. Protectorates generally and in annexation or independence.

The best example of a protectorate in recent times is that of Egypt. It is true that Britain declared the "independence" of Egypt on February 28, 1922, but this independence was so hedged and qualified that even to-day Egypt may be regarded as a "disguised protectorate." According to the 1922 declaration, four points are "absolutely reserved."

"(a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt.

"(b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.

"(c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities."

"(d) The Sudan."

Some writers prefer to regard Egypt as a semi-protectorate. In a territory of this kind, the control exercised by a foreign power, even in foreign affairs, is neither complete nor continuous. Other examples of semi-protectorates are Cuba and Haiti, which can make certain treaties in their own name. All that the foreign power does is to act as a check.

A third type of protectorate is known as international protectorate, an example of which is Abyssinia till recent times. According to a convention signed in 1906 between Great Britain, France, and Italy, these three powers agreed to protect the integrity of Abyssinia and not to compete with each other for concessions. Recent history shows that this convention has been regarded as another "scrap of paper."

(3) *Spheres of influence*: These are areas where the foreign powers secure certain economic privileges for themselves, while the states granting the privileges retain their sovereignty and political authority. Spheres of influence are generally the thin end of the wedge, ultimately resulting in protectorate or outright annexation, although they are neither colonies nor dependencies. These spheres are sometimes carved out even without the consent of the backward countries in question. In Asia, Africa, and the Pacific, spheres of influence have been a convenient instrument of imperialism in recent times. The Washington Conference of 1921-22 tried to prohibit the establishment of further spheres of influence in China. A sphere of influence means that the State holding it is given "preferential or exclusive rights to make loans, construct railways, operate mines, or develop public works."* This form of control," observes Buell, "has probably led to more disputes than it has settled."† England and France hold spheres of influence in Siam.

* R. L. Buell: op. cit., p. 447.

† " " " p. 448.

Some writers distinguish between a "sphere of interest" and a "sphere of influence." The former is strictly economic, while the latter may give certain vague political privileges, short of a protectorate. Spheres of influence have been more common in Africa than in Asia, where spheres of interest have been more common.

(4) *Condominium* or Joint Government means control by two or more powers over disputed territory in order to prevent colonial rivalry. Such control is exercised by Great Britain and Egypt over the waters of the Nile in the Sudan; by France, Spain, and Britain over the city of Tangier in Morocco; and by France and England over the New Hebrides. This form of jurisdiction satisfies neither the foreign powers exercising the control nor the native people over whom the control is exercised. Schuman holds that international control of this type is almost always unsatisfactory and is usually unsuccessful in the long run. It means divided responsibility.

(5) *Financial control*.—"In a number of cases, capitalist countries, either through government officials or representatives of bankers, control the revenues and expenditures of the governments of backward countries which are otherwise independent."* This form of control may be exercised by several states together or by a single state alone. Examples of the latter kind are found in the financial control of the United States

* R. L. Buell: *op. cit.*, p. 458.

over certain Caribbean and Central American countries, as well as over Liberia and Persia.

(6) *Tariff control*.—With a view to benefitting themselves, western powers have frequently compelled backward countries not to raise their tariff duties on foreign goods beyond a certain limit. This kind of control was exercised over Japan till as late as 1911. Such control has also been exercised over China, Turkey, Morocco, Siam, and Persia. The object of this control is to enable western countries to dump their goods upon backward regions and prevent the development of indigenous industries.

(7) *Extra territoriality*.—This means the right of a foreign government to establish courts of its own for its nationals residing in backward countries on the ground that these countries do not possess a reasonable brand of justice which can be applied to all. This right of extra-territoriality in the earlier days was claimed and established practically in all Mohammedan countries, which give few rights to Christians and in Japan, China, Korea, and Siam. When, however, these countries adopt western standards of justice, the foreign powers gradually drop their extra-territorial claims. Thus, the United States relinquished her claims in Japan as early as 1894. The Soviet Union relinquished her extra-territorial rights in China in 1924, and it is hoped that other powers will follow suit. Turkey has abolished all extra-territorial claims. In Siam there are very few of these rights left.

The extra-territorial rights are usually exercised by

consular courts maintained by foreign governments, and sometimes by international courts. As is to be expected, these courts have frequently abused their privileges. Extra-territoriality at times has been interpreted to mean exemption from local taxation, with serious consequences to local revenue. In some countries, extra-territorial protection was extended even to natives who were adopted as their "protéges" by foreigners.

(8) *Informal Control* — Sometimes foreign countries, acting together in unison, refuse to recognise the government of a backward country until it fulfils certain conditions laid down by their diplomatists. R. L. Buell rightly describes this method of control as "extra-legal or backstairs" method. In exercising this form of control various devices are adopted. The United States has used her marines in Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, the Caribbean, etc. Great Britain has had recourse to the device of forcing her advisers, especially in the matter of finance, on Persia, Egypt, and Mesopotamia. There may be a stage in the history of a backward country when foreign advisers are of great value. But the trouble is that frequently they work more for the good of their own country than of the country which employs them.

(9) *The Open Door and Closed Door*: Imperialistic countries often use these devices in controlling the economic life of backward regions in their own interest. Several wars were fought with China in the last century to impose the open door policy on her. According to this policy, all the foreign powers wishing to trade with

a backward country are given equal facilities. No discrimination is practised against the goods or nationals of any foreign country. The "open door" is at times extended also to shipping and settlement. It means "equality of opportunity." It places the imperial country and other foreign countries on the same footing. The traditional policy pursued in the British Empire has been that of the "open door," but to-day it is considerably modified. Tariff preference has become the order of the day. The mandatory system requires the maintenance of the open door in the A and B classes of mandates. Any member of the League can have "complete economic, commercial, and industrial equality," in these areas. No discriminations are to be shown in granting concessions, except as regards essential public works. Monopolistic concessions are strictly prohibited.

Since "open door" frequently leads to cut-throat competition between foreign powers, recourse is sometimes had to international co-operation. Thus, in China to-day, no single government or a group of governments is allowed to make loans in return for political privileges.

The "closed door" is the opposite of the open door. It means preferences, discriminations, and monopolies, not only as regards trade and commerce, but also as regards colonial shipping, investment, and settlement. Its purpose is to strengthen the economic ties between the mother country and the colony and shut out foreigners from any appreciable share in the profits. The United States has followed this policy with regard

to the Philippine Islands for many years. It is, says Schuman, a survival of the old mercantilistic system. The open door is being more and more shut in China, especially in areas where the Japanese hold a sphere of influence. In the C class mandates there is no obligation to keep the door open.

The closed door usually takes three forms: (a) tariffs, (b) shipping, and (c) concessions. The closed door as regards tariffs does not necessarily mean high tariffs. It only means that preference is shown to the mother country. Some countries adopt tariff assimilation and others adopt tariff preference. According to the former, there is free trade between the mother country and the colony, but both have the same tariff system in their relation to other countries. Tariff preference means that the mother country and the colony have different tariff systems, but extend special concession to the goods of each other.

The closed door in shipping means that the carrying trade is reserved to the ships of the mother-country. The closed door in concessions means that the mother country is granted concessions as regards the development of natural resources, the building of public works and railways, the oil industry, etc. The open door is no doubt preferable to the closed door, but the latter has been more successful. Pointing out the defects of the closed door, Buell writes: "From the standpoint of the consumer, the closed door means high prices; from the standpoint of a native, it is but one more phase of the policy of exploitation; from the standpoint of the world

at large, it means the perpetration of the worst forms of nationalistic imperialism."^a

The Mandates: The close of the Great War was marked by a high degree of political idealism largely due to the towering personality of President Wilson. It was freely said that the War had been fought in order to end all wars, that every nation should have the right of self-determination, and that the rights of backward territories and small nationalities in Europe should be freely respected. It is true that this idealism was not sincerely shared by all those who took part in the Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919. Nevertheless, the mode of approach to colonial questions on the part of the imperialist powers was quite different from the policy which had been followed hitherto. While previous wars between European nations often meant the outright annexation of the colonial possessions of the defeated powers, at the Peace Conference it was said that the rights of the backward peoples should be the first concern of the Allies and that no single allied power should be allowed to become the sole possessor of any of the colonial territories of the former enemy countries.

The imperial system which was evolved at the Peace Conference in response to these new ideas is known as the Mandatory System, embodied in Article 22 of the League Covenant which reads:—

- "1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which

^a H. L. Buell: op. cit., p. 426.

formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant.

- "2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.
- "3. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.
- "4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a

Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

- "5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League.
- "6. There are territories, such as South-west Africa and certain of the South Pacific islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the

safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

- "7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.
- "8. The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.
- "9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories, and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates."

It is to be noted that the mandatory system was applied only to the colonial possessions of Germany and Turkey, and not to those of the Allies. The object of the system was twofold : (1) to safeguard the interests of the native population ; and (2) to avoid friction and rivalry between the imperial powers which, if not checked, would lead to future wars. The idea of "trusteeship" on behalf of "people not yet able to stand by themselves" was definitely asserted. At first there was no question of classifying the mandates into "A" "B" & "C" classes, but the astute politicians who worked behind the scenes at the Paris Conference were able to smuggle in this classification, much

against the wishes of President Wilson, who had intended that all the mandates should belong to the "A" class.

It was argued that not all the territories taken over from the former enemy countries were on the same level of development and civilisation and that, therefore, different systems of government be devised to meet their differing needs. Accordingly, the mandates were divided into A, B, & C, classes. The A class mandates were considered to be most fitted for the attainment of self-government in the near future and the C class mandates were considered to be the least, while the B class was placed in between. The tutelage of these mandates was entrusted to "advanced nations", which were required to submit annual reports of their work to the Council of the League of Nations, which was working through a Permanent Mandates Commission for this purpose.

The mandates were classified as follows* :—

| | Mandates | Area in square miles | Population | Mandatory |
|---|------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|---------------|
| A | Iraq ... | 177,148 | 2,819,292 (1920) | Great Britain |
| | Palestine & Trans-Jordan ... | 70,000 | 1,295,154 (1931) | " |
| | Syria & Lebanon ... | 60,000 | 2,046,857 (1926) | France |
| B | Tanganyika ... | 873,494 | 4,363,488 (1921) | Great Britain |
| | Ruanda-Urundi ... | 21,429 | 5,603,000 (1926) | Belgium |
| | Togoland (British) ... | 13,240 | 275,968 (1931) | Great Britain |
| | " (French) ... | 21,893 | 780,504 (1931) | France |
| | Cameroon (British) ... | 84,286 | 7,050 (1930) | Great Britain |
| | " (French) ... | 166,489 | 1,900,000 (1928) | France |
| C | Southwest Africa ... | 322,294 | 275,520 (1930) | South Africa |
| | New Guinea ... | 91,800 | 404,400 (1930) | Australia |
| | North Pacific Islands ... | 830 | 99,590 (1930) | Japan |
| | Western Samoa ... | 1,183 | 44,585 (1931) | New Zealand |
| | Nauru ... | .9 | 2,692 (1931) | Great Britain |

* F. L. Schuman : op. cit., p. 612.

Although the mandatory system was devised in good faith, it has not justified the high hopes entertained regarding it at the time of its inception. The mandatory powers, instead of regarding the mandates as "trusts of civilisation," imposed upon unwilling nations, proceeded to regard them as annexations. The spirit of disinterestedness was singularly absent. Prof. Schuman writes : "For all practical purposes, the C mandates are treated as annexations and the B mandate administration is scarcely distinguishable from that which would have been provided for outright conquest. The A mandates are also under the effective control of the mandatories."* In all the mandates, except in Iraq, the mandatories have ruthlessly crushed the legitimate aspirations of the people towards independence and self-government. Even in the matter of the choice of the mandatories, the wishes of the mandates were set aside, as in the case of Syria, which declared the United States to be its first choice and Britain its second, and yet was assigned to France.

According to the League Covenant, the A mandates were to be fitted for self-government as soon as possible. So far only Iraq has been allowed to attain to that position. But even her position is not very enviable. On October 3, 1932 she was declared an independent British protectorate and was on the same day admitted to membership of the League of Nations. Yet her "independence" is no more real than the "independence" of Egypt. In the words of Prof. Hocking: "The

* op. cit., p. 617.

treaty which sets Iraq free resembles in some ways the Egyptian Declaration of Independence, in that it provides reasonably and well for British protection of acquired British interests. Such continued oversight of Iraqians is British, not international : and the League can only regard such a change as for the worse."

According to the same authority, mere change in the system of imperial organisation is not enough. What is more important is a new mentality. The old colonial and military mentality is not conducive to a sympathetic treatment of imperial questions, which ought to be resolved into questions of human happiness and welfare.

The situation in Syria is much worse. Even to-day there is not much love lost between the French and the Syrians. The two people seem to be temperamentally incapable of understanding and helping each other. After studying conditions in Syria at first-hand, Professor Hocking concludes that the right course for France to adopt is to leave Syria. The French use of Senegalese soldiers in Syria, much inferior in civilisation to the Syrians, and the military excesses which France has practised there have left rankling bitterness in the hearts of the Syrians. "If Syria cannot be controlled by civilised means," says Hocking, "there remains the alternative not to control it."* Syria is far too advanced in civilisation to be brought under European tutelage in the twentieth century.

* W. E. Hocking : *The Spirit of World Politics*, p. 279.

One salutary feature of the mandatory system, in spite of the serious defects mentioned above, is that there is a certain amount of effective international supervision. The sovereignty of the backward regions in question is vested not in the mandatories, but, in theory at least, in the League as a whole, which functions through the Permanent Mandates Commission for this purpose. This Commission consists of ten members, and six form the quorum. None of them is allowed to hold an official position with his government. This gives the Commission an independence of outlook which is very desirable. The members are chosen on the basis of merit and competence. They are paid a fixed annual salary and their travelling expenses. They meet usually once a year. The sittings are ordinarily private. When they meet they discuss the annual report-submitted to them by each of the mandatory powers in the presence of a representative of the mandatory. After the representative withdraws, the Commission drafts its report and submits it to the Council.

The recommendations of the Commission cannot bind anybody. They are only of an advisory character. Nevertheless, the League Council has been looking more and more to the Commission as its authoritative agent. A serious drawback in the working of the Commission is that the inhabitants of the mandates do not have the same access to the Commission as the mandatories. Any petition of theirs can be sent up to the Commission only through the mandatory government,

and it is easy to imagine what this restriction means. Since 1927 the Council of the League has disallowed to the petitioners the privilege of oral evidence. The Commission does not visit the mandates to see for itself how the mandatory powers do their work of humanising and civilising their wards and of fitting the more advanced among them for self-government. It does not even send out committees to enquire into glaring abuses. Thus the dice seems to be loaded heavily against the inhabitants of the mandates. There is no opportunity for a full and impartial hearing of evidence on any matter under dispute. Occasionally the Commission takes a bold and independent line, as it did in the case of the ill-treatment of the natives of South West Africa, but it often hedges and hesitates, because of the entrenched position and influence of the mandatory powers in the League Council. The judgment of Prof. Schuman is that the Mandates Commission "has not acted vigorously as a bold and independent agency."

Nevertheless, the mandatory system marks a definite improvement. It is a step in the right direction, though only a short step. There is no doubt whatever that imperial profit and exploitation are at a premium in the mandates, as in the colonial possessions. But there are checks in the former which one does not find in the latter. The interests of the indigenous people are on the whole better safeguarded. Freedom of conscience and religion are provided for them. Slave traffic, traffic in arms and liquor are forbidden. The

natives are protected against forced labour, except as regards essential public works, and fraud in labour contracts. They are not allowed to transfer their lands to non-natives without the express consent of the government.

Many of these safeguards are probably only paper safeguards. Yet, the redeeming feature is that to these paper securities is added publicity. The Report of the Mandates Commission is first submitted to the Council of the League and is afterwards published and discussed by the Assembly; and when this second stage is reached, what was once private becomes public property. To use the words of W. E. Hocking: "Thus to the security of Paper adds itself the security of Publicity. Paper and Publicity, with a thinking commission sitting between: this is the kernel of the working-guarantee that the mandate shall be a mandate."

It is a new day in imperialism when an international body which has no physical force behind it, can sit in judgment over the actions of great imperial powers. What these powers could at one time do with impunity cannot now be done without the fierce light of world opinion being thrown upon it. The outburst of Sir Austen Chamberlain a few years ago, when the Mandates Commission asked too many inconvenient questions, is indeed significant. Men like Mussolini may contemptuously disregard world opinion, but even they cannot ignore it when it is organised effectively.

In dealing with the Bondelzwarts Affair in S. W. Africa, where the mandatory had committed excesses,

the Chairman of the Mandates Commission, boldly declared: "This principle (*i.e.*, the trusteeship principle) involves the adoption of an attitude toward the minor interests and administrative practices very different from the former. First in importance come the interests of the natives, secondly the interests of the whites. The interests of the whites should only be considered in relation to the direct or indirect exercise of protection over the natives "

Admitting all the faults and defects of the mandatory system, we still believe that the strengthening and extending of the system is in the best interest of the world at large. It is in the nature of imperialism to exploit the helpless. In order that such exploitation may be kept within limits and in order that the interests of the backward races may be adequately protected, international supervision is absolutely essential. As yet the mandatory system is limited to a few areas. It covers $1\frac{1}{2}$ million square miles and 20 million people. On the other hand, half of the world's total surface, with 600 million inhabitants, is under imperial powers, which show no inclination whatever to bring their territories under the mandatory system. To hope that these powers will voluntarily be converted to the new day towards which we are pressing is an empty dream, so long as capitalism, nationalism, and imperialism continue. It may be that the only hope is to be found in socialism and internationalism, shorn of their Marxian crudities. Leonard Barnes holds that the British Empire should take the lead in extending the mandate system to her

colonies and possessions. In his judgment, India, Burma, and Ceylon are ripe for self-government, and, therefore, there is no need to apply the mandatory system to them. But Malaya and some of the West Indian Colonies, Barnes believes, could be brought under A mandates, and the possessions in tropical Africa under B.

It will be a great advantage if the Mandates Commission can be increased in numbers, and its power greatly strengthened. It must be given the authority to visit the mandates and arrive at its own conclusions. This power in course of time must be extended to the whole of the colonial world as well. All the colonial powers should be induced, and even obliged, to live up to certain conditions "imposed for the good of the outside world." Buell remarks in this connection: "One of the greatest steps toward world peace would be a treaty signed by the ten leading colonial powers, guaranteeing the open door in their colonies and just treatment for the natives, as provided in the mandates subject to the supervision of the Mandates Commission."* The general principles worked out by the Mandates Commission, when approved by the Council and Assembly, should be binding on the Mandatory.

The number of members of the Commission should be so increased that different members could give their attention to different questions such as education, public health, development of natural resources, labour conditions among the natives, and the like. Such increased

* *op. cit.*, p. 888.

membership would give a chance to representatives of non-imperial countries to have a share in the "responsibilities of trusteeship." Even representatives of the mandated territories should have a place on the Commission. Representatives of the aggrieved population in the mandates should have the right of direct access to the Commission either in person or through counsel. A certain proportion of appointments in the mandates should be allotted to qualified candidates of foreign nationalities, in order that the mandatory power may not have the monopoly of such appointments. The sovereignty of the mandate should rest with the League of Nations, and when any mandatory leaves the League, the mandates under its care should revert to the League. The free flow of capital into and out of mandates, as well as of population, should be brought under the direct control of the League.*

In the case of the A mandates at least, it is the moral obligation and legal duty of the League and the Mandates Commission to see to it that none of these territories remains under European tutelage for a day longer than is absolutely necessary. Proof of their fitness for self-government and the stages by which they should attain complete independence are matters which should come within the purview of the League, and not of the mandatory in charge. In this connection, it must be said that the fine sentiments expressed by the French rapporteur, M. de Caix, in relation to Syria and

* Refer to Leonard Barnes: *The Future of Colonies*, pp. 38-40.

Lebanon are vague and elusive: "As soon as the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon gave proof of their capacity to govern themselves, to exercise in actual fact the sovereignty which was theirs already in law, on that day the part played by the Mandatory power would be completed without even the necessity of confirming this fact by legal action." What constitutes "the proof of their capacity to govern themselves?" To whom is it to be submitted? Such inconvenient questions are not meant to be asked of imperial diplomats.

V. Is Imperialism Justified?—It is too late in the day to try to justify imperialism by roundabout and circumlocutory methods. Very few people to-day are prepared to believe with C. D. Burnes that imperialism breaks down the mere narrowness of village politics and leads to internationalism and world brotherhood. If anything, it has the precisely opposite effect. The essence of imperialism is competition and exploitation. It is no heresy to say that imperialism has not had a respectable ancestry, although a stage comes in the history of its development when ruthless exploitation is clothed behind such high-sounding conceptions as "the white man's burden" and "the civilising and humanising mission" of the West to the East. Many a modern empire had its origin in piracy and slave trade. Even the mighty British Empire, says Barnes, is no exception to this rule.* Ideas of civilisation, culture, and

* Ref. to L. Barnes: *The Duty of Empire*, p. 11.

knowledge are later additions devised partly to soothe troubled consciences. The first impulse of imperialism is economic gain, to which is later added political control.

In discussing the rightness and wrongness of imperialism, four questions have to be distinctly borne in mind.

(1) Does it materially and morally improve the condition of the people over whom it is exercised?

(2) Does it materially and morally improve the condition of the people of the imperial country?

(3) Does it avoid friction points between the nations of the world and make for world peace and prosperity?

(4) Is there a suitable alternative to imperialism which will make for a better and happier world?

It is difficult to give an answer to this question which will equally apply to all empires and all imperial possessions. For a few cases of genuine humanitarianism, there are many cases of ruthless exploitation. Leonard Barnes is right when he paints the British Empire as "a composite jumble, ramshackle in some parts, repressive in others, aimless in most, and beneficent in a few"* as against the familiar picture of "a perennial spring of universal justice and benevolence on which the sun never sets."† It is true that in out of the way places in Africa, imperialism has abolished cannibalism, slavery, and crude forms of justice and government. But over against these benefits of imperialism we must weigh in

* op. cit., p. 21.

† op. cit., p. 20.

the balance such facts as the culture system followed by Holland in the Dutch East Indies, the atrocities committed by the Belgians in Congo, indentured labour and virtual slavery which prevail in many parts of the tropical empire, and the confiscation of enormous tracts of land by a handful of whites in South Africa and Kenya. In South Africa, we are told that a million and a half whites own 230 million acres, while 5½ million Negroes possess 27 million acres. "When the white man came," runs a South African saying, "he had the Bible and we had the land; now we have the Bible and he has the land."

Barnes points out that in the mining districts of Africa "conditions analogous to slavery" prevail. Native labourers are recruited for the most part by deception, and the compound system under which many of them live is detrimental to health, morals, and economic uplift. A compound Barnes defines as a "cross between a barrack and a gaol." "There is no comparison whatever between the wages earned by native workers and those earned by European Workers. On an average, the European earns eight times as much for less arduous work. Heavy fines and hard labour are imposed for the slightest infringement of contracts, the term of which many a native may not understand. Besides, the native is effectively shut out from all skilled and semi-skilled occupations, and is destined by law to remain for ever on the level of a floating proletariat. In the words of Barnes: "It is the distinction of the mines to have rendered slavery [unnecessary by

retaining its substance while dispensing with its form." *

Conditions in agriculture in Africa are not any better. In the last twenty years, as Barnes points out, a system of native policy has been built up in the Union of South Africa which is a calculated outrage upon every tradition of fair dealing. In the Transvaal and Natal, "no male native may be employed outside the farm on which he resides, unless he carries a document from the former permitting him to seek employment!" † Brutality is added to oppression. For instance, if a person "appears to be" under eighteen, "he may be flogged in addition to any other penalties inflicted on him" for violation of the contract. ‡

It is a notorious fact that imperialist countries spend very little money upon improving the conditions of the people over whom they are the self-appointed trustees. Leonard Woolf says that in the year 1924, out of an estimated revenue of two million pounds, the Kenya Government spent £ 44,000 on prisons and £ 37,000 on education! The whole policy pursued by the Government is to favour some 10,000 Europeans at the expense of 2,500,000 Africans and 36,000 Asiatics. All the desirable land is reserved for them and "the native is on the road which leads to economic slavery." * Conditions in South and East Africa show that the fate

* L. Barnes: *The Duty of Empire*, p. 252.

† L. Barnes: *Do.* *do.* p. 256.

‡ L. Barnes: *Do.* *do.* p. 258.

* L. Woolf: *Imperialism and Civilisation*, p. 86.

of the native population is much worse when entrusted to the white settlers on the spot than when it is in the hands of the colonial government in the mother country. Contrast, for example, conditions in South Africa and Kenya with those of British West Africa and Nigeria. The policy which the white settlers have pursued through the years has made them "thriving earthworms" practically devoid of all humanitarian feelings towards the people of the soil. Speaking about Egypt, Rushdi Pasha bitterly remarks: "The British are deliberately keeping the Egyptians from getting an education, and then they tell the world we are incapable of governing ourselves." The Congo government in 1923 spent one per cent of its total budget on education.*

Imperial powers are, as a general rule, short-sighted. They are in a hurry to extract the golden eggs from the goose as quickly as possible. They fail to see that even from their own selfish point of view, the happiness and contentment, the higher standard of living, and high purchasing power of the colonies are of distinct advantage to them.

When we turn from Africa to India, we find that conditions are not very much better, although Great Britain has been a much better master than most imperial powers. The economic exploitation and drainage of the country have gone on apace without much let or hindrance. Parker Moon writes: "The reason why the British first entered India, and the primary

* Parker Moon: *op. cit.*, p. 290.

reason they have remained there, was not to benefit India, but to benefit Great Britain."* In spite of 175 years of British rule in India, the average wage of the Indian labourer is about four annas a day. The appalling poverty of the masses is the most hideous fact that strikes the attention of any observer. In the words of Mahatma Gandhi, "The Government established by law in British India is carried on for this exploitation of the masses. No sophistry, no jugglery in figures can explain away the evidence the skeletons in many villages present to the naked eye." † Besides poverty, there is ignorance of the worst kind, 93 per cent of the people being illiterate. Public health is very poor, with a high rate of mortality and a high birth rate, although the imperial power is not to blame for all of it. A disproportionately large percentage of the revenue of the country is spent on an expensive army and an equally expensive civil service and a host of pensioners, with the result that nation-building departments such as education and public health are obliged to live a hand-to-mouth existence. The free flow of capital from England to India in the form of investment has not brought any relief to the masses. As Barnes notes, all that it has done is to tighten the grip of the Anglo-Indian and Indian rich upon the poor and of Great Britain upon India.

By controlling currency and the military budget and, to some extent, the tariff and fiscal policy of the

* Parker Moon: *op cit.*, p. 200.

† Speeches, *op.* 753-4.

country, England has been able to favour her own people at the expense of the poverty-stricken masses of India. The indigenous cottage industries of India, which provided a living to many thousands and gave them opportunity for the expression of their personalities in creative work, have practically been wiped out under the stress of imperialistic competition. It is a well-known fact that the widespread textile industry of India was destroyed early last century by, among other things, the imposition of prohibitive import duties in England on fine Indian fabric. In the light of all this, it seems a mockery to speak of imperialism as a purely humanitarian task. Cecil Rhodes was nearer the truth when he said: "Pure philanthropy is very well in its way, but philanthropy plus 5 per cent is a good deal better."! Schuman contends that profit motives, power motives, and prestige are skilfully concealed in terms of humanitarianism, civilising missions, religious conversion, and material benefits conferred upon the backward peoples.* The same writer says that in the countries under the heel of imperialism, very little money is spent as a rule on removing illiteracy and in promoting education.

"In the U. S. 200 children attend school for every 1,000 inhabitants, as compared with 175 in the Hawaiian Islands, 120 in the Philippines, 40 in Madagascar and Uganda, 38 in the Dutch East Indies and British India, 37 in Haiti, 28 in Tunis, 26 in the Belgian Congo, 20 in Korea, 3 in French West Africa and French Cameroon,

* *Cp. op. cit.*, p. 422.

and 1 in Portuguese Angola".* Much money is spent for military purposes, administration, and railway building. The white settlers take the lion's share. Beggary, starvation, and social disorganization stare one in the face everywhere. Head taxes and hut taxes are levied in Africa primarily not to raise revenue, but to compel the natives to work for white employees. "The backward peoples have obtained less of civilization and enlightenment from the white man than of misery, improvement, and ruthless economic exploitation". †

Even if it be granted, as we do, that certain indirect economic benefits accrue to the victims of imperialism, it must be said that these benefits are often at the loss of their political independence, self-respect, and manliness. Political subjection is as intimate a part of imperialism as economic exploitation. The nature of power is such that those who are kept under its yoke for long years come to love their very chains. To recall the words of Rousseau in this connection : "If there are slaves by nature, it is because there have been slaves against nature." The recent history of Egypt, Syria, Palestine, India, and Ceylon goes to show that imperial powers are most loath to part with authority and responsibility, and can be depended upon to place as many hindrances as possible in the way of a people being able to govern themselves. Imperialist powers have not yet learnt the truth that "no man is good enough to be another's master."

* F. L. Sohman : op. cit., p. 591.

† " : op. cit., pp. 591-2.

When the agitation on the part of the subject peoples for self-government and independence becomes presistent, the imperial power adopts one or more of the following devices * :--

- (a) It crushes native resistance by force and devises means by which to enfeeble the victims.
- (b) It uses persuasion, education, and coercion to make people loyal subjects of the empire.
- (c) It replaces the language and culture of the people by those of the conquerors.
- (d) It makes "a pretence of colonial participation in the national government", substituting such an arrangement for national self-determination.
- (e) It provides for various forms of autonomy, protection, and native participation in local government, taking care to retain the substance of power in its own hands.
- (f) It uses native princes and other vested interests as agents of colonial government.
- (g) It sees to it that executive power is not allowed to be controlled by the legislature.
- (h) In exceptional cases, it relinquishes power without war, as in the case of the British Dominions, where the two sides belong to the same or similar racial and cultural group.

*Condensed from F. L. Schuman : op. cit., pp. 624-29.

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"So long as those who resist" alien rule, "are weaker than the foreign conquerors, resistance merely intensifies foreign oppression and prolongs the dictatorial regime imposed from without."† Public disorders, inter-communal rivalries and frictions, illiteracy, low moral standards, and the like are used as excuses for indefinitely postponing self-government, without any attempt being made to remove these hindrances. The backward countries are not given a chance to develop themselves and to learn by making mistakes. In this respect, the African native has probably been the most unfortunate.

Another fact of which Schuman reminds us in connection with the alleged benefits of imperialism is that Western civilisation is not an unmixed blessing. The white man's religion, morals, language, and social institutions have not infrequently resulted in the destruction of indigenous culture and in social chaos and demoralisation. We are told that the white population of the South Seas is dead or dying on account of its contact with the West, which, at its worst, has meant rum, guns, and syphilis. In other parts of the world, people living under imperial sway have lost their own cult, arts, mores, and folkways and have become "grotesque and debased caricatures of western white men."* While ancient imperialism touched the lives of the people only at a few points and left the people for the most part to develop their own native genius, modern imperialism is thorough-going in its application to

† F. L. Schuman : op. cit., p. 4

* F. L. Schuman : op. cit., p. 51

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the lives of the people and is destructive of the best in their culture and civilisation. It brands them as people of "lesser breeds without the law" and equates military superiority and superior technology with cultural superiority.

Imperialism has much to answer in the matter of racial relationships. Racial frictions which mar the relationships of people in Asia and Africa are a direct legacy of imperialism. C. F. Andrews asks the question : "How can you be a friend of the man who insists on always keeping you in a semi-inferior position ?" The Dean of Worcester, speaking on India, is reported to have said : "Let us turn to the root of the troubles in India. Our rule in that country has undoubtedly conferred great benefits upon it. We have kept the peace during a long period between warring factions. We have made railroads. We have fought famine. We have improved health. We have increased fertility.....We have done much for the material needs of India, but we have not won the love of her people. Why not? Because we have hurt souls." According to H. G. Wells, imperialism means "arrogant swagger, opposite of cosmopolitanism." Norman Thomas, a well-known Socialist leader in the United States, remarks sarcastically: "Many a man without six feet of earth in which to be buried is swollen with pride because his country 'owns' an empire." In the German Colonies before the War, we are told that "white men carried around whips as naturally as they did handkerchiefs."

As Prof. Hocking points out, the West assumes that what is good for it is good for everybody. "It destroys even without knowing what it destroys"; witness, for example, its destruction of the Arabic culture. It has no eyes to see that "in grace of life, dignity of thought and language, courtesy, hospitality, conversation, intuitive poetry and metaphysical sense, the Orient is advanced." (Hocking).

Furthermore, war is a necessary feature of imperialism in the first instance with the backward peoples, and later with other imperial powers. Hardly a single colony has been won without some bloodshed at least. A recent writer observes that the path of empire is red with the blood of its victims. Another writer says: "Diplomacy, coercion, and military force are the necessary accompaniments of imperialism." Even after subjugating a backward country, the imperial power is obliged to maintain a large army of occupation, partly for the sake of asserting its prestige, partly because of the fear of native revolt, and partly because of the fear of the possibility of rival imperial powers grabbing an ill-gotten gain. An imperial power is always on pins and needles, and the mentality which it exhibits is inimical to the maintenance of normal human relations.

In spite of these obvious evils which imperialism brings in its train, advocates of imperialism say in its defence that it brings peace and order out of chaos and confusion, that it acts as an arbiter between the various warring sections of the backward community, that it protects the masses against native

exploitation, that it makes available the unused resources of the country to the world at large, that it makes for uniform laws over vast territories, and that, in these days of terrific competition for finished goods and markets for raw materials, it is a distinct advantage for countries unable to stand on their own feet to be parts of a large empire which can give them protection and make orderly life possible. We ungrudgingly admit that every one of these arguments has a large degree of force behind it, as in the case of the British connection with India. Nevertheless, we must confess that while these factors alleviate the evils of imperialism, they do not by any means justify it. Imperialism can be justified only when it is exercised first and foremost in the interests of the people it governs and only when it takes the speediest measures possible to fit the subject people for self-government and freedom. Honesty requires us to say that neither of these conditions obtains to any appreciable extent anywhere in the imperial world. Foreign rule may be a good thing for a while, but the price it exacts is out of proportion to the benefits it confers.

(2) *Does imperialism benefit the people of the mother country?* It is often assumed that imperialism brings great material advantages to the people of the mother country. But a careful analysis of the situation does not support such an assumption. On the emotional side, there is no doubt that imperialism is a good tonic for a people smarting under an inferiority complex. Modern imperialism is an expression of "the will to

power" and of "the drive for conquest." Thus we find that, suffering from an inferiority complex in her relation to such European powers as England and France for not possessing a large colonial empire, Italy provoked a war with Abyssinia and has "conquered" her after a fashion. Empire to Fascist Italy means a sign of virility and masculinity, although the victim chosen is like a lamb to a wolf. It remains to be seen whether for all the hardships that Mussolini has inflicted upon his own people, there are to be compensating advantages in the future. Judging from the Italian conquest of Libya (formerly known as Tripoli), we cannot be sure of such advantages. "Libya constitutes one of the most perfect examples of a colonial possession acquired and held at a great cost to the taxpayers of the home country for reasons of diplomatic power and prestige, with only moderate profits accruing to privileged investors and concessionaries and no economic gains whatever accruing to the nation as a whole."*

As a general rule, the pecuniary gains resulting from imperial adventures go to a favoured few. The nation as a whole pays the piper without calling the tune. Thus, for instance, the direct gain to the British masses from their possession of India is probably slight, in spite of the fact that "India is by far the greatest market ever acquired as a colony by any industrial empire." † Particular industries such as cotton and iron may benefit, but not industry in general. If the

*F. L. Schuman: *op. cit.*, p. 406.

† P. T. Moon : . . . p. 520.

huge capital which has been invested in India and other colonial possessions had remained in Britain itself, the condition of the British working classes might have been much better than it is to-day. Leonard Barnes writes: "Colonies, in particular, are normally class assets, which bring advantages, e.g., to investors and manufacturers, but disadvantages, e.g. to wage-earners."*

Advocates of empire often say that the imperial country obtains a bulk of the raw materials which its colonies produce. Actual facts, however, do not support such a contention. Raw materials, as Parker Moon puts it, are colour-blind. They obey economic rather than political laws. It is foolish to assume that the capital invested by an imperial country in her colonies always brings her direct returns. The money may just as well be used in ordering goods from countries outside the imperial ring and in converting customers into competitors. The idea of an empire becoming self-sufficient in raw materials, especially at times of War, seems equally preposterous. The cost of attaining such a goal is not worth the trouble. In a fit of patriotic passion, countries belonging to the same empire may agree to buy from, and sell to, each other even at considerable financial sacrifice. But such a mood soon passes away. Trade generally follows the lowest price level, and not any patriotic exhortations.

The imperial preference idea which has been gaining strength in the British Empire since the War and which reached its climax in the Ottawa Agreement

* L. Barnes : *The Future of Colonies*, p. 21.

of 1932 has not brought much relief to the empire. Leonard Barnes contends that "it can no longer be seriously questioned that from the standpoint of world needs imperial preference is an anti-social principle, of doubtful advantage even to its supposed beneficiaries and calculated gravely to prejudice any peaceful solution of the problems now confronting the dissatisfied powers." * Imperial preference is a hindrance to the building up and holding of markets nearer home.

In order to protect a far-flung empire, Britain is obliged to maintain a large army, navy, and air force. And this means that the British tax-payer has to bear the brunt of the burden; and whatever indirect gains he may derive from Britain's imperial possessions is possibly more than offset by the burden of taxation.

The plea that imperialism is a remedy for overpopulation is not supported by facts. The people of Italy and Japan who complain of over-crowding have not found colonies a solution to their problem. Adjustments of industry, agriculture, and finance as well as international co-operation can, perhaps, solve the problem much better.

Imperialism further has the result of lowering wages and standards of living among the people of the imperial country. When the capitalist finds that he can get quick returns for his money by investing it in backward areas where labour is cheap and abundant, he naturally diverts his capital there. Before long he finds that a great variety of goods can be produced there at

* L. Barnes : *The Future of Colonies*, p. 17.

is taken up, and the future promises to witness a period of struggle between the imperial powers for colonies and markets.

The late Mr. Mohammad Ali of India is said to have remarked: "If the last War (the World War) was a war to end all wars, the last peace (Versailles treaty) was a peace to end all peace." The latter part of the remark indeed contains much truth. The Versailles treaty which concluded the war between imperial powers, deprived Germany and Turkey of their colonies, gave most of them away in the form of mandates to England and France, and made slight additions to the territories of Japan and Italy. The arrangement was such as to cripple the former enemy powers and add to the strength of the two foremost imperial powers—England and France. Italy and Japan were frankly dissatisfied and were waiting for an opportunity to assert themselves. Within the last few years Japan has established a form of protectorate over Manchukuo, using all the art and diplomacy of the West in asserting her claim, and keeps a hungry eye upon the rest of China. Italy has "conquered" Abyssinia and is waiting for the farce of international recognition before annexing it. Germany, too, is profoundly dissatisfied. She has openly violated many of the terms of the Versailles Treaty and is frankly preparing for war and annexation of colonial territory. It is too early to say where all this will end. The present struggle is between the 'static' powers like England, France, and the United States, on the one hand, and the 'dynamic' powers like Germany, Italy

and Japan on the other which are profoundly dissatisfied and even disgruntled. The attitude of the static powers is, in the words of Leonard Barnes: "What we have is enough, and what we have we hold."* The dynamic powers, on the other hand, complain that in the face of their growing population, they do not have enough access to raw materials and settlement colonies and enough markets for their finished goods. The population of Germany is increasing roughly at the rate of a third of a million per year, that of Italy half a million and that of Japan a million, while the population of France has been stationary for a long time, and that of Britain is rapidly approaching stagnation. Germany is on the whole poor in raw materials and produces only 80 per cent. of her food supplies. The position of Italy is even worse. In pre-war years a large number of Italians used to emigrate to France, the United States, and South America, but immigration rules to-day are so strict that Italians are practically shut out. Besides, Italian colonies are not a paying proposition. Likewise, the Japanese are not wanted in Australia, Canada, and the United States. The dynamic powers, rightly or wrongly, believe that expansion in the colonial sphere will bring them relief. But such expansion is sure to be resisted by the static powers. Thus the entire situation is brimful of trouble for the future.

Both Marx and Lenin foresaw years ago that all the available territory of the world would be taken up by the capitalist countries of the world and that when this

* The Future of Colonies, p. 9.

situation came about, there would be a scramble between them for power and position, leading eventually to a world-wide socialism. The first part of the prophecy has come true already, and it looks as though that the second part, too, may come true before very long. Even if world-wide socialism does not come into being in our day, it seems almost certain that imperialism will lead to war in the future, unless imperialists change their methods and policies and accomodate themselves to each other. In the opinion of Barnes: "It is true and fair to say that Britain's possession, on the present privileged terms, of a vast dependent Empire is incompatible with peace." *

British writers on the whole do not agree with the opinion of Barnes. They believe that the British Empire is the greatest safeguard of world peace. It is claimed by Prof. E. Barker, for instance, that, while the British Empire originally signified overseas expansion for the two-fold purpose of settlement and business, it is "revealing a process of sublimation which is leading to the totally new idea of a community of self-governing nations based on voluntary adhesion to the English ideas of law and liberty." It is needless to say that this statement about a free association of self-governing nations may apply to the Dominions, but not to the colonies and dependencies which constitute 6/7ths of the whole Empire. The day that India is admitted to a completely equal status with the Dominions, we shall be prepared to believe with Barker and others like him that

* *The Future of Colonies*, pp. 21-22.

concept of Empire has undergone a radical change.

Leonard Barnes says that the British Empire is supposed to stand for—

- (a) Peace among all its members.
- (b) A system of co operative defence against outside aggression.
- (c) Freedom for all its members.
 - (i) Personal.
 - (ii) Economic (i.e. decent and steadily rising standards of living).
 - (iii) National.

Barnes himself admits that all this is true only with regard to the self-governing Dominions.

Even if it be admitted for the sake of argument that the British Empire secures peace, order, and contentment over vast territories, it does not follow that world peace is secure. Britain may be honest in her desire not to engage in wars and aggression as well as in her desire to fit her colonies and dependencies for self-government as speedily as possible. But so long as the non-British capitalistic countries of the world harbour the grievance that they do not have an adequate share in the trade and territories of the world on account of the existence of the British Empire, world peace rests on a slender basis. Therefore, our conclusion is that imperialism in practice, and not the imperialism of the philosopher, is generally not conducive to peace. At best it means armed neutrality.

(4) *Is there an alternative to imperialism?* Imperialism is so firmly entrenched in the present world

order that it seems as though nothing can shake it. To condemn it roundly at the present stage will have the same effect as a dog barking at the moon. Entreaties and persuasions to imperialist statesmen to change their methods and policies are likely to fall on deaf ears, until the self-interest of their own country is vitally affected. If imperialism cannot be destroyed or abandoned overnight, the most that we can do is to change it to suit modern conditions. The key to the situation is to be found in the words "international control" and "international co-operation." We have already spoken of the possibility of strengthening the mandatory system and extending it to cover all or nearly all of the backward regions of the world. While many agree that some form of international control of colonial possessions will go far towards preventing international friction in the future, they doubt whether the existing system of mandatory administration will prove capable of this extension.

The suggestions made by Leonard Barnes are:

- (a) application of the open door throughout the colonial empire;
- (b) "transfer of territory at present colonial, not as such, but as mandated territory, with the mandatory power (which would be one or other of the dissatisfied powers [Germany, Italy, Japan, etc.]) answerable to the League of Nations;
- (c) "similar transfer of existing mandates;
- (d) "administration of existing colonies, etc., to be

undertaken no longer by the old imperial powers, but by an international authority acting for the League and representing the dissatisfied powers as well as others;

(e) "extension of the mandate system." *

Barnes believes that if the present strangulation of international trade is to be avoided, England should revert to her traditional free trade policy. He advocates "an agreement between Britain, the Dominions, and India for the progressive reduction of inter-imperial tariffs and for leaving the way open to any other countries to join in the agreement on the same lines." † This means the abandonment of the Ottawa Agreement and the entire principle of imperial preference. Raw materials should be sold on the same terms to all the purchasers, except when economic sanctions are to be applied to a defaulting nation. If the supply of raw materials is to be restricted or controlled in some other way, "the interests of consumers should be safeguarded by governmental supervision and (the) consuming countries as such should be associated with that supervision." ‡ In return for throwing open her empire to low tariff, Britain should drive a hard bargain to the effect that all the nations which participate in such a privilege should strictly adhere to international agreements and conventions. In particular, she should demand "the return of Japan and Germany to the

* *The Future of Colonies*, p. 84.

† " " " p. 16.

‡ *L. Barnes: op. cit.*, p. 17.

League and the agreement of all the dynamic powers (a) to work the trusteeship principle in terms of the suggested reforms in the mandate system, (b) to sign a disarmament convention, and (c) to enter into a system of co-operative defence.”*

As regards the second and third suggestions, Barnes rightly reminds us that colonies and mandates are not the possession of any nation to give away as it pleases. They belong to the people of the land, and their interests should come first. Therefore, any transference which might be made should be with “the full and spontaneous consent” of the people concerned. Such transference should not take the form of paying blackmail to the disgruntled powers. It should be resorted to only as the last remedy, when every other remedy fails.

The fourth suggestion—placing mandates and colonies under an international authority—is ideally the best solution. But it is not likely to work satisfactorily at least in the beginning. Condominiums are generally failures. The only condominium which is a partial success is that of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the reason for which is to be found in the fact that Egypt’s share in the condominium is merely nominal.

Barnes places much emphasis upon his last suggestion, *viz.* the extending of the mandate system. This means, according to the same authority, “(a) that Britain should accept the supervision of the League, acting through the Mandate Commission, in respect of territories now held as colonies or protectorates, and (b) that the present

The Future of Colonies, p. 45.

supervisory powers of the League should be made wider and more strict."* Countries which are already ripe for self-government such as India, Burma, and Ceylon should be assisted speedily to reach their goal. If they still require the assistance of the advanced countries of the West, it is better that it should take the form of supply of experts, advisers, and administrators by an international body like the League of Nations than indefinite tutelage to a single country. In the other possessions which come under this new mandate system, the open door should be maintained; the interests of the people of the land should be given the first consideration; "there should be no militarisation either of population or of territory;" † the Mandates Commission should exercise strict supervision over all the territories transferred to its jurisdiction.

Other suggestions which have been made for improving imperialism are:—(a) Do not leave the fate of the indigenous population to the white settlers. Both Woolf and Barnes trace many of the internal difficulties in South Africa and Kenya to the selfish and grabbing policy pursued by the white settlers there. Judging from the Colour Bar, Class Areas Bill, etc., it would seem as though the granting of Dominion Status to the Union of South Africa in 1909 was premature. The colonial office might have pursued a more sympathetic policy towards the Negroes.

* L. Barnes: *op. cit.*, p. 36.

† " " " p. 37.

In particular, the alienation of native land and the exploitation of native labour should be forbidden by the imperial country or by an international body. In Southern and Eastern Africa virtual wage-slavery prevails, involving "minimum of rights and maximum of obligations." Barnes says: "The reform of 'conditions analogous to slavery' to-day constitutes a graver practical problem even than the abolition of what remains of slavery itself."* Racial tyranny is justified as being in the interest of "the natives." The present situation could have been avoided if the recommendations of the Parliamentary Commission of 1837 had been carried out: "(1) So far as the lands of the Aborigines are within any territories over which the dominion of the Crown extends, the acquisition of them by Her Majesty's subjects upon any title of purchase, grant, or otherwise, from their present proprietors, should be declared illegal and void. (e) The protection of natives is not a trust which could conveniently be confided to colonial legislatures." †

(b) Restrict the free flow of private capital into backward areas. Vested interests, particularly of foreign origin, often constitute the most serious hindrance to the advancement of a country. If this situation is to be avoided, it is necessary to bring the movement of capital under League control. Barnes suggests the advisability of constituting an International Board of Colonial Investment "which would raise loans, allocate funds for

* The Duty of Empire, p. 55.

† Quoted by Barnes: The Duty of Empire, p. 182.

works in mandated territories, and secure an equitable allocation of contracts to the several member states. Private investment for development purposes should cease so far as financial and administrative technique can prevent it."*

(c) Fit the backward areas for self-government as soon as possible on the basis of indigenous institutions. L. Barnes believes that British administration in India, though efficient, has not much soul. The reason for it he traces to the fact that indigenous organizations are neglected. "For Indians the whole structure of government is an imposition, not an evocation."† L. Woolf writes: "Unless Europe does its best to help Asia to pass from imperialist subjection to complete independence without resistance and friction the world may find itself faced with a conflict and outburst of nationalism compared with which the Great War was the mildest of evils."‡

(d) As long as outside control is necessary, it is better on the whole to have partial control than complete control; indirect control based on indigenous institutions and culture than direct control; international control than national control.

(e) A very useful suggestion made by Barnes is that, inasmuch as imperialism and capitalism are intimately linked together, it is necessary to substitute socialism for capitalism in the "mother country," if imperialism is

* L. Barnes: *The Future of Colonies*, p. 89.

† *The Duty of Empire*, p. 111.

‡ L. Woolf: *Imperialism and Civilisation*, p. 70.

to undergo profound modification. In the author's own words: "Some sort of socialist revolution in Britain is a pre-condition of every tolerable imperial system." The "liberation and development of the colonies is inter-dependent with the socialisation of Britain. Neither can take place without the other. They are two aspects of a single inter-locked process."* According to R. Fox † "The issue of the struggle of the British working class, the question of socialism in England, cannot be considered apart from the liberation of the peoples of the Empire." ‡ The British character needs to be socialised and internationalised before imperialism can be modified or abandoned.

Imperialism, we are convinced, is not *finally* possible. Schuman believes that "the days of the empires are numbered, even though their decline will inevitably be slow and gradual." † Parker Moon holds that imperialism is the survival of a mid-Victorian policy in a very un-Victorian age. If imperialism is to justify itself during the transitional period, it is necessary that the "imperialism of responsibility" should rapidly replace the "imperialism of exploitation." More than mere lip service should be paid to such declarations as that of the British Colonial Office in 1923: "Primarily Kenya is an African territory, and His Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African

* The Duty of Empire, p. 275.

† The Colonial Policy of British Imperialism, p. 11.

‡ F. L. Schuman: op. cit., p. 624.

natives must be paramount, and that if, and when those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail."

Ismail of Egypt lays down what he considers to be the duties of foreigners in a backward country, which apply equally well to imperialist rulers and statesmen.

"To accept government only if by so doing you benefit the race you rule;

"To lead, not drive, the people to a higher civilisation;

"To abandon relations with your native land;

"To resist other governments, and keep intact the sovereignty of the state whose bread you eat;

"To represent the native when advisingon any question which your own or any foreign government may wish solved; and in this

"To have for prop and guide that which is universally right throughout the world, that which is best for the people of the state you serve."

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CHAPTER III

Internationalism.

I. The Meaning of Internationalism.—We are living in a world in which the need for international co-operation and international control is most pressing. The world is no longer divided into water-tight compartments. It is increasingly becoming a single unit. Modern scientific discoveries—the railway, the steamship, the telegraph, the telephone, the cable, and the radio have annihilated distance. The economic needs of man have so greatly multiplied in recent times that an adequate satisfaction of them requires the resources of the whole world. Epidemics are no longer confined to any single part of this planet. The influenza, making its first appearance in Spain, soon spreads over the entire world and takes a heavy toll of human lives in every part of the globe. A political murder taking place in a remote corner of Europe immediately involves the entire world in the most deadly war that we have ever seen, resulting in the loss of millions of lives and in the destruction of incalculable wealth and resources. A proletarian revolution breaking out in far-away Russia gradually wins adherents in every part of the civilized world. The news service, the cinema, and the radio keep us informed of the latest happenings in the world. Fashions in dress set in Paris, London, and New York become the order of the day everywhere.

Labour strikes and upheavals in one part of the world evoke the sympathy of working classes elsewhere. Oppression and injustice to a religious group in one section of the world soon bring to its side the sympathy and support of fellow-religionists outside its own borders.

In the light of all this, it is midsummer madness to act as though our first and last concern was the immediate neighbourhood in which we lived or the national or political group to which we belonged. We are surely living in an inter-dependent world in which what concerns one people sooner or later has its repercussion upon every other people. Dr. Norwood of the City Temple, London, is right when he says that the keyword of our age is the prefix 'inter' signifying between, among, mutually, reciprocally. "We are members one of another." * If mankind is to save itself from the catastrophe which awaits it, it should replace national exclusiveness by international inclusiveness; the doctrine of national sovereignty by the doctrine of international solidarity. "International-mindedness" on the part of the civilized world is the pre-requisite to its future progress, if not to its very existence.

If internationalism is of such utmost importance to us, it is obvious that we cannot go very far in adjusting ourselves to it without first making its meaning clear to ourselves.

(a) Internationalism is not mere *sentimentalism*. It is not a pious, sentimental, quasi-religious cloak to be put on during times of peace and to be cast off as

*Ephesians, 4: 25.

soon as the War Office declares a crusade against the "backward" peoples of the world, or against those who seek to subvert "justice and democracy." Witness, for example, "the International Labour Union which crumbled like the walls of Jericho at the trumpet call of war" and the World Student Federation which "disintegrated at the call of the military." An internationalism which stirs up our feelings without convincing the head is bound to be short-lived. Of such internationalism, it may truly be said that it is "as pious as a cat when the meat is out of reach"!

(b) Internationalism is not a mere *utopia*. It does not promise a new heaven and a new earth. The Utopian internationalist labours under the misconception that, in the twinkling of an eye, we can transcend all our differences of race, language, religion, and culture, and become brothers and sisters to one another and vie with each other in acts of goodwill and fellowship and universal love. An internationalist of this kind, if he happens to be a Scotsman, imagines the world to be composed of black Scotch, brown Scotch, yellow Scotch, and the genuine Scotch! The Negro is, to him, an Anglo-Saxon who happens to have a black skin. It is needless to say that internationalism of this kind is absolutely visionary and has no relation to facts. Internationalism does not aim at the eradication of differences. It aims at working them into a larger whole.

(c) Internationalism is not identical with *cosmopolitanism*. Cosmopolitanism forgets our inherent national differences and seeks to mould mankind after a

single pattern. But that is death. Life is variety, and without variety there is no change, and without change there can be no progress. In connection with biological evolution, Darwin discovered long ago the need for variety, for without variety, he rightly held, there could be no selection. Internationalism provides room for political experimentation. Its goal is a large number of nation-states, each seeking to arrive at the best form of government suitable for its needs. Its aim is not uniformity of life, ideas, or ideals. It does not even aim at identically the same laws for the whole world. It believes in diversity in unity. Cosmopolitanism spells death and the crushing of individuality.

(d) Internationalism is not synonymous with a *Super-State*, at least at the present stage of our social evolution. Mankind is not yet ripe for complete world-government or for world citizenship. The public is not yet ready to countenance the idea of a world army, a world navy, and a world air force, for it believes that such international forces would result in the destruction of patriotism. It is not even prepared to countenance the idea of an international police force. "International government" at present is not government in the real sense of the word, as it lacks the physical power to enforce its decisions. It is an organ of influence and advice, but "influence," as has aptly been remarked, "is not government."

(e) Internationalism ought not to mean a combination of the big nations of the world against the small nations. A League of Nations ought not to become a league of

robbers, notwithstanding recent events in Manchuria and Abyssinia.

Speaking positively, it may be said that internationalism stands for a family of self-respecting and self-governing nations united to each other by ties of equality and living at peace and concord with each other. At the present stage of human development at least, a sound nationalism is a prelude to a sound internationalism. In the words of B. Joseph: "nationality is the necessary link between man and humanity." Ramsay Muir writes: "It is only on the basis of triumphant nationalism.....that an effective internationalism can be realised."*

To quote from an earlier work of the present writer: "Militarism and jingoism or what has earlier been described as 'wolf-pack nationalism,' is surely an enemy of internationalism. But nationalism of a cultural, moral, and spiritual kind which follows the principle of 'live and let live' is an ally of internationalism. The fact that I love the group to which I belong does not in any way mean that I should despise other groups. On the other hand, my love for my group must make me understand and respect the love and devotion which others have for their groups. "All true love is holy and love does not breed hatred!" In the words of William Lloyd Garrison: "Our country is the world, our countrymen are all mankind: We love the land of our nationality as we love all other lands." †

* Ramsay Muir: *Nationalism and Internationalism*, p. 7.

† *The Message of the Kingdom of God*, p. 240.

II. The History of Internationalism.—Although the ancient city-states of Greece were self-governing and, for the most part, self-sufficing, there existed between them practically all the relations which exist between nation-states. They declared war with each other, concluded peace, observed truce for the burial of the dead, exchanged ambassadors and envoys, entered into leagues and confederations, and at times even maintained a balance of power between them. They further made a distinct contribution to the idea of settling disputes by arbitration and adjudication. In spite of these features of internationalism, the Greek city-state remained an exclusive unit. The Greeks looked upon the outside world as barbarians. In later times they observed certain ill-defined rules towards them and frequently used "the laws of all mankind" in relation to them.

Warfare between the city-states was quite common. It was marked by cruelty and severity. Booty was divided among the victors. Prisoners of war were put to death or sold into slavery. The later Greeks, however, were more humane to them.

Greek exclusiveness was broken down by Stoic cosmopolitanism during the declining days of Greece. The Stoics taught that all men were naturally brothers and that they were fellow-citizens in a world republic. This cosmopolitan teaching of theirs, along with the doctrine of natural law, to which they first gave full expression in the Western world, had profound influence on later times. Cosmopolitanism soon expanded into

humanitarianism and had a far-reaching effect upon Christianity and the institution of slavery. Natural law which was understood to mean a law universally just and unchangeable, to be interpreted by man's reason, influenced Roman law, and, in turn, the international law of later times.

*Rome began her political career as a city-state but soon became a world-wide empire by a series of military conquests. Her way of securing peace was by force and by creating a world state. The Roman theory of international relations was more primitive and elementary than that of the Greeks. In concluding peace, however, Rome entered into some permanent relationship of alliance with the former enemy. At first Rome dealt with neighbouring cities on terms of equality; but later she treated them as vassals, subordinate to Rome. Foreigners were treated more liberally in Rome than in the Greek city-state. The foreign policy of Rome was guided by shrewd considerations of self-interest. In estimating the justice and legality of international acts, Rome always applied her own standards.

Rome expanded her empire just as much by diplomacy and statecraft as by force. The policy of Rome was to sow discord among different nations, to aid the weaker in overthrowing the stronger, and finally to bring both under her control. It was a policy of 'divide and rule.' Rome used her allies to her own advantage. She frequently evaded treaties by subterfuge and

* The paragraphs on Rome are condensed from R. G. Gettell: History of Political thought, Chapter IV.

practised injustice under the guise of equity. The Roman theory considered the empire as the only legal state and, from the point of view of international law, other states did not exist. The *jus gentium* was applied only to the peoples who were the allies of Rome. With others no legal relations whatever were recognised.

Notwithstanding these defects in the Roman character and administration, Rome brought practically the whole of the civilised world into a single political system. She further prepared the way for the later growth of international law. The creation of common citizenship, the maintenance of the *Pax Romana*, and the impartial administration of justice over other nations—all these had far-reaching effects. They broke down the social and racial barriers between nations, as well as the idea that foreigners were naturally inferiors and enemies. Subjection to a common superior and to a universal law contributed in the middle ages to the creation of a law among nations. Equally important in this direction was the idea of a *jus gentium*, a body of rules and usages common to divers peoples. Later, Roman jurisprudence identified the general principles of *jus gentium* with the law of nature. These principles the Romans considered to be universal principles applicable to all nations. Towards the close of the Middle Ages, the founders of international law availed themselves of these general principles and applied them to international practice and made them serve as a basis for modern international law.

Cosmopolitanism was the characteristic note of the Middle Ages. Both the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire were wedded to the ideal of universalism, although the former came nearer to its realisation than the latter. The Church was so influential that it was able to give direction to the moral, religious, and intellectual life of Western Europe. Even in political affairs "it gave strength and reality to the unity of Christendom." In all matters which involved ultimate moral issues the Church was universally accepted as the arbiter. In carrying out its decisions, it found such disciplinary measures as the interdict and excommunication of great value. Towards the close of the Middle Ages, however, papacy began to decline. It lost a considerable part of its power and prestige as a result of the Babylonish Captivity and the Great Schism which followed closely on its heels. But even after this decline the arbitrary authority of the Pope was generally accepted by the European people. Witness, for example, Alexander Borgia, one of the worst men that ever sat on the papal throne, dividing the non-European world between Spain and Portugal.

The modern period began with the Renaissance and the Reformation, and both these movements gave a death blow to the moral influence of the Church. Even before this time the power of the Pope had received a rude shock at the hands of Marsiglio of Padua and Machiavelli. But the final blow came with the Protestant Reformation. To the question who was to be the arbiter of the moral law, Luther's answer was "each

prince within his own territory." This teaching of Luther's, in addition to destroying the moral unity of Christendom, paved the way for the modern doctrines of nationality and national sovereignty. "In proportion as the sentiment of nationality grew in strength the sentiment of the unity of civilization seemed to decay." * The mediaeval idea of a world-state gradually disappeared. Although it still played a part in the writings of poets and philosophers till as late as the eighteenth century, it had no effect whatever upon the evolution of social and political organizations.

With the growth of nationalism, trade, and commerce, the jealousies between peoples increased and Europe became divided into numerous rival groups, each striving to gain mastery over the rest. War became the order of the day. Between 1470 and 1721 there was a war every year in some part of Europe or other. Between 1721 and 1814 were fought in succession the war of the Austrian succession, the Seven Years' War, the wars of the French Revolution, and the wars of Napoleon. During the last eight centuries, England was at war during 419 years. † It was with the nineteenth century that international ideas began to take shape. Curiously enough, it was in the same century that the nationalistic idea reached its full growth and imperialism made its greatest advances in Africa and Asia.

* Ramsay Muir : op. cit., p. 130.

† R. L. Buell : op. cit., p. 475.

✓ Various efforts were made prior to the nineteenth century to bring close together the peoples of Europe and maintain permanent peace among them. (1) In the first place, several schemes were prepared with a view to bringing the different peoples of Europe under a common authority which would be able to compel peace. All these schemes met with failure, because they aimed at the mere perpetuation of the *status quo*. One of these schemes was that of the great French statesman, the *Duc de Sully*, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, attributed by him to the French King, Henry IV. Its chief merit is that it breaks away from the mediæval idea of a world-state and recognises the autonomy of the existing states. Sully foresaw, however dimly, the necessity for national independence in any scheme of world peace. He fully realised the impracticability of the mediæval cosmopolitan ideal. The national idea which he anticipated was still in its early stages and did not reach maturity till the nineteenth century.

According to this scheme, known as the "Grand Design," Europe was to be constituted into a "Christian Republic." Russia was to be excluded from it as being too backward and barbarous. The Ottoman Empire was to be considered as a common enemy. The Republic was to consist of six hereditary monarchies, five elective monarchies, and four republics. Over the republic was to preside the Romano-Germanic Emperor, assisted by a Council or Perpetual Senate "consisting of 64 Commissioners, who were to debate questions of common

interest and preserve peace by settling disputes between nations." * To carry out its decision the Council was to have at its disposal an international army and navy, a suggestion which was revived by Premiers Tardieu and Herriot of France in the Disarmament Conference of 1932.

The next important scheme was put forward by the *Abbe de St. Pierre*, immediately after the Congress of Utrecht (1713) in which he had taken part. The scheme received great attention at the time and was considered by the German philosopher, Leibnitz, to be both practicable and desirable. It continued to influence the thinking of European statesmen even after the close of the Napoleonic Wars. The underlying principle of the scheme is that the whole of Europe is a single society and that no one state should be so strong as to domineer over the rest of Europe. If the civilization of Europe was to be preserved, St. Pierre held that the several states of Europe should live in mutual dependence on each other. All the sovereigns of Europe were to enter into a contract pledging themselves to maintain the territorial integrity of each other, to suppress revolutions and keep monarchs on their thrones. If any of the powers should break the agreement or refuse to carry out the decisions of the alliance, force of arms was to be brought to bear upon it. Differences between states were to be settled by arbitration and not by war. "Utrecht was to be designated as the City of Peace. Each state would maintain agents there who

* J. Bryce : *International Relations*, p. 18.

would constitute an assembly, authorised to keep the peace and to enact, by majority vote, all laws necessary and proper to give effect to its decisions and to achieve the objects of the alliance." *

In spite of several valuable features the scheme did not succeed as a whole owing to the following reasons : (a) It assumed the inviolability of treaties. It overlooked the fact that, however sacred treaties may be, they cannot be considered inviolable in an ever-changing world. The first lesson to learn in international relations is that treaties, particularly those concluded at the end of a war, need to be re-examined from time to time in order that a just settlement may be reached. Mere maintenance of the *status quo* does not necessarily mean justice, and justice, it need hardly be said, is the very foundation of permanent peace. (b) St. Pierre did not realise the strength of the national idea. He was unaware of the truth that the well-being of mankind demands that, as far as possible, political boundaries should coincide with national boundaries. (c) The Alliance which St. Pierre sketched, being one between despotic princes and not between peoples, meant the perpetuation of a system of government for which there could be no justification. It meant the supporting of despotic princes and iniquitous dynastic arrangements against the welfare of the subjects.

The Abbe's essay was used as the basis of discussion by *Jean Jacques Rousseau*, who came to the conclusion that it was the foreign relations of states which were

* R. L. Schuman : op. cit., pp. 225-226.

responsible for international strife and warfare. He, accordingly, put forth the idea that the states of Europe should be organised into a federation and placed under the rule of law. A common tribunal was to be set up for passing necessary rules and regulations for the governance of the federation. Secession from the federation was to be resisted, by force if necessary. The five specific articles which Rousseau laid down are : (a) The States should enter into a lasting and irrevocable alliance and disputes between them were to be settled by means of arbitration or judicial decision. (b) Each member State, whether small or big, was to have one vote in the Congress or Diet, and the presidency of this body was to be rotated among the members. Each member State was to contribute a certain proportion of the expenses (c) The federation as a whole was to guarantee to each member its territorial integrity and its existing form of government. (d) If any member violated the terms of the contract, it was to be proscribed as a public enemy and military sanctions were to be applied to it. (e) The plenipotentiaries in the congress, by a three-fourths vote, were to be empowered to frame rules which could be applied to all.

The work of Rousseau was taken up by *Jeremy Bentham* in his "Principles of International Law" (1786-1789). He has the distinction of first using the word "international" in the English language. He was opposed to war and held it to be "mischief on the greatest scale." It was his belief that wars could be averted by "defensive alliances, general guarantees,

disarmament, and the abandonment of colonial imperialism." * He was convinced that secret diplomacy, tariffs, bounties, and colonies were all inimical to world peace and should therefore be abolished. Bentham rendered further service to the cause of internationalism by codifying the laws of several countries.

The last great philosopher of the eighteenth century to give his attention to the question of world peace was the celibate philosopher of Königsberg, *Immanuel Kant*. In his celebrated essay, "Towards Eternal Peace," Kant outlines a federal scheme for the maintenance of peace. The principles laid down are "the maintenance of the independence of all states, the acceptance of the principle of non-intervention and the gradual abolition of standing armies." † Kant further advocates republican constitutions for all the states and world citizenship. His teachings hardly had any influence upon the course of events.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century, Napoleon gave some attention to the question of world peace. He realised the importance of the principle of nationality and was the first among modern statesmen to come to the conclusion that a triumphant nationalism was the basis upon which a successful internationalism could be built. If we are to believe the record of *Les Cases*, the object of Napoleon's wars was to re-draw the map of Europe along national lines and combine the newly

* F. L. Schuman : op. cit., p. 236.

† do. do. p. 237.

constituted states into a federation under the leadership of France.

(2) *The evolution of international law.* While diplomats, philosophers, and warriors were engaged in outlining schemes for maintaining the peace of the world, development took place along a totally different line, but aiming at the same goal. This was the evolution of international law. It was largely the work of the Dutch jurist, *Hugo Grotius*, in the seventeenth century, who later came to be known among jurists as "the father of international law." Living as he did in a period of wars and internecine strife, Grotius saw the great need for peace. In working out a system of international law he derived great help from the Roman ideas of *jus gentium* and *jus naturale*, which were later fused into a single system of natural law, from the body of customs which had been observed between states through the centuries, and from innumerable treaty relations into which states had entered with each other. From the conception of "the State of nature" Grotius derived the idea of the equality of all states—an idea which has come down to modern times. Unlike later writers, he held that sovereignty was neither absolute nor unlimited. It was subject to divine law, the law of nature, and the law of nations, as well as to agreements entered into between the rulers and ruled.

(3) A third line of development which took place in the modern period is the formation of congresses of European powers for the settlement of disputes. Such

congresses were unknown both to the middle ages and to the ancient world. The important among these congresses were attended by representatives of so many European powers that they may almost be regarded as European diets or parliaments. They concerned themselves not only with questions of territorial adjustments arising on the close of wars, but also with questions of general interest.

These congresses in a more developed form continued all through the nineteenth century. Between 1815 and 1825 serious efforts were made to federate the whole of Europe.

The leading spirit of these efforts was Tsar Alexander I of Russia. He was "a sentimentalist and a dreamer, an egoist and an altruist at once"* with a sincerely religious nature. His ideas began to take shape in 1804 during the days of Napoleon's glory. He outlined a scheme for the permanent pacification of Europe, known as the Holy Alliance, incorporating into it such ideas as arbitration and mediation and the nascent idea of nationality. The scheme was submitted to Pitt for approval, but he gave it lukewarm support. Nevertheless, as a result of negotiations Britain and Russia entered into a treaty in 1805 to co-operate with each other in establishing a federative system of Europe, in insuring the "independence of the weaker states," and in erecting a "formidable barrier against the more powerful."

* R. Muir: *op. cit.*, p. 155.

For nine years the scheme was not put into operation. The war-weary Europe in 1814 longed for permanent peace and hoped to secure it through the Congress of Vienna. Tsar Alexander came to the forefront again with his Holy Alliance in 1815. It was entered into by Alexander, Francis of Austria, and Frederick William of Prussia. This Alliance was responsible for an elaborate treaty arrangement with every part of Europe, exclusive of the Turkish Empire. It planned for a series of congresses from time to time, the significance of these congresses being that they were the first in European history summoned to organize peace. At the first of these congresses held in Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 France was admitted to membership. A League of Peace was formed, but it soon became an engine of oppression. For about 30 years it continued giving Europe "an uneasy peace." Although it failed, and deserved to fail, it is remembered in history as "the first great practical experiment in the organization of *respublica Christiana*" *

The reasons for its failure, as analysed by Ramsay Muir, are: (a) It did not give full recognition to the principle of nationality, as for instance in its promise to annex Norway to Sweden. (b) It made the treaty rigid and did not provide machinery for its periodic revision. (c) It became "in essence a League of despots for combined resistance against the claims of their subjects."† (d) It intervened in the internal affairs of individual states.

* R. Muir: op. cit., p. 164.

† " " p. 167.

The lessons which we learn from the failure of the League of Peace are: (a) No League can last long if it does not satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people. A fine adjustment between the rival claims of dynasties is a bed of sand on which to build a League of Peace. (b) A treaty on which a League is based should not become so sacrosanct that it is incapable of orderly change. (c) "The League must essentially be a league of people and not of sovereigns." * (d) The League should abstain from interference in the internal affairs of individual states.

The achievements of the League, to use R. Muir's analysis again, may be summed up as follows: (a) It gave a more formal endorsement to International Law than had been the case hitherto. (b) It recognised a new principle in international affairs in the neutralisation of Switzerland—protection of weak states by the strong. (c) The idea of the concert of Europe continued in spite of its temporary setback.

(a) *Development of international law from 1815 to 1914.* International law was still vague in 1815 and diplomats continued to call it the Law of Nations. Nevertheless, some important additions were made to its scope in the nineteenth century. In 1815 the rights of navigation on rivers passing through more than one country were defined. Several declarations were made against slave trade, and these were interpreted by the Berlin Conference of 1885 to mean the illegality of slave trade from the point of view of international law.

* R. Muir: *op. cit.*, p. 129.

During the second half of the nineteenth century several "legislative congresses" were held. The Declaration of Paris in 1856 prohibited profiteering and defined naval blockade. The Conference of Geneva in 1864 and 1868 laid down rules regarding the wounded and their attendants on the battlefield. The Red Cross code was a direct outcome of this conference and was observed everywhere in the world, till the other day when it was flagrantly violated by Italy in the Italo-Abyssinian War. A conference held at St. Petersburg in 1867 "prohibited the use of explosives or expanding bullets in civilised warfare."* The significance of all these acts lies in the fact that European powers for the first time recognised the need of common legislation.

Besides this advance in passing measures in relation to military questions, advance was also made in promoting the art of peace. Several postal conferences were held to establish uniform rates of postage. Uniform copyright rules were passed for the whole of Europe in the conference of Bern in 1887.

A conference was held at the Hague in 1899, and again in 1907, to regulate armaments. It was attended by every civilised state. Although it failed in effecting disarmament, it succeeded in "the task of revising, clarifying, and codifying the whole body of international law affecting the conduct of war,"† and in thus

* Ramsay Muir: *op. cit.*, p. 172.

† Do. do. p. 173.

placing international law on a new and strong footing. The first Hague conference succeeded in setting up an international tribunal for the arbitration of disputes. It was not an international court sitting in permanent session. It was in the nature of a panel of jurors from which the parties to an arbitration could make a selection. Appeal to the tribunal was not compulsory but optional. The second session of the Hague Conference held in 1907 sought to draw up a list of subjects for compulsory arbitration, but failed in the attempt. The Hague Tribunal set up in 1900 was not "a piece of sentimental Utopianism" (R. Muir). It provided the machinery which could be developed as time went on for the pacific settlement of international disputes. The idea of arbitration had taken such deep root in the early years of the nineteenth century that on the eve of the Great War nearly all civilised states were pledged to amicable settlement of disputes by arbitration.

(b) *The Neutrality of States.* The neutrality and independence of Switzerland was recognised early in the nineteenth century and this status has been respected both by Switzerland and the rest of Europe till to-day. The neutrality of Belgium also was recognised in 1831 and 1839, but after a period of more than eighty years it was ruthlessly violated by the might of Germany.

(c) *The concert of Europe* initiated in 1815, barring a few trifling exceptions, gave two long periods of peace to Europe from 1815 to 1848 and from 1878 to 1912. Even during the intervals when there was no

peace and when wars were being fought in order to assert the nationalist principle, the concert was active. The Partition of Africa which took place in the last quarter of the nineteenth century was peacefully brought about by the concert. It was a useful organization so far as it went, but it divided Europe into two warring camps. Between 1878 and 1891 Germany was able to dominate the European situation by means of the Triple Alliance. France and Russia which were the excluded powers joined hands together. England kept aloof from the concert on account of her insular position and was able to exercise a mediating influence till the outbreak of the War in 1914.

III. *Functions of Internationalism.* It is too late in the day to argue a case for effective international organization. In spite of the Concert of Europe of the nineteenth century and the League of Nations of the twentieth, we have only made a halting advance in the direction of internationalism. As time goes on jingoism and chauvinism should decrease and internationalism increase. The purpose of internationalism is to secure peace and the fruits of peace. It is to organise effectively the good-will and enlightened public opinion of the nations of the world so that they can live together in peace and concord with each other.

Some of the important functions which a sound international organization may be expected to fulfil are :—

- (a) Destruction of the war mentality and discouragement of the tendency to resort to war in the settlement of international disputes; promotion of disarmament and removal of causes provocative of war.
- (b) Inducement of the nations of the world to have recourse to arbitration, adjudication, and conciliation.
- (c) Destruction of the profit, power, and prestige motives of nations to-day and substitution of service and humanitarian motives for them.
- (d) Guardianship of subordinate nationalities of backward peoples, as in the case of the mandatory system of the League of Nations.
- (e) Determination of the eligibility of weaker nationalities to Statehood.
- (f) Removal of social and economic grievances by such means as legislation relating to health, labour conditions, minimum hours of work and minimum wages, abolition of white slave traffic, and regulation of opium and drug traffic.
- (g) Promotion of international co-operation.
- (h) Promotion of intellectual co operation and the cross-fertilisation of cultures.

In the fulfilment of these functions, an international organization should not use force, at least for the present. It may use moral persuasion and economic pressure. With the progress of time it may be necessary

to have international army, navy, and air force for police purposes.

IV. *Internationalism in the twentieth century: The League of Nations.* The greatest advance in internationalism has been made in the first quarter of the twentieth century, at least from the point of view of machinery. What is lacking is the will to international co-operation and international control. Nevertheless, public opinion is gradually veering round to internationalism, and it is reasonable to hope that before the century is over, internationalism will become as much a natural and normal part of men's thinking as nationalism and imperialism have been hitherto.

One of the blessings in disguise for which the Great War was responsible is the League of Nations. Even the most enthusiastic supporters of the League cannot claim that it has been an unqualified success. While it has done great good, it has failed to prevent war and injustice in several cases. Nevertheless, it is a movement in the right direction. It must be reformed and strengthened, and not abolished. Without it conditions would be much worse than they really are to-day. Its failures have been largely in the domain of "high politics," while in the field of international co-operation in non-political matters, it has achieved considerable success. Hitherto, it has been an association of sovereign nations. What is required is that it should become an association of peoples. A confederation of governments alone, each striving for its own ends, can never attain success.

The Genesis of the League of Nations. The League came into existence on the conclusion of the Great War. The idea of a League was not new to the statesmen who helped to create it. It was not the work of any single individual or of any single generation, although Woodrow Wilson, the then President of America, had a greater share in making it a practical reality than any other statesman. For this reason he is rightly regarded as the "Father of the League of Nations." He believed in it whole-heartedly and worked for it in the face of grim opposition. He argued that a durable peace must be a "peace without victory." On Jan. 8, 1918, he issued his famous programme of fourteen points. The last of these declared : "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to governments and small States alike." On November 11, 1918 the armistice was signed and the War came to a close. The Peace conference began its work in Paris in January 1919. Several drafts of the League covenant were prepared. The final draft was adopted on April 28, 1919 and the League saw the light of day on January 1, 1920. In order to win over the European statesmen whose enthusiasm for the League was lukewarm, Wilson was obliged to tie it up to the Peace Treaties, which contained many unjust and impracticable conditions and which have been responsible for much trouble in recent years.

The Nature, Scope, and Functions of the League are clearly summed up by the Information Section of

the League as follows : "It is not a separate organization existing apart from and above the States of which it is composed. It is international, not supernational . . . It seeks agreement in which it may or may not be successful, but failure to accept its decisions or recommendations involves no penalty . . . The League is, in fact, a body of States working together on a common basis, seeking to promote their common interests in one co operative effort for the purpose of which they have voluntarily agreed beforehand to observe certain rules of conduct, and, in the mutual interest, to limit their freedom of action in certain directions."

The general purpose of the League as set forth in the preamble to the Covenant is as follows :—

"The High Contracting Parties,

In order to promote international co-operation, and
to achieve international peace and security,
by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to
war, by the prescription of open, just, and
honourable relations between nations,
by the firm establishment of the understandings
of international law as the actual rule of
conduct among Governments,
and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous
respect for all treaty obligations in the
dealings of organised peoples with one
another,

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations,"

The primary concern of the League is international
co-operation and international peace and security

Domestic questions are excluded from its purview. The question is sometimes asked whether the League is an alliance, a confederation, a partnership, a super-state, or a corporation. The answer is that it possesses some of the attributes of each of these, but it does not closely resemble any of them. As Schuman puts it: "It operates on States, by States, through States." * It is the most important international organisation to day and is bound to gain in strength and prestige with the passage of time. Thus, a question like Dominion Status for India cannot be taken up by the League.

The Covenant of the League consists of twenty-six articles. Of these, "the first seven deal with membership and structure, 8-21 deal with the League as an agency to keep the peace, and 22-25 with the League as an agency of international co operation." † Article 26 is concerned with the amendment of the Covenant. A close study of the Articles shows the objects of the League to be :—

- (a) Preservation and maintenance of the *status quo* as established by the Peace Conference;
- (b) Fulfilment of certain administrative and supervisory functions, such as the protection of national minorities, the supervision of the free city of Danzig, the administration of the Saar Valley, and the operation of the mandate system ;

* F. L. Schuman : op. cit., p. 258.

† F. L. Schuman : op. cit., p. 259.

- (c) Concern with problems of health, social questions, finances, importation, communication, and the like ; and,
- (d) Prevention of war and the pacific settlement of disputes.

Membership in the League and Withdrawal. There are two kinds of members : (a) original, (b) non-original. The original members are forty-two in number. New members admitted to the League since its inception are designated as non-original. The total membership to-day is fifty eight. Admission of new members requires two-thirds vote of the Assembly. The condition of membership is the promise to observe international obligations and disarmament regulations laid down by the League. Very small states such as San Marino, and Armenia are excluded from membership. Switzerland was allowed to become a member, although she was not prepared to fulfil her military obligations on account of her neutralised status. The United States never became a member, because of the failure of the Senate to ratify the covenant. This failure was partly due to the American fear of "entangling alliances," and partly due to the virulent Republican campaign conducted against the Democratic President, Wilson. Although not a member, the United States of America has co-operated with the League in many of its activities. She has been sending representatives "in an advisory and consultative capacity." American financial experts-General Dawes and Young-have been closely associated with the reparations question. J. B. Moore,

C. E. Hughes, and F. Kellogg have been judges of the International Court of Justice. Japan and Germany have withdrawn from the League in recent years.

Withdrawal of membership requires two years' notice. Before withdrawing a member is required to fulfil all its obligations. A state which does not approve of an amendment to the covenant duly passed is allowed to withdraw without the necessary notice. A member which violates the Covenant may be expelled.

The Organs of the League. (1) *The Assembly.* Each member of the League, whether big or small, has one vote. In this practice is embodied the idea of the absolute equality of states found in the conception of the law of nature. Since the majority of the League members are small states, the League is practically controlled by them. Each member of the League is allowed to have three delegates, collectively exercising one vote. India and the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire are counted as separate states for this purpose. They are under no obligation to go into the same lobby with Britain on any matter. The delegates are chosen by the executive governments of their countries, and hence represent governments, rather than peoples. Sometimes prime ministers and ministers attend as delegates.

The Assembly meets once a year at Geneva beginning its session on the first Monday of September. Provision is made for special sittings. Any member may ask for a special session, but it has to be approved by a majority of members. Its business is conducted

in English and French. Much of its work is done through committees, there being six standing committees to deal with the important aspects of the League's work. Final debate takes place in the Plenary Assembly.

The agenda of the Assembly is prepared by the Secretary-General in consultation with the President of the Council. Questions proposed by an earlier Assembly, by the Council, or by any member of the League are included. "Under exceptional circumstances the Assembly may add new questions to the agenda; but it cannot pass upon them until four days after they have been reported by a Commission, unless the Assembly shall decide otherwise by a two-thirds vote."*

It is presided over by an elected President, who is assisted by twelve vice-presidents, six of whom are specially elected for the purpose and six are presidents of the standing committees.

The Functions of the Assembly fall under three general divisions; (a) elective, (b) constituent, and (c) deliberative. As an electoral body, it exercises the function of admitting new members to the League by a two-thirds majority. It also elects annually three of the nine non-permanent members of the Council by a majority vote. Once in every nine years, in conjunction with the Council, it elects by a majority vote fifteen judges and four deputy judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice. It further approves by a majority vote the Council nomination for the post of the Secretary-General.

* R. L. Buell: op. cit., p. 650.

As a constituent body, the Assembly has the power to amend the Covenant of the League in accordance with article 26, which reads :

"1. Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the members of the League whose representatives compose the Council, and by a majority of the members of the League whose representatives compose the Assembly.

2. No such amendment shall bind any member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a member of the League."

As a deliberative body, the Assembly has very wide functions. Article 3 of the Covenant says : "The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League affecting the peace of the world." According to Article 11, it is "the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding among nations upon which peace depends." It needs to be noted that this latter Article gives the League not only the right to use its good offices in settling disputes, but also the right to discuss policies which may give rise to disputes in the future. Finally, Article 19 gives the Assembly the right to advise the reconsideration by Members of treaties which have become inapplicable. This does not mean that the League can compel any state to modify an existing treaty without its consent.

A special function of the Assembly is the approval of the annual budget which amounts to \$ 5,000,000. This is not a very large sum compared with the amount annually spent on armaments. We are told that the League budget is only one-fifth of the cost of a single modern battleship. The budget is prepared by the Secretariat and is subject to revision by the Assembly. It is divided into three sections, one for the Secretariat and special organizations, one for the International Court of Justice, and one for the International Labour Office. The apportionment of the League expenses among the Member States is a task assigned to the Assembly. The total expenses are divided into one thousand units and a certain number of units are assigned to each State in accordance with its size, population, and political importance. Thus Great Britain pays a hundred and five units, France, seventy-nine units, Italy sixty units, India fifty-six units, and such small States as Albania, Haiti, and Liberia one unit each. Several States have been defaulters. Of the total income, approximately half is spent on the Secretariat, one third on the International Labour Office, and one tenth on the International Court, while printing the proceedings in English and French costs one tenth. No government in the world exercises such rigid economy as the League of Nations.

In the very nature of the case the work of the Assembly is of a general character. On account of its size and diversity, it cannot act as swiftly as the Council. Nevertheless, it exercises a general supervision

over the work of the Council and considers "general, political, economic and technical questions of international interest." *

The Assembly and the Council are assisted by a certain number of "Technical Organisations." One of the limitations of the Assembly is that it cannot arrive at any decision without a unanimous vote of the members present at the meeting. But since most of its acts are in the nature of recommendations, unanimity is not required. A simple majority will do. The representatives at the Assembly are the delegates of their respective governments. Therefore, they cannot vote independently, but under instructions from their foreign offices. No State is bound to carry out any of the decisions or arguments arrived at by a League body unless it is ratified by it. Some writers go so far as to say that all the acts of the Assembly are in the nature of recommendations, since they require ratification, and that, as such, a simple majority will do for any of them.

In spite of these limitations, the Assembly is a valuable body. It provides a ready platform for the discussion of international grievances and disputes. Even "domestic questions" which are not matter for arbitration by any League body can be discussed by the Assembly under Article 11 and, if they have an international bearing, they can be made the basis of a treaty, binding those powers which ratify it. Although the Council is a more influential body, in one case at least, namely, the Japanese occupation of Manchuria,

* Schuman: *op. cit.*, p. 262.

the League was able to deal with the situation more effectively than the Council. Finding itself unable to bring Japan to her senses in this case, the Council summoned an Extraordinary Session of the Assembly on March 3, 1932. Among other things the Assembly appointed a Committee of Nineteen to make recommendations with regard to the situation. Early in 1933 the Committee issued a report suggesting a solution along the lines recommended by the Lytton Commission. The report was discussed by the Assembly and passed by 42 to 1 votes, the only dissenting member being the Japanese delegate. The enraged public opinion of the world as expressed by this decisive vote was so telling that Japan subsequently withdrew from the League.

(2) *The Council* consists of three classes of members: (a) permanent, (b) non-permanent, and (c) special. The permanent members are the allies who won the War—Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. A place was provided for the United States, but since she never became a member of the League, her place has been forfeited. In 1926 Germany was admitted to a permanent seat on the Council, but she has lost it since her withdrawal from the League.

According to the Covenant, the "non-permanent" members were four in number, but this number could be increased by the Council with the approval of the Assembly. In 1922 it was increased from 4 to 6 and in 1926, when Germany was admitted to the League and a crisis was created by the German demand for a permanent seat on the Council, the number of

non-permanent members was still further increased to 9. These members are elected by the Assembly and since that body is controlled by small powers, the Council cannot act flagrantly against their wishes. The 1922 Assembly passed a resolution "saying that non-permanent members should be chosen, on the first ballot, by absolute majority of the Assembly, and if a further ballot was necessary, by a plurality."^{*} In 1926 when the number was increased to 9, it was laid down that one-third was to retire every three years and that the term was to be three years in duration. "By a two thirds vote the Assembly may declare non-permanent members re-eligible, may fix rules for the election of non-permanent members, and may, if it chooses, elect *in toto* an entirely new group of non-permanent members."[†] The present strength of the Council is 5 permanent members and 9 non-permanent members.

The Covenant provides for special members in these words: "Any member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to sit as a member (omitted in the French text) during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League." Such members, by convention, are not given the power to vote when the Council sits as an arbitral body. This limitation is in accordance with the maxim that no man may be a judge in his own case.

The Council holds four regular meetings a year. Provision is made for special sessions. They may be

^{*} R. L. Buell: op. cit., p. 660.

[†] F. L. Schuman: op. cit., p. 264.

called at the request of any one member represented on the Council or of three outside members. At the beginning of each session, the Secretary-General of the League presents a report on action taken on the earlier decisions of the Council. The President and Vice-President of the Council are elected annually by a majority vote of the Council. They are not eligible for election continually for two years.

The functions of the Council are as broad as those of the Assembly. The Council may deal with "any matter within the sphere of action of the League." Its most important function is the settlement of international disputes. In cases where the disputants refuse arbitration or adjudication, as well as in cases where these methods of settlement are not applicable, the Covenant requires that the matter should be referred to the Council for action. This means in other words that "non-justiciable" or "political" disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the Council. According to Article 15, "If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Art. 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council." During the time that a dispute is under consideration by the Council or the Assembly, the parties concerned are required not to go to war.

The powers of the Council can be increased by treaty agreements between the member States. It exercises executive, administrative, and supervisory functions in

connection with the Free City of Danzig, the Saar Valley, the Mandates, etc. [The Saar Valley was restored to Germany in 1935 as the result of a *plebiscite*, and so the League has no further jurisdiction over it]. It is vested with authority to mobilise sanctions against a Covenant-breaking State, as happened recently in the case of Italy. It "carries out recommendations of the Assembly, prepares plans for disarmament, nominates the Secretary-General, and approves his appointments to subordinate positions in the Secretariat." * "The Council and the Assembly, or their members, perform certain tasks jointly—such as the election of the judges to the World Court, the appointment of future secretaries general; increasing the number of members on the Council." † As in the case of the Assembly, a unanimous vote is required for all decisions and agreements. But on matters of procedure and several such matters, majority vote is sufficient.

The precise relation between the Assembly and the Council is not laid down in the Covenant. Some have confined the two bodies to the two houses of a modern legislature and others have compared the Assembly to a Parliament and the Council to a Cabinet. Both these comparisons are misleading. Although the Council has considerable powers, the Assembly is able to exercise much indirect pressure on it because it has the power to elect the non-permanent members of the Council, to control the League budget, and to review annually the

* F. L. Schuman: *op. cit.*, p. 265.

† R. L. Buell: *op. cit.*, p. 662

work of the Council. While the Assembly concerns itself largely with questions of "legislative" policy, the work of the Council is mostly semi-judicial and administrative. "Either body may discuss and examine any matter which is within the competence of the League." (Resolution of the First Assembly, 1920). The Assembly discusses thoroughly the annual reports of the Council and of the Secretariat. Buell believes it possible that "in the future the Council will evolve into a sort of international ministry responsible to the Assembly" *

(3) *The Secretariat*.—This body is considered by many to be the most important addition to the old conference system. It is the permanent administrative organ of the League machinery. Without it, the League cannot function, even a single day. It may be regarded as an International Civil Service. The universal experience of all modern States is that without a permanent Secretariat or Civil Service, the day to day routine work cannot be carried on satisfactorily. One of the defects of the old Conference system was that it had no regular machinery for planning its work beforehand, for collecting the necessary data, and for giving effect to its decisions. This deficiency has been made good by the Secretariat of the League of Nations. While not in itself an executive body, it is vested with administrative powers.

The Secretary-General is the head of the Secretariat. He is appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly. He in turn appoints other

* R L Buell; op. cit., p 663

Secretaries and members with the approval of the Council. There is no competitive examination for the appointment of these officials. Professional competence and a fair distribution of posts among the member States of the League are taken into account. The immediate subordinates of the Secretary-General are a Deputy Secretary-General and three under-secretaries. Once a person has been appointed to a place in the Secretariat, he is to regard himself as the servant of the League of Nations, and not of the particular State to which he belongs. The duties of the members of the Secretariat are not national, but international. During the period of service they are not allowed to accept any honour or decoration from their governments. There are altogether some 500 of them. The first Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond of England who, occupied the post from 1920-1933, did most valuable work in organising the work of the Secretariat on an efficient basis. His successor is M. Joseph Avenol of France.

The work of the Secretariat is divided into 12 sections, namely, the financial, economical, communications and transit, disarmament, health, social and humanitarian, mandates, international co operation and international bureaus, administrative commissions and minorities, legal, political, and information. Of these 12 sections, the political and international bureaus are presided over by under-secretaries. The rest are under the supervision of directors.

The work of the Secretariat is to collect data, prepare the agenda for the meetings of the Council and the

Assembly, summon meetings, keep records, communicate decisions and agreements to the member States for ratification, transmit recommendations for information and action, prepare drafts, and make suggestions for the solution of current international problems. It prepares and publishes the Official Journal of the League which contains minutes of the Assembly and Council proceedings. From all this it will be clear that the Secretariat is not a mere piece of machinery. It is the permanent adviser on international affairs. It provides the necessary continuity for the successful working of the League.

(4) *The Permanent Court of International Justice.*—

In the settlement of international disputes, Schuman traces five progressive stages. These are (a) enforcement of rights by self-help; (b) settlement by negotiation; (c) settlement by methods approaching arbitration; (d) arbitration; and (e) adjudication. These methods, as the same writer notes, roughly correspond in personal disputes to (a) duel or trial by battle; (b) discussion and compromise; (c) settlement outside of court through a meeting of agents; (d) resort to friends or neighbours as impartial moderators; and (e) recourse to courts, with juries to find facts and judges to apply the law of the land.

It is needless to say that the Permanent Court of International Justice belongs to the last stage. Prior to the formation of this Court in 1920 there was no genuine "International Court," much less a Permanent International Court. The first Hague Conference held in 1899

set up the Permanent Court of Arbitration which was neither "permanent" nor "court." The only thing permanent about it was the panel. A new tribunal was set up for each dispute. Resort to it was purely optional and voluntary. Between 1899 and 1925 it decided only eighteen cases, mostly relatively unimportant.

The second Hague Conference held in 1907 attempted to set up a really Permanent International Court, with a limited number of judges, meeting periodically at the Hague. Difficulty arose as regards the number of judges and the mode of selecting them. The result was that the plan failed. A later attempt to establish an International Prize Court also met with the same fate. The rock on which it foundered was disagreement over the international law to be applied.

In 1907 a court was established to judge cases between the five republics of Central America known as the Central American Court. It had compulsory jurisdiction over all questions "of whatsoever nature and no matter what their origin may be" It consisted of five judges, one elected by the legislature of each state. This court did not function satisfactorily owing to the domination of politics and the failure of Nicaragua to abide by the verdict of the court in a case in which she was concerned. Hence it was allowed to lapse.

In 1920 there came into existence the Permanent Court of International Justice. President Wilson regarded a court of this kind as a necessary part of the peace settlement. A constitution for the court was drawn up by a body of jurists and was adopted by the

Council and the Assembly. By 1921 a majority of the Members of the League approved of it. It consisted of eleven judges and four deputy judges. The formal opening of the court took place in 1922. In 1930 the number of permanent judges was increased to fifteen. The term of office is nine years. The judges are in a sense representatives of their nations, but are really international judicial officials. The system of electing is such that both big and small nations are represented on the bench. In the case of a state to a dispute which does not have its own national on the bench, it is allowed to select a judge. Thus, for the first time in world history, there has come into existence a genuine international tribunal superior to the old Hague tribunal both as regards composition and jurisdiction. The judges receive a handsome salary and sit at the Hague. They are required to have a sitting at least once a year.

The court has the competency to decide all cases of an international character submitted to it by the parties concerned. It also gives advisory opinion upon all questions submitted to it by the Council or the Assembly. Although such opinion has no binding effect, it is generally accepted. The interpretation of the League Covenant does not belong to the court. It finally belongs to the Member States. In the words of Politis: "The interpretation of the Covenant falls within the sovereign competence of the States Members of the League of Nations."

The powers of the court are much wider than those of the old Hague Tribunal. Article 13 gives the court

the power to deal with four types of cases. These are : (a) Interpretation of treaties, (b) questions of international law, (c) the extent and nature of reparations to be made for breaches of international obligation, and (d) determination of the existence of any situation, which if established would constitute a breach of such obligations.

The Committee of jurists who drew up the constitution of the court wanted that these four classes of disputes should be matter for compulsory arbitration. The Council of the League dissented and substituted instead "the Optional Clause." This clause means that if a government signs it, "it accepts as compulsory, *ipso facto* and without special convention," the jurisdiction of the World Court in the four classes of disputes. States which do not sign this clause are free to submit or not to submit such disputes to the court as they choose. Forty-two States have signed this clause. The Members of the League agree to submit to the Council for either arbitration or investigation such matters as cannot be settled by the Court.

Compulsory arbitration is likewise given to the Court by a large number of international treaties. It includes such questions as arise with regard to ports, waterways, and railways. "The minorities treaties, the mandates, the international conventions for the control of the arms and liquor traffic, the regulation of air navigation, the freedom of transit, and a number of other similar agreements provide, that any difference

over the interpretation of the treaty concerned shall be decided by the Permanent Court." *

The expenses of the Court are met by the League. Judgments are delivered by a majority vote and there is no appeal. If, however, a party to a dispute discovers a new fact which is relevant to the case it may appeal for revision of the judgment "within six months after the discovery of the fact and within ten years after the judgment." † For failure to fulfill the conditions of his appointment a judge can be removed from office by a unanimous vote of his colleagues.

In arriving at decisions, the Court uses international conventions and rules established under them by the agreement of the contracting states, international customs, the general principles of law recognised by civilised States, and judicial decisions and teachings of eminent publicists of the various nations.

(5) *The International Labour Organisation:* Labour has been a pioneer in internationalism. The first International Workingmen's Association was formed as early as 1864 in response to the Communistic Manifesto, "workers of all countries unite." This Association came to be known as the "First International" and lasted up to 1873. A second "International," was formed in 1889 and lasted up to the time of the Great War. It was hoped by some that this "International" would be able to stop the war by means of an international strike but the nationalist passion was so strong

* R. L. Buell: op. cit., p. 585.

† Do. do. p. 588.

that nothing could be done. The third "International" came into being with the success of the Soviet government in Russia.

Alongside of these revolutionary organisations "reformist" tendencies were in operation in different parts of the world. It was felt that if justice were to be meted out to the labouring people, it was necessary to have international legislation. Better conditions of labour in one country could easily be undone by the exploitation of labour in other countries. An International Labour Conference held in Berne in 1906 signed two conventions, the first prohibiting night-work for women in factories, subject to certain exceptions; and the second prohibiting the use of white phosphorous in the manufacture of matches. Both these conventions were adopted by many governments. But these conventions were just a drop in the bucket when labour needs as a whole were taken into account. Besides, the interpretation of international labour conventions was left to the governments concerned. All this meant a very unsatisfactory state of affairs.

During the War several promises were made to the labouring people, as a reward for their loyalty, that their condition would be taken in hand at the close of the War. In accordance with this promise, the treaty of Versailles devoted a whole section (Part III) to the ways and means by which the lot of the labouring people could be ameliorated, and this section has come to be known as the Magna Carta of the working man.

The International Labour Organisation which has its headquarters at Geneva is the outcome of this Magna Carta. Article 23 of the League covenant reads: "Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the members of the League:

"(a) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organisations....."

The International Labour organisation consists of (a) a General International Labour Conference, (b) a Governing Body, and (c) an International Labour Office. The General International Labour Conference is composed of four delegates of each co-operating government. Two of these represent the government itself, one represents capital, and one, labour. Although capital and labour representatives are chosen by each government, they are chosen in consultation with the industrial organisations concerned. The delegates are given the privilege of voting individually. This makes it possible, for instance, for all the labour delegates of the conference to vote against the employers' delegates. Non-members of the League are also allowed to send representatives.

The conference meets once a year at Geneva. It adopts proposals by a two-thirds vote, either in the form of recommendations or conventions, both of which require

the ratification of the governments concerned before they can become operative. When ratified by the governments they have the same force as domestic law. All recommendations and conventions must be placed within a year before the national legislatures of the countries concerned or before other appropriate bodies for action, even if the representatives of a country had voted against them at the conference. This provision has not been strictly adhered to in the past.

The Governing Body consists of 24 members—12 government representatives, 6 labour representatives, and 6 employers' representatives—holding office for a period of three years. Of the twelve government representatives, eight are appointed by the principal industrial countries of the world, India being one of them, the others being Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and Belgium. The remaining four government representatives are chosen by the conference itself. The employers' delegates and the workers' delegates are chosen respectively by those who represent capital and labour at the conference.

The Governing Body meets every three months. It prepares the agenda of the conferences, appoints the director of the International Labour Office, and supervises the work of the office. M. Albert Thomas was the Director from the beginning until his death in 1932.

The International Labour office consists of a Director and some three hundred and fifty experts appointed by him. It is the Secretariat of the Labour Organisation. Under the supervision of the Director, it "collects

international labour information which it publishes in several forms, prepares the agenda for the annual conferences, urges States to effect ratification of labour treaties, and supervises their administration." * It does most valuable follow-up work and helps to remove difficulties so that ratifications can be effected. The Labour Legislation section of the Office translates and brings together social legislation.

The chief object of the International Labour organisation is to promote uniform labour legislation throughout the world. While the organisation has not accomplished wonders, it has done much valuable work. One of the conventions passed is an eight-hour day and forty-eight hour week convention. Owing to differences in climatic and other conditions, the conference authorised a fifty-seven-hour week for Japan and a sixty-hour week for India. Another convention passed by the Conference is the prohibition of children under fourteen from being employed in gainful occupations. Here, again, exceptions were made for Japan and China. The minimum age was reduced to twelve in the case of Japan. As regards India, children under fourteen were prohibited only from working in mines, factories, and transportation. The members of the Conference are expected to apply labour conventions to their colonies, too, so far as local conditions permit. But the exceptions made are such as to reduce the convention to a dead letter.

* R. L. Buell: *op. cit.*, p. 159.

Even countries which have ratified conventions have not always observed them. The Governing Body is authorised to give publicity to such violations and ask the Secretary-General of the League to appoint commissions to enquire into alleged violations. If one of these parties is dissatisfied with the report of such a commission, it is allowed to appeal to the Permanent Court, whose decision is final. Economic sanctions may be prescribed by the Court or the commission of investigation against the offending State. This extreme measure has not been used so far.

In spite of its limitations, the International Labour Organization is a useful body. In the words of Schuman: "(It) provides an international forum for the discussion of labour legislation ; it prepares the way for the formulation of international standards of labour legislation, and constitutes a useful agency for the collection and publication of labour statistics ; it promotes the crystallisation of attitudes and policies on the part of governments, employers' associations and workers' organisations ; it prepares the way for the formulation of international standards of labour legislation, and constitutes a useful agency for the collection and publication of labour statistics ; it promotes

V. Appraisal of the League of Nations. A question which is being seriously considered both by governments and private individuals is the utility of the League. Recent events in Manchuria and Abyssinia have made many believe that the League is altogether futile. They believe that the time has come for scrapping it entirely. Others want its reformation, forgetting that what requires reformation is not the League machinery, but the mentality of governments and peoples. It is not often remembered that international relations cannot be improved without improving human nature.

(1) *War and Peace.* Many who judge the value of the League judge it by its ability to prevent war and settle international disputes by pacific means.

The institution of war is almost as old as man himself. Plato says "war is the natural relation of every community to every other." History shows more of war than of peace. Primitive man fought with his teeth, claws, fists, and muscles. Later he used clubs, sticks, and stones. Still later, with the invention of tools, men fought with swords, spears, bows and arrows, and sharp instruments of various kinds. Early in the fourteenth century the use of gunpowder was discovered, and this gave Europeans immense superiority over non-Europeans and later led to unprecedented imperial expansion. During the Great War the German "Big Bertha" bombarded Paris from a distance of 70 miles. To day wars are waged not only by means of firearms but also with the help of chemicals and bacteria. Modern warfare is most deadly. During the last war

ten million people were killed and a total expenditure of \$ 200,000,000,000 was incurred. It brought untold suffering to both the victors and the vanquished. War no longer settles anything. The economic breakdown, social dissolution, and political upheaval which are the aftermath of war are most serious in their consequences. In spite of the horrors of war which are known to everybody there is little disposition on the part of the nations of the world to abandon the war mentality. S. Lowes Dickinson is right when he says : "If mankind does not end war, war will end mankind".

In earlier times, dynastic ambitions and the love of power were fruitful causes of war. To day we find that even democracies are as keenly militaristic as ancient despotisms. Power, prestige, and profit motives are chiefly responsible for war to day. War, says Schuman, is an incident in the competitive struggle for power. Struggle for markets and raw materials, control of trade routes—sea and land—high tariffs, existence of the creditor-debtor relations between nations, scramble for grants of natural resources of wealth and concessions of various kinds, struggle for independence from an outside power or from an oppressive majority community within, lust for territory, religious hatred, injuries inflicted on the citizens of one country by those of another, unjust peace settlements—these and many other factors are provocative of war in modern times.

Has the League of Nations helped to remove these causes of war so far as it lies in its power? As said earlier, it is most unfortunate that the unjust peace

treaties of Versailles should have been linked up with the covenant of the League of Nations. The avowed policy of France at the close of the War was to emascuate Germany as far as she could so that she would not wage war with her again. Germany was made to admit by means of the famous "war guilt" clause that she was solely responsible for the war. When the time came for the calculation of reparations, Wilson insisted in one of his 14 Points that Germany should only pay for actual damage done to civilians. But when the peace terms came to be written, the allies made Germany responsible for the whole cost of the war. Even pensions to the soldiers of the allies were added to the cost, although the United States waived her claim to such compensation and these doubled the amount of reparations. Germany's ability to pay was not taken into consideration. The Allied Governments presented bills amounting to 172 billion gold marks and the Reparations Commission which had been appointed to scrutinise them reduced the sum by fifty billions. Even this reduced amount, 122 billion gold marks, was too much for Germany to pay. Not being able to meet her payments, Germany asked for a moratorium or a delay in 1922. Great Britain was willing to grant it, but not France, with the result that the Allied powers were obliged to occupy certain German towns and establish a special customs regime. Later when Germany could not give the required amounts of coal and timber, France and Belgium proceeded to occupy the Ruhr valley (Jan. 11, 1923),

the industrial heart of Germany, to impress upon the fallen power, their determination to collect "the last ounce of flesh" due to them. The railways and even the local government were taken over and a virtual Foreign Government was established over the area. The British and American governments refused to be parties to this deal. The occupation of the Ruhr was obnoxious to the Germans and everything possible was done to exasperate their feelings. The League of Nations was helpless in this situation, because one of the purposes for which it was established was to give effect to the Peace Treaties of Versailles.

In 1924 Germany offered to pay 20 billion gold marks, but this offer was rejected. The occupation of the Ruhr did not bring much relief to France. She was unable to absorb all the coal she got out of the Ruhr and other parts of Germany—2,000,000 tons a month. So she gave up buying coal from her ally, England, and sold part of the coal back to Germany through Belgium, Holland, and the Central European powers. The reparation question together with that of international allied debts passed from one stage to another from the Dawes Plan (1924) to the Young Plan (1929); from the Young Plan to the Hoover Moratorium (1931); from the Hoover Moratorium to the Lausanne Conference (1932); and finally was allowed to lapse with the collapse of the whole debt structure resulting from the Great Depression of recent years. To France security was far more important than reparation.

The League has cut a rather sorry figure in this whole episode. The same is nearly the case as regards the League "trusteeship" of the Saar Valley in the interest of France which has now come to a close. Much the same remark may be made with regard to the joint protectorate of the League and Poland over Danzig taken from Germany and made a free city in order to give Poland a port on the Baltic. The League administration of Memel, a port given to Lithuania, has also been a subject of much criticism.

What comes out clearly from all these instances is that it was a great mistake to have linked up Versailles with Geneva. W. E. Rappard describes the League as "three Leagues in one." (1) the League for the enforcement of the peace treaties ; (2) the League for the promotion of international co-operation ; (3) the League for the prevention of war. Schuman, commenting upon this description, rightly says that the third League does not fulfil its function properly because the first League functions too well. If the League is to do credit to itself, it should strain every nerve possible to bring about treaty revision by peaceful means. Article 19 dealing with the revision of treaties which has remained a dead letter should be clothed with flesh and blood with the help of the parties concerned.

For the pacific settlement of international disputes, the League has provided a satisfactory machinery, even though it has not been fully utilised hitherto. Cases are broadly divided into "international" and "domestic". Over the latter the League has no jurisdiction unless

they should threaten the peace of the world. International disputes in turn are subdivided into (a) legal and (b) political. For the settlement of these two classes of disputes, the League has two kinds of machinery. Legal disputes are subjects for arbitration and adjudication, and the chief instrument which the League possesses in this direction is the World Court. Political disputes are those which deal with the "national honour", "vital interests," etc. of countries. They are not capable of exact legal definition and require delicate handling. Such cases are assigned by the League to the Council and, in some instances, to the Assembly for investigation and conciliation or for any other action. They are known as "non-justiciable" cases.

When a dispute comes up before the League, the question asked by the Council is, is it domestic or international? This question is not settled by the state or states involved, which are certain to be interested parties. It is decided by the Council with the help of the International Court. After this question has been settled, the further question to decide is, is it legal or political? Answer to this question is not always easy to give and to some extent at least depends on the relative strength of the disputants.

After this preliminary discussion is over and the Council is satisfied that the dispute is a political one, it may do one of three things (a) keep the matter in its own hands or (b) refer it to a commission of conciliation or (c) submit it to the Assembly. Whatever course of

action the Council decides upon, the first thing it does is to send a 'stop fight' resolution to the parties concerned. The covenant requires that when the dispute is under investigation the parties should desist from fighting. After due enquiry, the Council tries to bring about a reconciliation and if it fails in this effort it publishes its report and recommendations within six months after the submission of the dispute. If the report is unanimous except for the parties and if one party to the dispute accepts it, the covenant requires that the other party should not go to war. In any case the parties are required not to go to war for three months after the award or decision or report. All this delay provides a "cooling off" period during which time passions may subside and opportunity may be given for a rational consideration of issues.

This arrangement is decidedly superior to the secret diplomacy and the prompt declarations of war of earlier times. But it does not prevent war altogether. Schuman writes : "War is still possible under the covenant in the following situations : (1) where one or both parties to a controversy refuse to abide by an arbitral award, a judicial decision, or a unanimous recommendation of the Council ; (2) when the Council fails to reach a unanimous decision, in which case the League members reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice." (Article 15 Para 7) ; (3) when the dispute is found by the Council to be solely within the domestic jurisdiction of one of the

parties ; (4) when there is unreasonable delay in arriving at an award, decision, or recommendation of the Council ; (5) when the dispute is between non-members of the League ; and (6) when sanctions are applied against a covenant-breaking state." *

Turning from theory to practice, we may ask ourselves what the League has done in certain typical cases to prevent war.

(a) *The Åland Islands*.—These are islands in the Baltic Sea, occupied by Swedish-speaking people. They belonged to Sweden prior to 1809. From 1809 to 1917 they were under the sovereignty of Russia. In 1918 and 1919 the inhabitants declared by means of a *plebiscite* their desire to be re-united with Sweden. The Swedish government supported the Islanders, but Finland objected. Relations between Sweden and Finland became strained. The matter was referred by Britain to the League Council in 1920. In the absence of the World Court, the Council appointed a committee of jurists to find out whether the dispute was domestic or international. On their holding that it was "international," a committee of enquiry was appointed which made a recommendation. On the strength of this recommendation the Council decided that the islands should be left "under Finnish sovereignty subject to minority guarantees, neutralisation, and demilitarisation."† Sweden grumbled at this decision, but finally acquiesced in it.

* F. L. Schuman: *op. cit.*, pp. 223-224.

† F. L. Schuman: *op. cit.*, p. 772.

(b) *The Vilna dispute.*—Vilna was the ancient capital of Lithuania. It was returned by Russia to Lithuania in 1920. It has a mixed population surrounded by Poles in the countryside. Poland cast a covetous eye on it. In 1920 a Polish General marched on it with his troops and set up an administration of his own. The Polish Government, although disclaiming to have anything to do with the incident, acquiesced in the occupation. The League Council planned on a *plebiscite* under the supervision of an international police force, but Poland resisted this effort. She refused to budge from Vilna, "despite protests from Lithuania and admonitions from Geneva,"* with the result that the League had finally to acquiesce in a *fait accompli*. This was a case of a small state being deprived of her territory by a large one, with powerful allies like France behind her. Neither Article 10 which promises help in cases of violation of the territorial integrity of the member States nor Article 16 which provides for sanctions against a covenant-breaking State was invoked.

(c) *The Corfu Incident.*—To settle a boundary dispute between Albania and Greece, the conference of Ambassadors set up a commission with an Italian General at its head, who was accused by the Greeks of being pro-Albanian in his sympathies. When the General with his chauffeur and some other Italians was passing through Greek territory some miscreants fell upon them and murdered them. The Greek government

* F. L. Schuman: op. cit., p. 773.

at once expressed its profound regret to the Italian Minister in Athens and promised to enquire into the matter and punish the culprits. The Italian government, not satisfied with it, sent an ultimatum, "demanding (1) an unreserved official apology, (2) a solemn memorial service for the victims, to be held in Athens and attended by all members of the Greek government, (3) honour to the Italian flag and to an Italian squadron by the Greek fleet at Piraeus, (4) an official Greek inquiry within five days at the scene of the murder, in the presence of the royal Italian military attache, (5) capital punishment for all the offenders of the crime, (6) the payment of a fifty million lira indemnity within five days, and (7) military honours to the bodies of the dead."* The Greek government agreed to some of the demands, but considered (4), (5) and (6) as "an infringement on Greek sovereignty and injury to the honour of Greece." Enraged at this reply, the Italian government sent its naval forces to occupy the Greek Island of Corfu. The forces bombarded Corfu and killed and wounded several Greek and Armenian refugee children.

The Greek Government promptly appealed to the League and the matter was taken up by the Council. The Italian representative on the Council claimed that it was not a question for the Council to decide, but the Council over-ruled him. The Assembly which also was holding its session at the same time expressed its resentment at the high-handedness of the Italian government. The matter at issue was referred to the Conference of

* F. L. Schuman: *op. cit.*, p. 775.

Ambassadors, and their report was accepted by both the Greek and Italian governments. Italy practically got all that she wanted, but had to withdraw from Corfu. The Greek government paid an indemnity of five million lira, but received no compensation for the loss of life and destruction of property in Corfu.

(d) *The Greek-Bulgarian frontier case, 1925.*—In this case the League was even more successful. General firing ensued between the Greeks and Bulgarians as the result of a Greek soldier crossing the Bulgarian boundary and firing at the sentry. The Greek troops were all in readiness for a war. The Bulgarian government appealed to the League. The Council met hurriedly and approved of the "stop fight" telegram which Briand, the President, had despatched earlier to both Governments. The troops were asked to withdraw to their respective territories behind the frontiers within sixty hours. The order was complied with and open hostilities came to a close with lightning speed. Once hostilities ceased the Council looked into the merits of the dispute and made Greece pay an indemnity to Bulgaria.

(e) *The Sino-Japanese conflict of 1931-1932.*—In this instance the League failed to prevent aggression. In the name of protecting her interests, Japan occupied Mukden and other points in Manchuria. The Chinese Government invoked Article 11 of the covenant. In the Council meeting the Japanese delegate claimed that the military action taken by his government was entirely a matter of self-defence and expressed a desire for direct negotiations with the Chinese Government.

The Chinese delegate protested against direct negotiations in the face of the military occupation of Manchuria. The Council despatched a "stop-fight" telegram to both the Governments and required them to withdraw their troops immediately. The Chinese Government was willing, but the Japanese gave an evasive reply. Fighting continued. Another Council meeting was summoned in October 1931. Japan asserted that her troops would be withdrawn only if the Council conceded certain "fundamental points." The United States, although outside the League, promised support to the League policy. Japan protested, but the Council ruled her out. Lord Cecil wanted Japanese evacuation of Manchuria and the submission of treaty violation by China to the World Court.

Private conferences and negotiations took place. Japan laid down certain conditions before hostilities could cease. All through this period, Briand, the Council President, tried unsuccessfully to bring about peace. The Japanese went on with their fighting, never declaring actual war with China. After much delay the Council appointed a Commission of enquiry in December 1931, with Lord Lytton as chairman.

Early in 1932 the situation grew from bad to worse. Despairing of receiving any help from the Council, the Chinese Government appealed to the Assembly. An extraordinary session of the Assembly was convened on March 3, 1932. In the meantime fighting continued fiercely in China, and Japan set up a puppet ruler over "Manchukuo." When the Assembly met it appointed a

Committee of nineteen to make recommendations. The indignation expressed at the meeting of the Assembly was such that Japan was obliged to drop her enterprise for the time being. The Lytton Commission was very slow in submitting its report which appeared on October 3, 1932. It was an extremely able document, but appeared almost a year too late. Japan flatly refused to return to the *status quo ante*, claiming that the protection of her interests demanded her continued occupation of Manchukuo. Having firmly established herself there, she refused to surrender. The Lytton report recommended no sanctions of any kind against Japan.

The League Council met in November 1932 and adopted the Lytton report, but this made no difference to Japan. The matter was again referred to a special session of the Assembly, in which the small powers protested against Japan, but the larger powers remained neutral. The Japanese threatened to withdraw from the League. The Committee of nineteen was once again asked to make recommendations. In the meantime Japan continued her military activities. The Committee recommended a settlement along the lines of the Lytton report. In February 1933, the Assembly unanimously accepted the committee's report. The Japanese delegate alone dissented, and the episode came to an end with Japan withdrawing from the League, and keeping a firm footing in Manchukuo.

Two interesting things to note in this sorry story are:—(1) From the legal point of view, all through the hostilities, Japan was never at war, for she never

declared it. She claimed that she was acting in self-defence. Thus, strictly speaking, she was not violating the League obligations. (2) The League has been successful in preventing hostilities between small powers, but when it is a question of large powers, it is absolutely helpless. The same story has repeated itself in the recent Italo-Abyssinian War.

(f) *The Italo-Abyssinian War*.—The most tragic breakdown of the League has occurred in this war. Italy invaded Abyssinia using for pretext the Walwal incident partly to avenge her defeat at Adowa at the hands of Abyssinians in 1897, partly to find an outlet for her surplus population and manufactured goods, and partly for the sake of her prestige and imperial vanity. Fierce fighting went on at different points, and the Ethiopians won a few initial victories. But the odds were against Abyssinia from the very beginning against the well-trained and well-equipped army and air force of Italy. As a member of the League, Abyssinia appealed to it. After a great deal of delay, economic sanctions were applied against Italy—except as regards oil, which is one of the most important requisites of war. Italy paid little heed to these sanctions and went on with the war. When the Negus (the Abyssinian Emperor) found that defeat was inevitable he fled the country and appeared before the League Assembly in person for help. Meanwhile Mussolini, the Italian dictator, proclaimed King Victor Immanuel Emperor of Abyssinia and made arrangements for the rule of the country. The Negus appealed to the League for financial help to conduct the

war against Italy, which was refused, and for the non-recognition of the Italian rule of Abyssinia. Whether this latter request will be granted remains to be seen. What is likely to happen is that the League will sooner or later be obliged to acquiesce in a *fait accompli*. Already on the recommendation of the League, the Member States are lifting sanctions. The campaign against sanctions after the Abyssinian defeat was led by Britain on the ground that continuance of sanctions meant war with Italy; and Britain apparently was not prepared for war. In the earlier stages of the war, France gave lukewarm support to the League and was not anxious to apply sanctions, as she was keen on cultivating the friendship of Italy in case of war with Germany in the future.

The sad story of Abyssinia shows that the League is helpless when a big State chooses to break the covenant and launch upon war. The machinery of the League may be sound but there are not enough Governments to work it honestly, irrespective of consequences. Therefore, as a member of the Assembly recently remarked: "To criticise the covenant instead of the men who had not applied it is a profound injustice."

The Outlawry of War.—Efforts have been made both by the League Members and by outsiders to renounce war altogether and to form defensive alliances. One of these efforts was made by the *Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance* 1923, prepared by the Temporary Mixed Commission of the League on the basis of the Cecil and Requin drafts. According to this Draft, the Council by

a unanimous vote was to decide who was the aggressor in a given case. After such decision had been taken the Council was to proceed "to determine the forces which each State furnishing assistance shall place at its disposal," as against the provisions of the League covenant which laid down that the Council was to "advise" what steps should be taken after the aggression had taken place. According to the Draft, further, the assistance to be given was to be by the Member States of the same continent and not by the Members scattered over the whole world. Since even this provision was considered not specific enough by some powers, the Draft authorized defensive alliances, according to which two or more States would agree among themselves beforehand on the amount and nature of help they would give to each other in the case of aggression. Although the Draft Treaty was a concession to the French point of view of the League providing military sanctions in cases of aggression, it failed to be acceptable even to France. It was claimed that it would be extremely difficult to define "aggression" and that the guarantee given was not adequate.

The next important plan was that of the *Geneva Protocol* (1924), which also failed of adoption. The main principle on which it was based was compulsory arbitration, and to this principle were added the principles of security and disarmament. According to the Protocol, disputes which are not submitted to the world court "must be settled either (1) through compulsory arbitration at the request of one of the parties; (2) an

unanimous decision of the Council; (3) or compulsory arbitration enjoined by the Council."* If a State signing the Protocol refused to abide by the decision of one of these three tribunals, it was to be regarded as having violated an international agreement.

The Protocol outlaws all aggressive wars and considers them international crimes. It allows force when used in self-defence as well as in compliance with the decision of the Council or Assembly in giving effect to the provisions of the covenant or Protocol. To the difficult question, what constitutes aggression, the answer given by the Protocol is that a country should be regarded as an aggressor "when a resort to war is accompanied

"1. By a refusal to accept the procedure of pacific settlement or to submit to the decision resulting therefrom.

"2. By the violation of the provisional measures which the Council may enjoin....

"3. By a disregard of a decision recognising that the dispute arises out of a matter which lies exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the other party and by failure or refusal to submit the question first to the Council or the Assembly."†

According to the Protocol, when a state is declared to be an aggressor, military sanctions may be applied against it. The Protocol allows defensive alliances, but these are to be used only in support of the victim of

* R. L. Buell: *op. cit.*, p. 617.

† R. L. Buell: *op. cit.*, pp. 619-620.

aggression. It further makes the maintenance of a large army unnecessary.

The features of the Protocol, as outlined by Buell, are:--

- (1) The outlawry of all forms of aggressive war.
- (2) Provision of compulsory arbitration for all disputes except for those arising out of domestic questions and peace treaties.
- (3) The automatic determination of war.
- (4) The obligation to carry out general sanctions.
- (5) The authorisation of special sanctions in the form of controlled alliances.
- (6) The reduction of armaments.

In spite of these valuable features, the protocol was not ratified by any state. Great Britain, after having sponsored it, dropped it on the grounds that it was too sweeping in its range and that it might involve war with non-members. She, therefore, proposed defensive regional alliances, and the outcome of it was the Locarno treaties which are still in force to-day.

The Locarno Treaties. These treaties were concluded between Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in 1925. They are seven in number. The first of them is a treaty of mutual guarantee binding France and Belgium on the one hand and Germany on the other not to go to war against each other except in self-defence and in carrying out certain treaty provisions to settle all their disputes by pacific means, such as arbitration, adjudication, or settlement by the Council and to respect the frontiers

between each other as laid down by the Versailles Treaty. If any of these powers should be attacked unprovoked, as ascertained by the Council, all the signatories to the Treaties including Great Britain and Italy were to come to its aid. This meant that if France provoked a war with Germany, Great Britain and Italy would come to the aid of Germany, notwithstanding the fact that France was their former ally. Two treaties of mutual assistance and guarantee were concluded between France and Poland and between France and Czechoslovakia as against possible German aggression. The remaining four treaties provide for compulsory arbitration and conciliation between Germany on the one side and France, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia individually on the other. "They oblige the parties to submit all disputes of every kind with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights to a permanent conciliation commission, arbitration, adjudication or to settlement by the Council." * The treaties do not guarantee the eastern frontiers of Germany. On the conclusion of these treaties Germany was admitted to the League of Nations in 1926.

The upshot of these treaties is that if Germany attacks France unprovoked, the latter will have the support of Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. If France attacks Germany unprovoked the latter will have the support of Great Britain and Italy, but not of Poland and Czechoslovakia. If

* F. L. Schuman : *op. cit.*, p. 226.

Germany attacks Poland or Czechoslovakia, only France will come to their aid.

The chief criticism of the Geneva Protocol and of the Locarno treaties is that they do not provide machinery for peacefully changing the *status quo*. Courts of law cannot change existing treaties. They can only maintain them. Without justice no peace can long endure.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, also known as the Pact of Paris. This is a multilateral agreement initiated by a non-member state—the United States—and France to abandon war as an instrument of national policy and to resort only to pacific means of settlement. It is a solemn pledge on the part of the signatories to renounce war once and for all. The first two Articles of the Pact, which contain the essence of the agreement, read:

“Article 1. The high contracting parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

“Article 2. The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.”

It will readily be seen that this pact is too sweeping and general in its nature. It is also negative and does not provide machinery for its enforcement. Past

experience shows that solemn promises pledging eternal friendships and agreements not to resort to war have not been successful. When the safety of the state is in danger, many a state breaks its pledge and regards treaties as "mere scraps of paper." Besides, the reservations incorporated in the pact are such as not to exclude the right of self-defence or mutual assistance promised in the Locarno treaties. All modern wars are claimed to be "defensive" by both sides. Japan, for instance, claimed that her military activities in Manchuria and subsequent annexation of that territory were not a violation of either the League covenant or the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to both of which she had added her signature, on the ground that neither party had declared a legal state of war and on the plea that Japan was only acting in defence of her interests. Therefore, the value of the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war is only "symbolic, moral, educational and propagandist."* It does not touch the grim realities of practical politics.

The Pact will have value if it has behind it the sound public opinion of the world, but such opinion has not yet been built up. The only kinds of war which it forbids, says Schuman, are those which would never occur under twentieth century conditions. One of the loopholes in it is that if one of the signatories violates the Pact, all others are released from it. What we want is not the prevention of a mere legal state of war. Military activities carried on in the name of "self-

* F. L. Schuman ; *op. cit.*, p. 667.

defence," "protection of interests," etc. should cease. For this purpose a mere verbal censure is thoroughly inadequate.

The Pact has been signed by 63 states till the time of writing.

The General Act of Arbitration, 1928. In the Assembly of 1927, Dr. Nansen pointed out the urgency of having model treaties of arbitration, conciliation, and security. His suggestion was taken up seriously and the Assembly in the following year adopted a treaty known as the General Act of Arbitration. It came into force on August 16, 1929, and has been acceded to by 23 States so far. The peculiar feature of this treaty is that any State may adopt it in whole or in part.

The treaty arose out of the fact that promise to abide by compulsory arbitration by means of bilateral treaties was a long and tedious process. Need was felt for a general Act of arbitration and the Act of 1928 marks an important step in the history of the League and of arbitration.

The first chapter of the Act deals with *conciliation*. It lays down that all disputes, including political disputes, not settled by diplomacy should be submitted to bilateral conciliation commissions.

The second chapter is concerned with *judicial settlement*. According to it, all legal disputes are to be submitted to the International Court, unless the parties agree to resort to an arbitral tribunal; or, in the first place, to attempt conciliation.

The third chapter deals with *arbitration*. In case

of political disputes where conciliation has failed, the chapter provides for settlement by arbitral award. The parties agree beforehand to abide by such award. The tribunal is to consist of five members, specially constituted for the purpose. Its powers are defined in a special agreement.

"The fourth chapter contains general provisions, one of which binds the signatory to abstain from all measures likely to react prejudicially upon the execution of the judicial decisions or upon the arrangements proposed by a Conciliation Commission with the object of safeguarding peace." *

The model furnished by this Act has been used in recent years in several bilateral treaties.

Disarmament, Security, and Sanctions. The traditional policy which countries have been following hitherto is "If you wish for Peace, prepare for War." Their logic has been security requires armaments and armaments guarantee peace, even though history has disproved this logic times without number. Armaments can never secure peace. Preparedness for war sooner or later provokes war. Realising the futility of armaments in securing peace, Article 8 of the League Covenant lays down: "The members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."

* The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations: (1935) p. 79.

"The Council taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments."

Preparedness for war no doubt gives a country initial advantage. It may even mean victory. It leads to rivalry and competition in armaments. Armaments are often said to be for defence purposes. The fact of the matter is, however, that they lead to aggression. A recent writer says : "No one in his senses can believe that armaments insure peace."

One of the important causes of war to-day is naval rivalry. Ships are important for the transportation of armies, for purposes of blockade, for preventing the seas from becoming the monopoly of any one country, for trade and communications. Navies are "the bulwark of imperialism."

For a long time England has been supreme as a naval power. In 1888 Germany set out to become a rival. By 1900 she had built up a strong navy. Alarmed at this, Britain set for herself the goal of the *Two Power Standard*, i.e., a navy equal in strength to that of any two European powers. Competition was so great that she could not reach this standard. In addition to Germany, the U. S. A. also became a strong naval power, her goal being equality with the strongest naval power in the world. Alarmed at the rapid growth of the American navy, Japan began to increase her naval strength. She adopted an "eight-eight" programme in 1920.

In the midst of these circumstances a conference was called at Washington by the United States Government in 1927 to reduce naval armaments. It was attended by the U. S., Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. In considering the basis on which reduction of armaments was to be effected attention was given to the *status quo*, the political importance of the country, and the extent of territory and the volume of trade which each country had to defend. After much discussion and delay, the United States, Italy, Britain and Japan agreed to destroy a total of 79 ships, either built already or in the process of construction. The ratio on which they agreed for capital ships was 5 : 5 : 3 : 1.67 : 1.67 for Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy respectively. This was an important international agreement and was to be in force until 1937. No agreement was arrived at as regards other types of vessels. Great Britain urged the abolition of submarines, but could not get much support for her proposal. So she in turn refused to limit light cruisers. Likewise, no agreement was reached as regards aircraft and land forces.

The Conference reached a number of agreements, relating to the Far East and the Pacific. Japan succeeded in making the United States promise to limit fortifications in the Pacific. A four-power pact was formed undertaking to respect the insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific.

It was further agreed not to use submarines as commerce destroyers. Merchant vessels were not to be

seized or sunk without making proper arrangements for the safety of passengers and crew.

The Washington Conference was a great success. In 1922 Russia called a disarmament conference at Moscow of the Baltic States. This was not a success. Another conference of the Central American States was held in Washington in 1922-23 and agreement was reached for limiting armaments for five years.

All through this period Germany was practically disarmed. The allies had forced her to limit her troops to 100,000 men. Conscription was forbidden. The German Navy too was limited. No submarines were allowed to Germany. She was allowed to maintain no military or naval air-force. All these rigorous conditions could not be strictly enforced. Germany evaded her promise by subterfuge and secret military preparation. The Allies failed to realise the futility of one-sided armaments. They forgot that "disarmament that has been imposed by force will probably have to be maintained by force." *

In 1927 President Coolidge called a conference to limit competition in vessels which had not been covered by the Washington Conference. Great Britain and Japan accepted the invitation, but France and Italy stayed out. So only three powers met. The conference was attended largely by admirals and naval experts. So much progress could not be made. Britain was so jealous of her position as regards light cruisers that she

* R. L. Buell : op. cit., p. 540.

was not willing to give parity to the United States. The United States representatives on their side insisted on parity and large cruisers. The result of these disagreements was that the conference broke up in failure.

The London Naval Conference was held in 1930. Great Britain was willing to reduce armaments. But the United States once again insisted on parity with Britain. Bargaining went on for several weeks without much success. The French also created difficulty by demanding large tonnage and by refusing to admit parity with Italy. Difficulties were likewise raised by Italy and Japan with the result that what success the conference accomplished was very moderate. The Treaty which emerged out of the conference known as the London Naval Treaty consisted of five parts. Part III, which contained the essence of the agreement, was not signed by either France or Italy.

While all these efforts at disarmament were undertaken outside the League of Nations, the League also made its own independent efforts. The two bodies through which it has worked are the Permanent Advisory Commission and the Temporary Mixed Commission. The former body consisted of naval, military, and air representatives of each state represented on the League Council. The latter body consisted of laymen and military experts. Both of these have worked together and studied armament questions. The Temporary Mixed Commission tried to implement Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant through the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1923)

and the Geneva Protocol, but both these agreements failed.

Earlier, in 1921, Lord Esher submitted a plan to the Permanent Advisory Commission for the reduction of land armaments. The central feature of this plan was the limitation of the size of armies in each country to units of 30,000 men, and the assignment of a certain number of units to each country in proportion to its population, strength, needs, etc., Thus France was to have six units, Italy and Poland four each; Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Yugoslavia, Netherlands, Roumania and Spain three each; Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, two; Portugal, one. The plan was not adopted.

In 1925 the Temporary Mixed Commission was abolished and the "Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference" was established. It held five sessions, all resulting in failure. Russia at once proposed complete disarmament, but it was thrown out. She then produced a scheme for partial and gradual disarmament, and this too was rejected. The seventh and final session of the Preparatory Commission was held on November 6, 1930 and its work came to a close on December 9, 1930. The General Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations met at Geneva on February 3, 1932 under the chairmanship of the late Mr. Henderson of England. It was attended by more than 232 delegates representing 57 States. Curiously enough, open warfare was going on at Shanghai at the same time. A multitude of proposals

came up before the conference but nothing materialised. At one stage in the conference Soviet Russia once again proposed complete and immediate disarmament. At a later stage President Hoover of the United States presented a scheme for 1/3rd cut in all arms. Although this proposal was received sympathetically, no agreement was concluded on the basis of it.

If the history of the Disarmament conferences and commissions is full of failures, the reason is to be found in the fact that nations do not trust each other. While Great Britain and the United States believe that disarmament will eventually lead to security, France is adamant in her position that security guaranteed by means of international organisation and control should precede disarmament. In the words of Premier Herriot before the 1932 Geneva Disarmament conference ; "We French always have demanded, and still demand, international organisation and control."

At the time of writing, armaments, instead of going down, are mounting up high. If armaments are to be reduced, it is necessary to have united action. There should be an arbitral tribunal to decide on questions arising over the interpretation and enforcement of armament treaties. The general practice of maintaining the *status quo*, irrespective of considerations of justice is sure to retard disarmament. The institution of war should be outlawed. The private manufacture of arms should be restricted so that government could control the output. No director or manager should be able to influence newspapers ;

neither should he be allowed to seek election to the parliament. If states are not likely to abuse their privileges, the manufacture of arms may be made a state monopoly.

Security has been sought not only through standing armies and alliances, but also through neutralising territories, creating buffer states, and entering into "territorial integrity" agreements, as in the backward areas, and agreements to maintain the *status quo*.

Sanctions. Sanctions are sometimes applied in putting pressure upon recalcitrant states. The kinds of sanctions are (1) diplomatic, (2) judicial, (3) economic, and (4) international military. Diplomatic sanctions mean the suspending of diplomatic relations, withdrawing of consuls, etc. Judicial sanctions mean the suspending of all commercial treaties with an offending state, so that its nationals lose the right of trade and access to the courts of suspending states. Economic sanctions mean the suspending of all economic relations by means of boycott and blockade. Under modern conditions both these practices bring hardships to the offending state as well as to the suspending state. International military sanctions mean the imposition of force by outside states on the defaulting state.

The League covenant provides for sanctions in five cases.

"1. When Article X is violated.

"2. Under Article XI, in cases of any war or threat of war.

"3. When a member fails to carry out an arbitral award under Article XII.

"4. When a member resorts to war without submitting a dispute to the Council or Assembly in accordance with Articles 12—15 of the covenant.

"5. When a non-member of the League, which has refused to accept the obligations of League membership, under Article 17, resorts to war against a member."*

The kinds of sanctions provided by the League covenant are economic, military, and political. During the Italo-Abyssinian War, economic sanctions were applied by several States, in regard to various commodities, but not in regard to oil. Hence they were only a limited success. The League cannot force any of its members to apply sanctions. Each Member State is allowed to decide it for itself. Military sanctions--use of armed forces belonging to the Members of the League on the recommendation of the League Council--have not yet been applied. Political sanctions refer to exclusion from membership of the League for violation of the League covenant. Such action is taken "by a vote of the Council concurred in by the representatives of all the other Members of the League (i.e. excluding the representative of the defaulting State) represented thereon"—Article 16.

Successful activities of the League.—Although the League of Nations has not been much of a success in preventing war, in stopping big States from grabbing territory belonging to small or badly organised States,

* R. L. Buell: op. cit., pp. 564-565.

effecting disarmament, in the application of sanctions, and in providing security, it has achieved a large measure of success in other matters.

(1) *The Mandates*.—Refer to Chapter II, Section on Mandates.

(2) *Protection of Minorities*.—The League assigns the protection of the rights of minorities to the Council. The rights of minorities are (a) equal political and civil rights; (b) admission to public offices in the States of which they are nationals; (c) use of their mother tongue "in private intercourse or commerce, in their churches, in the Press, and in publications; (d) school instruction in the minority language, in districts in which the minorities concerned are sufficiently large.

Violation or threatened infringement of the rights of minorities may be brought to the notice of the Council by any of its members. The Council is required to handle these questions delicately so as not to offend the susceptibilities of Governments. "The Council must, for example, be specially careful to satisfy itself that petitions from discontented minorities or individuals are not really intended, or indirectly likely, to stir up trouble."

The Council does not look upon petitions as complaints to be investigated, but as sources of information. All petitions have to be signed. The language must not be violent. Whether a petition is receivable or not is decided by the Secretary-General. When this question is decided in the affirmative, it is sent up to the government concerned. Both the petition and the reply of the

government are then placed before the Council for consideration. The Council does not deal with them directly, but through a Minorities Commission. Only in exceptional cases, the matter is brought before the Council by the Commission. The work is done by unofficial negotiations with the governments involved.

So far some 400 petitions have been received, of which half have been rejected, only 15 have been brought before the Council. Some difficult questions have been referred by the Council to the International Court.

The Assembly does not have a direct share in settling minority questions, but it does hold general discussions on them, which lead to valuable results.

Some States recognise no minority obligations. In 1922 it was proposed that all States which have considerable minorities should guarantee minority rights, but it was not accepted. The League has evolved a system of model treatment of minorities for States to adopt, the basis of which is the removal of suspicion between government and minorities and the ordering of their relations on a basis of fair play and generosity. "The League's work in this field has been, and continues to be, both wise and fruitful."*

(3) *Legal Activities*.—The League has been responsible for drawing up a large number of most valuable international agreements and conventions. The fact that they have not all been ratified does not detract

* The Aims, Methods, and Activity of the League of Nations (1935.) p. 121.

from their value. The codification of international law, especially in administrative and economic matters, is in progress. Codification has been attempted on the question of nationality, the question of territorial waters, and the question of State responsibility. The most important legal activity of the League is done through the Permanent Court of International Justice.

4. *Technical Activities.*—(a) *Economic and financial.* The League has attended to the economic and financial problems of the world. In 1921-1922 there was great hardship in Austria. The population was in danger of starvation. The League arranged for an international loan, which helped to put Austria back on her feet. Similar help has been given to Hungary, Greece, and Bulgaria. The League gives its advice disinterestedly and in a spirit of international co-operation.

The war brought about certain territorial changes. Greek and Bulgarian refugees had to be restored to their countries. The League granted an international loan to the Greek Government for the settlement of about 1,500,000 Greeks who had to leave Turkey and find a new home in Greece. Similar help was given to the Bulgarian Government in settling about 200,000 Bulgarian refugees.

The League has given valuable financial advice at international conferences. The first of these was held at Brussels in 1920, soon after the war, when financial conditions were unstable. The resolutions passed at the conference "exhorted States to balance their budgets, to

eliminate superfluous expenditure, to stop inflation due to war and post-war expenditure, to return to the gold standard, to abolish restrictions on international trade, to improve transport, etc."*

In 1927 was held the World Economic Conference at Geneva under the auspices of the League. It was attended not only by the Members of the League, but also by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The conference urged the reduction of tariffs by bilateral treaties as well as by multi lateral treaties through the League. Unfortunately this was the time when large scale production was being pushed in every country, and hence the recommendations of the conference did not bear much fruit. The world depression set in 1929, and with it economic nationalism became even more pronounced. "Customs tariffs were raised, import prohibitions and quotas multiplied, and the volume and value of international trade was further restricted."†

A third international conference was summoned at London in 1933. By now most countries were off the gold standard. The League's effort to stabilise currency was a failure. Attempt was made to check over-production and increase consumption which was a partial success.

Even though these conferences have not achieved much success, "they have turned an international search-light on national problems."‡ They have also increased

* The League of Nations : op. cit., p. 135.

† . " " op. cit., p. 187.

‡ " " p. 188.

the knowledge which each country possesses of world economics.

The League has established certain international conventions with regard to Customs, the export of certain commodities, the suppression of counterfeit currency, etc.

(b) *Communications and Transit.*—Transportation by land, sea, and air has made great advances in recent years, which raises many international questions. The League arranged for General Conferences on Communication and Transit at Barcelona in 1921 and at Geneva in 1923. A convention was laid down for the transportation of goods by rail or inland under absolutely equal conditions. Understandings were also arrived at with regard to transport on international waterways, the unrestricted use of harbours and harbour facilities, and obligations of States as regards railway transport.

The League organisation has further simplified administrative formalities so as to facilitate passenger and goods traffic. In 1920 a model passport for general use was adopted and stringent passport and visa regulations were recommended for removal. In the last few years, however, owing to chaotic economic and political conditions, passport regulations are strict once again.

Conventions have been drawn up also with regard to transport in international rivers, maritime signals, buoyage, the lighting of coasts, road traffic, etc. The object of the League in all these matters has been to unify and simplify diverse customs, practices, and laws, so that the nations of all countries may benefit. Expert

help has been given to the Polish Government to settle certain inland shipping questions and to the Chinese Government for road development and the improvement of certain waterways. The Siamese Government, too, has received similar help.

(c) *Health*.—Disease is no respecter of persons or countries. It spreads from country to country with alarming rapidity. In 1909, before the League came into being, there was established at Paris an "office international permanent d' Hygiene publique." Its principal task was to collect information concerning the spread of infectious diseases.

The League has a Health organisation as a part of the Secretariat, as well as a Health Committee of medical experts and an Advisory Council composed of government representatives. Soon after the war, even before the Health Organisation was established, the League was called upon to deal with typhus and cholera epidemics in Eastern Europe and the smallpox epidemic among the Greek refugees returning from Asia Minor. The League responded to these calls and gave valuable technical and material assistance.

At a sanitary conference held at Warsaw in 1922, a number of sanitary conventions were concluded between Eastern European countries. As a result of these measures Central Europe escaped contagion.

The Health organisation has set up a permanent Epidemiological Intelligence Service at Singapore which collects data regarding the movements and incidence of diseases and sends the information on to the Geneva

Secretariat for collation and publication of health news in weekly and quarterly bulletins. The Service uses the cable and wireless for the rapid dissemination of information.

The Health organisation has established "international standards and units for the principal sera, four vitamins, three sex hormones, gland extracts such as insulin, and various other medicaments."* Endeavour is made to standardise morbidity and mortality statistics.

The Organisation is further conducting research in various diseases, particularly malaria. Experiments are being made to find a suitable substitute for quinine which is rather expensive for the poor man. Other diseases such as tuberculosis, leprosy, and syphilis are also receiving the attention of the Health organisation; as also rural hygiene, popular nutrition, urban and rural housing.

In concluding the "technical" activities of the League it may be said "that in no sphere have the League's labours achieved more positive results than in this strictly technical field, from which all politics are necessarily excluded, and where there is nothing to check the spontaneous movement toward human solidarity."[†]

D. International Co operation. The Committee on Intellectual co-operation was set up in 1928. In 1925 the executive organ of this body, the International Institute of Intellectual Co operation was established in Paris maintained at the expense of the French govern-

* The League of Nations : op. cit., p. 151.

† The League of Nations: op. cit., p. 151.

ment. The Italian Government has set up two similar institutes in Rome—one to deal with the unification of Private International Law and the other to deal with Educational Cinemas.

The Committee on Intellectual co-operation has had the services of distinguished scientists and philosophers—such as Bergson, Einstein, Madame Curie, etc. It has rendered useful service in promoting peace, in assisting states in the organisation and improvement of their educational services, and in encouraging the disinterested discussion of intellectual subjects.

The Committee has drawn up a number of suggestions and recommendations for instructing school children in the aims and work of the League. Although they have not all been adopted, a number of governments are orienting their school children to the new ideas of international co-operation and the pacific settlement of international disputes. The Committee has been inducing governments to delete from text-books passages calculated to disparaging foreigners and neighbouring States. It encourages young men and women to travel to foreign lands so that they can learn to appreciate the best in various cultures and civilisations. A draft convention prepared by the Organisation on broadcasting and peace has been adopted by a large number of governments.

The Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation encourages and arranges for contacts between librarians of different countries, so that they can benefit from each other's experience. It also promotes "Co-operation between directors of higher education, art and science

museums, graduate schools of international studies, and the like.”*

Arrangements are made for a scientific study of international relations. Suggestions are given for the protection of works of art and historical monuments. Periodic meetings of philosophers and scientists are encouraged.

E. Social and Humanitarian Work.—In the years after the war the League did most meritorious work under the direction of Dr. Nansen in restoring half a million war prisoners to their home-lands. Similar service was rendered to the refugees. Places of residence and employment were found for many of them.

Slavery.—In 1922 a New Zealand delegate brought to the notice of the League the existence of slavery in parts of Africa and elsewhere. In Ethiopia particularly, where the Sovereign had decided to abolish it, difficulties were cropping up. In 1926 the League adopted a convention making previous international agreements on slavery more binding. Slavery was defined so broadly as to include indirect forms of it such as serfdom, peonage, certain aspects of forced labour, purchase of girls, etc. It was defined as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.” The parties adopting the convention to abolish slave trade are required “to bring about, progressively and as soon as

* The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations (1935), p. 161.

possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms."

Forced labour developing into conditions analogous to slavery is prohibited. Such labour is allowed generally only for public purposes. Where it exists for other purposes, the contracting parties are asked to abolish it progressively. The Slavery Convention of September 25th, 1926, has now been ratified by forty-two states. The necessity for forced labour is diminishing. In 1932 the League reviewed the position and found that in some places capture of free men was still taking place. To deal with this situation and to demolish the last strongholds of slavery, the League has appointed a Permanent Advisory Committee which began its work in 1934.

Traffic in Women and Children—During the nineteenth century this traffic was conducted on a world-wide scale, using trans-oceanic shipping as the chief means. In 1904 an Agreement was signed by several countries "to collect all information concerning the traffic, to watch the ports where it might be carried on and to assist its victims." The 1910 Convention prescribed punishment for traffickers, even if the crime had been committed in other countries. Notwithstanding these conventions, the trade went on increasing as there was no central organisation to check it.

The League took up the task in co-operation with private organisations and Governments. A convention was adopted in 1921. According to it, no woman may allow herself to be recruited for the traffic before twenty

or twenty-one years of age. Below that age, such undertaking was punishable by law. Procuration, as well as attempts at procuring, was punishable. Annual reports on the execution of this convention were to be sent by the governments to the League. The convention has been ratified or acceded to by 47 states.

A Committee on the Traffic in Women and Children was set up to advise the League Council. It has done useful work in carrying on its work of co-ordination and supervision.

A large donation from the American Bureau of Social Hygiene has enabled the League "to undertake two comprehensive enquiries (1926-27 and 1930) into the nature and extent of the traffic in different parts of the world."

Another convention was adopted in 1933 and came into force in August 1934. This is an advance on the 1921 convention. It provides that "the international traffic in women of full age, with a view to immorality in another country, even with their consent, shall be subject to penalty."

The League has given its attention to the problem of tolerated houses of prostitution and is urging Governments to abolish them.

The problem of obscene literature has also engaged the attention of the League. A Convention was signed in 1923 undertaking to suppress the circulation of and traffic in obscene publications. It has been signed by more than forty States. Production of obscene literature, possession of it for commercial purposes, import, export,

and transport of it are all punishable by law. As a result of this Convention being adopted by many governments, traffic in obscene literature has been driven underground and the volume of the trade has greatly diminished.

Child Welfare.—The League has under its auspices a "Child Welfare Committee" which has evolved a model agreement regarding the return of children and young people to their homes. As a result of its efforts, a Convention has been signed giving equal treatment to foreign minors with minors of the country itself. Successful efforts have been made through national legislation in raising the age of marriage, in improving the legal status and compulsory guardianship of illegitimate children, and in the protecting and training of blind children.

The Drug Traffic.—The most important activity of the League in the social and humanitarian field is the supervision of the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs. Drug traffic has been one of the greatest curses of the world. Hundreds and thousands of persons fall victims to it every year.

A Convention known as the Hague Convention was adopted in 1921. It was not enforced as many states failed to ratify it. The League of Nations adopted it, but found it rather inadequate in providing for a general control of the international drug traffic. Drugs were being passed from country to country with great ease. The industry was profitable to both individuals and governments.

The League appointed an Advisory Committee of Experts. With the help of the Health Committee, it was discovered that the total output of opium and cocaine was ten times as much as what was required for medical and scientific purposes. A Convention was drawn up in 1923 known as the Geneva Convention supplementing and extending the Hague Convention. It laid down that drugs could not be imported without proper certificates. It also regulated production and provided for a strict supervision of national and international traffic. Not only was trade in opium restricted but also in new chemicals based on morphine. A Permanent Central Opium Board was established, to which contracting parties were to supply quarterly reports in the export and import, and manufacture of narcotics. One of the objects of this requirement was to discover where leakage occurred. Some forty States ratified the Convention, imposing stringent obligations on themselves. Demand was made in progressive quarters that no margin of opium should be left for illicit traffic.

A Convention was adopted in 1931 and has been ratified by fifty-five States hitherto. It has set up a Supervisory Body of the League "to keep exact accounts of the world trade in narcotics and to limit manufacture by States of the quantities strictly necessary to meet medical and scientific requirements, while leaving the necessary margin for the formation of reasonable stocks." * If a State fails to submit an estimate of the

* The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations: 1. 179.

narcotics it proposes to supply for the following year, the Body makes its own estimate on the basis of the information available, which is binding on the government.

The chief feature of this Convention is the strict regulation of the export of opium and related drugs to the Western Countries. The standard laid down is that which is necessary for medical and scientific purposes. Production, too, is restricted. But governments have not always kept their word in this regard. In some of the oriental countries raw opium is still consumed ; and in China it is smoked.

The importance of the 1931 Convention lies in the fact that for the first time an international body has been allowed by Sovereign States to establish "supervision over a complete branch of economic activity, from the production of the raw material to the consumption of the manufactured articles".* A strict co-ordination has been effected between production and consumption.

The task is not over yet. Illicit manufacture of narcotics has not yet been completely stopped. But the problem is fully capable of solution.

Conclusion. The League undoubtedly has its weaknesses and failures. But within the short period of its existence, it has made the States realise the necessity of international consultation and co-operation. The preservation of peace is its chief responsibility, and its formula is "collective security by collective action."

* *op. cit.*, 179.

The League machinery may require changes in the future. But even more important than that is the effecting of wholesome changes in the mentality of people and their governments. Regional associations such as the Pan-American Union and the contemplated United States of Europe may have their advantages. But they are not a substitute for the League representing, as it will in time, the whole world community. Bilateral declarations of mutual friendship and non-aggression and other pacts may reveal a lack of faith in the League of Nations. But it is to be hoped that such agreements and pacts are only a temporary phase. The time must come when the League can fix armaments at a level to be determined by mutual agreement.

The League has promoted international solidarity and encouraged most useful reforms in the non-political field. It "embodies the only known method of handling international problems, in all their apparent complexity, in an orderly, just, wise and effective manner. A little more education of the rising generation, and this truth will be everywhere recognised." *

* The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations. (1935), p. 195.

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